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69 Commits
04b3e1f40b ... c4df2e6da2

Author SHA1 Message Date
rustdesk
c4df2e6da2 connection: bind the port-forward multiplex flag into the login scope digest 
The hbb_common bump brings `PortForward.multiplex`, and the exhaustive
destructuring in login_scope_digest exists to force this decision on every
new field. A multiplexed tunnel takes its targets per channel rather than
from this login, so a retry that flips the flag asks for a different scope
than the one that was approved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:42:25 +08:00
rustdesk
b473977aa8 bump hbb_common: rebase onto main 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:36:41 +08:00
rustdesk
81b55dff24 port_forward: restore the ? the close removal left as a match 
Dropping the explicit close_webrtc() from the parse-error arm left a match
that only re-spells `?`; master just reworked this function, so the branch
now leaves port_forward.rs untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:36:41 +08:00
rustdesk
9eae353ee5 bump hbb_common: quiet the webrtc-rs warnings that describe the race's normal outcome 
Cancelling the transport that lost the race, and trickle checking before it
holds a pair, are what the design does on every session that connects - and
webrtc-rs reports both at warn, 90 lines of a 386-line controlled-side log,
beside connections that succeeded. agent_internal and peer_connection drop to
error; agent_gather keeps warn, since an unreachable STUN server is the one
upstream signal that explains a session which never connected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M54JAqUK4RynudFou89hod
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
a02063ece8 bump hbb_common: end the ICE forwarder at gathering complete, drop the closes Drop covers 
hbb_common now closes the local-candidate channel when gathering
completes, so the controlled side's forwarder in spawn_webrtc_answerer
ends there, and its signaling connection to hbbs with it, instead of
sitting on a socket hbbs closed at 90s idle for the rest of the session.
It also keeps the reassembly buffer across fragmented frames.

Stream closes the WebRTC peer connection on drop (hbb_common b0b624d),
so the close_webrtc() calls in port_forward and io_loop that sat
immediately before a return or the end of scope did nothing Drop was
not about to do, while the comments beside them still said a bare drop
leaked the pc. Remove both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
e677fd510a web: show the WebRTC toggle and transport in the web UI 
The web client now speaks WebRTC, but the desktop settings page hides
the punch options on web and the remote page opens without the session
tab that carries the transport name. Let the existing "Enable WebRTC P2P
connection" checkbox through on web (the other punch options stay
native-only), and add a Transport row to the quality monitor for WebRTC
sessions only (with "(TURN)" when ICE relayed), on every platform.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JXJJGEGdgu26wgCppvUXdZ
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
7280238993 bump hbb_common: decode TURN userinfo, add the webrtc_echo example 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JXJJGEGdgu26wgCppvUXdZ
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
019dd20b30 webrtc: take the fork's loss recovery for sending without a congestion window 
rustdesk-org/webrtc 825a0a48: without a congestion window a chunk is lost
once three chunks sent after its latest transmission are acked, counted in
send order so retransmitted chunks are covered too, and the fast retransmit
sends every lost chunk at once, as KCP nc=1 does; before, a lost
retransmission waited for T3-rtx. Also fixes the delayed SACK timer never
re-arming, the switch applying to established associations, T3-rtx
resending one chunk when the peer's window is full, and bounds new data to
1 MiB / 1024 chunks in flight like KCP's snd_wnd.

Simulated 35ms one-way, random loss both ways, 30 fps, frames later than
200ms out of 1200: 12 KB at 5% loss 996 -> 55 (KCP 61); 40 KB at 2% loss
1183 -> 20 (KCP 39).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
98c0401134 webrtc: send over SCTP without a congestion window, as KCP does 
The same link that streams over KCP crawls over WebRTC. webrtc-sctp runs
RFC 4960's AIMD: a fast retransmit halves cwnd, a T3 drops it to one MTU, and
slow start only rebuilds it while data is queued behind it. Where the loss is
random rather than congestion - a lossy long-haul link - the rate settles at
the Mathis ceiling MSS/(RTT*sqrt(p)) however idle the link is: about 1.3 Mbps
at 70ms RTT and 1% loss, 0.6 Mbps at 5%, while 1080p wants 2-5 Mbps. KCP's
turbo profile (nc=1) has no congestion window at all.

The fork now carries a switch that bypasses the two places gating sends on
cwnd, and hbb_common turns it on for every peer connection unless
`allow-webrtc-congestion-control` is set - the same opt-in KCP has in
`allow-kcp-congestion-control`, for the reason at `get_kcp_cc_enabled`.
Sender-side only; a browser or an older build on the other end interoperates.

Measured over a simulated link (35ms one-way, random loss both ways, 12 KB
frames at 30fps, 300 frames): at 1% loss the window stretches 9.9s of video to
20.7s with a mean latency of 5.5s; without it the stream stays realtime at a
mean of 113ms. At 3%: 47s and 15s against 10.2s and 290ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
3432b8bc30 hbb_common: bump to the webrtc branch rebased on main 
Picks up upstream's session-cache eviction by pc identity (#589, adopted without its
unused insert-path helper), the 90-day log retention, and the wlroots output fixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
fe1300584c tcp: repeat the punch across the controller's dial window 
The single punch leaves before hbbs has told the controller where to dial, so
it is never in flight at the same time as the controller's SYN: it opens our
NAT, meets nothing, and a gateway that answers it with RST takes the mapping
down with it, leaving the listener waiting on a hole that no longer exists.

Punch again while the controller may still be dialing, and race those punches
against the accept. That is two ways in where there was one: the mapping is
rebuilt if a RST took it, and once the controller sits in SYN_SENT one of the
punches meets its SYN and completes as a simultaneous open - which a punch sent
before the controller had been told anything never could. The crossing reaches
the punch rather than the listener because the two sockets share the address
but only the punch matches the four-tuple, which the tests now pin down.

There is no instant to aim at, and no window either. `Client::connect` sizes
the controller's dial only after our PunchHoleSent, from its own rendezvous
time and the direct failures it has recorded for us: CONNECT_TIMEOUT between
two known-asymmetric NATs that never failed, punch_time_used times three or
six otherwise, floored at a second - so a peer that failed once dials for a
second or two from then on, and none of that reaches this side. The repeats
therefore cover our own ceiling instead, CONNECT_TIMEOUT, which is exactly as
long as the accept has always been willing to take a connection through the
hole, and back off across it: dense at the start, where every window begins
and the short ones end, sparse afterwards, which is `punch_udp`'s shape for
the same reason. A window past that ceiling was lost before this change too,
and mostly to the controller's own kernel - Windows gives a SYN up at 21s,
Linux's next re-send after 15s is at 31s; a window short of it costs a few
SYNs to a port already closed.

No punch is cut on a per-attempt timeout; one in flight is bounded only by
the shared deadline plus PUNCH_GRACE. A punch is cancel-safe only while it is
still in SYN_SENT; once the controller's SYN has crossed it the socket is half
way through a handshake, and cutting it there cuts the connection the
controller is opening - whose `connect` has already returned, so that attempt
fails outright, there being no relay fallback after a failed TCP handshake. A
timer cannot tell the two states apart, and none is needed: a gateway that
answers with RST fails the connect at once and the loop punches again, while
one that drops the SYN in silence leaves the socket in SYN_SENT, holding the
mapping open while the kernel re-sends, which any SYN of the controller's then
crosses - a second punch has nothing to add. The deadline decides whether
another punch starts; one in flight runs a grace past it, enough for a
crossing begun just before it to complete. The last sleep is cut at the
deadline rather than run out past it, so the window ends on a punch given
that grace and not on a gap of up to the backoff ceiling: the controller's
window opened after ours, on the PunchHoleSent hbbs relayed, so one as long
as ours is still open through our tail.

Only the accept races the punch, never `accept_connection`: that one does not
return until the session it goes on to run has ended, so racing it would tear a
live session down.

Whichever arrives first is the one connection the request produces. `meta`
carries the control permissions hbbs granted for this one controller, so
serving the loser as well would hand them to a second peer - and nothing about
a connection tells the two apart before `create_tcp_connection` has spoken to
it, least of all its address: a carrier NAT shares one between subscribers,
and a NAT that pools its external addresses may dial us from a different one
than hbbs saw the controller through. So the address is not checked, as
`accept_connection` never checked it; the handshake says who arrived, and what
holds the invariant is that there is no second serve. Those
permissions are a ceiling and not a grant either way: `Connection` gates every
message on `authorized`, and latches the login scope of the first request it
accepts, so a peer that reached the hole still arrives with nothing.

The accept loops rather than taking a single connection, so that a transient
accept error does not spend the window the controller still has to arrive in.

libp2p's DCUtR reaches the same place by having both peers dial at one instant
agreed over the relay. Nothing we send reaches the controller directly, so we
cover its dial window rather than name an instant inside it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
6ffb506961 webrtc: skip the controller's ICE re-send instead of queueing it twice 
The controller sends every candidate twice, because the server's hop to a
peer registered over UDP can lose one. The ICE agent that dedups repeats
sits downstream of the answerer's queue, so the answerer paid for both
copies: a slot, a JSON parse, and the ICE agent's lock, once per repeat.

Remember a digest of what was queued and skip the repeat. Recorded only
once queued, so a candidate a full queue refused stays repairable by the
re-send.

The queue's depth is unchanged. A real peer gathers well under it - four
STUN servers, link-local IPv6 filtered, one component - and the drain
empties it as candidates trickle in, so what this removes is the redundant
work, not an overflow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
8f81561918 webrtc: correct the RTT variance floor to dcsctp's scaling 
The earlier commit took dcsctp's min_rtt_variance = 220 as a raw floor under
rttvar. dcsctp divides the option by kHeuristicVarianceAdjustment = 8.0 first,
a historical accident it kept because downstream users had measured good
values with it, so the intended floor is 27.5ms of variance contributing 110ms
to RTO. Flooring at 220 contributed 880ms instead, which on a 50ms path left
RTO within 7% of the 1000ms default this change exists to escape.

The fork also now records why T1/T2 share T3's RTO manager here, unlike
dcsctp's separate control timers: RTO_INITIAL is the T3 value for the first
DATA chunk, since no RTT sample exists before the first SACK.
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
093790875b udp: make the punch prove itself, and keep the listener answering 
punch_udp sent a zero-length datagram and called the hole open on whatever
arrived next. The rendezvous NAT test's own leftover replies satisfy that
immediately - connect() does not flush the receive queue - so the retry loop
never ran and success meant nothing. The dead socket then cost KCP its full
timeout to rediscover, which is how a failed punch came to take 18 seconds.

Probes now carry a magic and a 64-bit transaction id, and both ends answer
each other's probes, so returning is a fact: a reply echoing our own id is the
one thing that proves the pair carries traffic both ways. With failure now
distinguishable from 'not yet', the window drops from 20s to 3s.

Two asymmetries fall out of that:

Only the connector stops on its own acknowledgement, because only it has
something to send next. An acknowledgement proves our probe came back, not
that the peer's probe was answered - and after punch_udp returns nothing
answers probes any more, since KCP's io loop drops anything shorter than its
header. A listener that stopped there would go mute while a peer whose own
probe or answer was lost - the normal state of a hole still opening - kept
probing an endpoint that works, until it timed out.

So the listener stops on the peer's first real packet instead, and hands that
packet to KcpStream::accept as its init_packet: its arrival proves the pair as
well as an acknowledgement would, and KCP never retransmits its SYN.
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
c99ccdcb0d webrtc: take dcsctp's retransmission timings and IPv6-safe MTU 
webrtc-sctp ships RFC 4960's RTO.Initial/RTO.Min (3000/1000), TCP's values for
arbitrary public paths. On this workload they set the recovery time outright:
a request/response exchange keeps one chunk in flight, so no later SACK ever
raises miss_indicator to the 3 that arms fast retransmit, and the T3 floor is
the only way back. A single loss during a handshake or a first keyframe
therefore costs whole seconds.

The fork now carries dcsctp's numbers instead - the SCTP implementation Google
wrote to replace usrsctp for Chrome's WebRTC data channels, the same realtime
workload: rto_initial 500, rto_min 400, a 220ms floor under the RTT variance,
and mtu 1191. INITIAL_MTU 1228 plus DTLS/UDP/IPv6 overhead is 1313, past the
1280 minimum, so every full-size chunk fragmented on an IPv6 path.

Both patch entries move to the new branch, which also carries the Windows IPv6
byte-swap fix, so one rev matches the whole webrtc 0.13 stack.
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
e3ef5317c5 bump hbb_common: one STUN list, and drop the dead IPv4 half 
`test_ipv6` kept its own hand-written copy of the STUN servers. It now reads
`WebRTCStream::stun_servers()`, so an operator who points OPTION_ICE_SERVERS at their own
server gets it on both paths instead of one.

`test_bind_ipv6` sends nothing - `connect` only makes the kernel pick a route and a source
address - so the whole cost is DNS. It races the lookups rather than betting this host's
IPv6 support on whether the first entry happens to publish a AAAA where the user resolves
from; google's does not, from a Chinese resolver, and it was the entry being bet on.

`stun_ipv4_test`, `STUNS_V4` and `test_nat_ipv4` have had no callers since the punch stopped
taking its port from a second socket, and go.

`get_kcp_cc_enabled` reads the renamed option through `option2bool`, like every other one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
59b7987b1d bump hbb_common: name the family a WebRTC session runs over 
`stream_type` reaches the UI as the transport that won the race, and every other transport
already carries the family in that label - the v6 punch reports `IPv6`. WebRTC does not: one
label covers both families, and it is the one path whose real remote address can differ from
the rendezvous-observed one the session is identified by.

Refine it at the hand-off to the UI rather than at the source: five sites in client.rs
compare `typ == "WebRTC"`, so widening the label there would silently move control flow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
00005f6af5 bump hbb_common: drop link-local IPv6 from ICE gathering 
Also pin webrtc-util to a fork of 0.11.0 carrying a Windows IPv6 enumeration fix.
`ifaces` reads the adapter list's on-wire IPv6 bytes as host-order `[u16; 8]`, so on a
little-endian host every group comes out byte-swapped and unbindable: a peer's real
240e:369:9606:4600:f52a:7a8d:2530:4de0 is enumerated as e24:6903:696:46:2af5:8d7a:3025:e04d,
::1 as ::100 and fe80:: as 80fe::. Each fails to bind with WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL, so ICE gathers
no IPv6 host candidate at all on Windows - where a globally routable address is the one
NAT-free path a CGNAT'd peer has.

Never reported upstream; the unix twin of the same bug was fixed in webrtc-rs#475 (2023).
Fork: rustdesk-org/webrtc, branch rustdesk-patches, tag webrtc-util-0.11.0-win-ipv6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
6926ad290f bump hbb_common: record why WebRTCStream has no Drop 
Comment only. The absent impl keeps being proposed, so the reason it
cannot exist — and where ownership does live — is now on the type.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
ef642ae329 bump hbb_common: fix the SESSIONS leak the leak test was creating 
The zero-timeout cancellation in `test_cancelled_new_does_not_leak_the_pc`
is not guaranteed to win — the setup task can finish inside the single
poll it allows, and `new()` then returns a live stream that the test
discarded. `WebRTCStream` has no `Drop`, so that stranded its own pc in
SESSIONS and the test reported it as the cancelled attempt's leak.

Nothing in production was leaking. 24 tests now pass at 1, 2, 4, 8 and
default thread counts; `--test-threads=2` had failed every run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
fa48b3f88d bump hbb_common: sharpen the SESSIONS leak assertion 
The leak test waited for an instant with no new keys, which needs the
whole suite idle; it now watches for a key that outlasts its window,
which is what "leaked" means. `--test-threads=2` still fails: a real
entry survives the wait, and it is not the one this test creates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
d6a670e764 bump hbb_common: name the punch by every transport it carries 
`get_local_endpoint_trickle` became `local_endpoint() -> &str`, which
cannot fail, so both call sites lose an unreachable error arm — the
mediator's closed a pc against a failure that no longer exists.

`punch_type` named one transport, and picked it off `allow_tcp_punch`.
A round carries several at once — a NAT port and a v6 address and an
offer — and since the TCP punch became a switch it can carry none, so
one name had to misreport both: the logs of the round that broke WebRTC
read "#1 UDP punch attempt" while the request also carried the v6
address and the offer that was actually failing, and a round with
nothing to punch with was labelled "WebRTC". List them instead —
"UDP+IPv6+WebRTC" — and call the empty round "Relay", which is what it
can still end as and what `typ` prints for it.

The offer is moved into the request rather than cloned into it; that
was its last use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
39a266cfd5 bump hbb_common: keep ICE candidates out of the trickle offer 
The offer the punch request carries grew with ICE gathering, so the
rendezvous server's `PunchHole` datagram to a UDP-registered peer
fragmented and was dropped silently. The trickle endpoint is now taken
once at construction and carries no candidates — a fixed 673 bytes.

Both sides need this: the answer travels the same encoding path, and on
the UDP-punch route it rides a datagram of its own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
 2026-09-04 23:35:33 +08:00
rustdesk
1e00d09f84 feat: make the TCP punch a user option, with TCP as the backstop 
TCP punching was the one direct transport without a switch, while UDP,
IPv6 and WebRTC each had one. Add "Enable TCP hole punching" above the
UDP toggle on both desktop and mobile, default on — including on
self-hosted servers, since unlike the other three (whose default-off
there guards against an hbbs that cannot forward their fields) TCP
punching has always been supported by every server.

Turning all four off would leave no way to punch at all, so TCP runs
regardless in that case. That backstop keys off the switches alone: a
transport that is enabled but fails to materialize — no public v6
address, no NAT port, a failed offerer — is already covered by the
relay fallback for a round that ends up with no usable direct
transport. With the TCP punch off, the fallback request is skipped
too: it exists only to carry that punch, and would otherwise reach
connect() with nothing to try and merely open a second relay.

Known cost, unchanged behavior for the peer: the request carries no
field for this choice, so a peer that receives one with no udp_port and
no offer still punches a TCP hole and listens for a connection the
controller will not make. Representing the transport choice on the
wire needs a proto field and the server forwarding it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
7a0705bdad fix: give the UDP NAT test a real window when the TCP clock is faked 
The punch request carries udp_port only if the rendezvous server's
TestNatResponse has arrived, and the wait for it was bounded by
rtt / 2 — half the TCP connect time, on the assumption that TCP and
UDP round trips are comparable and the test, started earlier, has
already answered.

A transparent TCP proxy breaks that assumption: a TUN-mode VPN on the
host, or a redirect-mode proxy on the LAN gateway serving every device
behind it, completes the handshake locally in ~3ms while the real UDP
round trip is hundreds of ms. Log-confirmed against 5.161.65.208: ping
341ms, TCP connect 3.7ms, connect to a dead port there "succeeds" just
as fast. The window collapsed to ~1.5ms, udp_port stayed 0 on every
attempt, and UDP punch was never even requested — although UDP itself
passes such gateways untouched.

So use the TCP clock only when it is believable: below a plausible WAN
round trip it says nothing about the UDP path, and a flat ceiling
applies instead. The loop still exits the moment the port arrives, so
a genuinely nearby server pays nothing and only a UDP-dead network
waits out the ceiling — on the udp-carrying round alone, while the
parallel pure-TCP round is unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
bfd3a9d7d9 bump hbb_common: WebRTC peer connections own their I/O runtime 
Closing the controlling window left the controlled side waiting out
ICE decay — ~25-30s in the peer's log, its disconnected/failed ladder
running to completion — where TCP delivers a FIN at once. The session
end closed the pc by spawning onto io_loop's own
`#[tokio::main(flavor = "current_thread")]` runtime, which is dropped
the moment io_loop returns, and nothing after that call yields: the
task was never polled even once, so no DTLS close_notify ever left.

Every attempt to fix that on the caller's side failed the same way,
because the mismatch was never about where the close ran: a pc's UDP
sockets register with the reactor, and its ICE/DTLS/SCTP pumps spawn
on the runtime, that is current while it is built — so a pc created
by a session outlives the only runtime that can drive its I/O, and a
close driven anywhere else completes without reaching the wire.

The bump homes them where they can outlive any caller: WebRTCStream
builds on a process-lifetime runtime and every detached close runs
there as its own never-cancelled task. io_loop keeps its plain
close_webrtc() calls and only documents why nothing here may spawn or
await the teardown on the dying session runtime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
2786d12a28 webrtc: fix race edge cases that discard or mislabel a direct connection 
Three correctness fixes in the transport race, plus three convention
cleanups.

- race_transports_prefer_webrtc committed a relayed result while a direct
  attempt was still in flight: the others arm returned on
  webrtc_fut.is_none() even with an unfinished direct future, and the
  WebRTC-error arm returned a held relay without checking others_fut. A
  relay is now committed only when nothing direct can still arrive (or
  the window expires); a parked relay is also preferred over composing
  an error when both sides fail. Three regression tests, mutation-checked.

- connect()'s plain select_ok let a TURN-relayed WebRTC win as "first
  success", dropping still-racing UDP/IPv6 direct attempts and reporting
  the relayed pair as direct. It now runs through the same prefer-P2P
  race with each attempt carrying whether its path is direct, and the
  WebRTC future resolves is_relayed() so a TURN win is held behind
  direct attempts, not committed as one.

- The RelayResponse path kept direct == true when a WebRTC win's DTLS
  handshake failed and it fell back to relay, so the relay was reported
  P2P. Clear the flag with the transport switch.

- Trim the OffererGuard doc to the three-line max; move the new
  enable-webrtc localization key to the end of every lang list; the KCP
  option constant moved to hbb_common config::keys (0f663aa).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
cf9c94a677 webrtc: trim the comments to AGENTS.md length; drop is_direct_transport 
386 added comment lines down to 287 across client, mediator, kcp_stream
and common. Same rule as hbb_common 3d64e43: out go past-bug narration,
rejected alternatives, measurements and restatements of the code; the
non-derivable why stays.

is_direct_transport goes with them. Judging the race by a transport
label was replaced by the resolved direct flag, leaving it used only by
its own test — and, having been inserted between the doc comment and
race_transports_prefer_webrtc, it had also taken that function's
contract with it. Removing it reattaches the doc where it belongs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
db3830a781 webrtc: judge the race by the resolved path, not the label; bound the ICE queue 
Third review round. Two of these are regressions from the previous one.

- The RelayResponse race predicate was `is_direct_transport(result.2)`,
  which answers true for the label "WebRTC" - but WebRTC is only a
  direct path when ICE nominated a non-TURN pair. A TURN-relayed WebRTC
  result therefore committed instantly and cancelled the IPv6 attempt
  racing beside it, which is the same inversion the previous fix removed
  in the other direction. (That fix was also argued from a wrong premise:
  the site does carry an IPv6 future, pushed ~50 lines earlier than the
  relay one.) Each future now resolves whether its path is direct and
  the predicate reads that bool, matching the outer race, and the
  downstream recomputation goes away.

- policy_relay still folded in Config::is_proxy(), and that is what gets
  persisted into the peer's config as force-always-relay - so one
  session through a proxy pinned the peer to relay forever and disabled
  WebRTC for it, exactly the latch the previous round fixed for
  WebSocket. Split out peer_relay: the saved option or an explicit
  request for THIS peer, and the only part written back.

- The controlled side buffered remote ICE candidates in an unbounded
  channel while the controller caps the same buffer at 64, and draining
  one costs a JSON parse plus the ICE agent's lock. Whoever can reach a
  session's route could grow it without limit inside the long-lived
  service process. Bounded, with the overflow logged through the
  existing throttle.

- That route was also removed by key alone when an answerer finished, so
  a punch retry that built a fresh answerer under the same fingerprint
  had its live sender deleted by the previous one's cleanup - after
  which it received no candidates at all. Evict only our own sender, the
  way the session cache already guards the analogous case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
2befaa5b6a scrap/benchmark: give the Duration divisor an explicit u32 
The webrtc feature pulls time 0.3 into scrap's graph (hbb_common ->
webrtc -> webrtc-dtls -> der-parser -> asn1-rs), and that crate carries
an `impl Div<time::Duration> for std::time::Duration`. Orphan rules
allow it because the RHS is its own type, and trait impls are visible
across the whole dependency graph without a use, so std::time::Duration
now has two Div candidates. `yuv_count as _` casts to a plain inference
variable, which both candidates fit, so it stops resolving:

  error[E0282]: type annotations needed
    --> libs/scrap/examples/benchmark.rs:146:33

Only two of the four sites are reported - rustc emits one E0282 per
function body - so all four are annotated. The already-explicit
`as u32` at the hwcodec site and `start.elapsed() / cnt` are unaffected,
the latter because an integer literal's variable can only unify with an
integral type and rules the time impl out on its own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
b199024082 bump hbb_common: zero-copy receive for whole messages; document the single-reader lock 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
f578fa189f bump hbb_common: Stream closes its peer connection on drop 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
ed09f3cc76 webrtc: close without an await point; do not report an unknown path as direct 
- close_webrtc is no longer async (hbb_common 88f965f), so the ten call
  sites in port_forward and io_loop - all inside select! arms or futures
  the UI can abandon - can no longer be cancelled mid-teardown, which
  left the pc unclosable and its session entry stranded. Client's own
  spawn_close_webrtc went with it: the runtime-teardown guard it existed
  for now lives in close_detached, so both Drop paths share one
  implementation.

- webrtc_relayed() returns None when no candidate pair is selected or
  the pc closed under a concurrent teardown, and both call sites read
  that as "not relayed", i.e. direct. A TURN-relayed session could
  therefore be shown to the user as peer-to-peer. Claiming a direct path
  needs evidence of one, so an unknown answer now counts as relayed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
2657143712 fix three ways ws + WebRTC could not work in practice 
Review of #15684 and hbb_common#579. Each of these left the code reading
correct while the feature did not function.

- The RelayResponse race classified P2P with `result.2 == "IPv6"`, but
  that site's futures are only ever the relay ("Relay"/"WebSocket") and
  the WebRTC branch's own "WebRTC" — so the predicate was constantly
  false. When the relay landed first the result was still right (the
  webrtc arm's `others_fut.is_none()` fallback), but when WebRTC
  connected FIRST it was parked as if it were a relay and the relay was
  committed on arrival, discarding a live direct connection. That is the
  LAN case: the better the network, the worse the outcome. Classify by
  what the label means, via is_direct_transport, and test both orderings
  — only the relay-first one was covered.

- handle_peer_info wrote "force-always-relay=Y" into the peer's saved
  config whenever force_relay was set, which now includes the WebSocket
  transport. One ws session therefore turned the peer into a permanent
  relay-by-policy peer, and relay-by-policy means Relay-only ICE, so
  WebRTC could never go direct to it again — the flagship path worked
  exactly once. Persist policy_relay, which is the user's choice; the
  transport is a property of this client, not of the peer.

- The answerer gated on this machine's enable-webrtc option, but that is
  LocalConfig: the UI process writes it and never syncs it over IPC,
  while handle_punch_hole runs in the server process, which on Windows
  resolves LocalConfig under a different profile and reads the
  private-server default of "N". The gate refused to answer in exactly
  the self-hosted deployments the transport exists for. Drop it: the
  answerer follows the request, like the udp/ipv6 legs, and the option
  still gates the feature where it can — an offer only exists because
  some controller had it enabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
51bbaa3f17 android: define getifaddrs/freeifaddrs for the api-21 sysroot 
Turning on hbb_common's "webrtc" feature pulls webrtc-util into the android
link, and its ifaces() -- reached from vnet::Net::new() on every ICE gather --
calls getifaddrs(). bionic exports getifaddrs/freeifaddrs only from API 24,
while flutter/ndk_*.sh builds against --platform 21, so every abi failed to
link on the undefined symbols.

Raising the platform to 24 would have to drag minSdkVersion 22 with it and
turn the link error into a load-time one on Android 5.1/6.0, so define the
two symbols instead, using the RTM_GETLINK + RTM_GETADDR netlink dump bionic
itself uses. The definition also shadows bionic's on API >= 24 rather than
delegating to it, so the path that ships is the path every test device runs.

Checked against synthesised netlink dumps on the host -- link/address parsing,
prefix masks, point-to-point, ipv6 scope ids, malformed and truncated messages
-- under UBSan and byte-exact guard malloc, with a deliberately unsigned
remainder as the negative control.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
09e27370a3 kcp: make the congestion-control profile opt-in, not the default 
The branch had flipped KCP to nc=0 (built-in congestion window) for
every session. That is a transport-behavior change for all users made on
reasoning alone, and the reasoning does not decide it: which profile wins
depends on why packets are being lost.

nc=1 - what RustDesk has always shipped - never shrinks the send window,
so on a genuinely congested uplink it deepens the loss it is reacting to.
But nc=0's backoff is blunt: a fast retransmit halves the window while an
RTO sets cwnd = 1 outright (ikcp.c) and recovery slow-starts from one
packet, so on a link with random loss and no congestion - Wi-Fi
interference, a long-haul path - it reads loss as congestion and can
stall an interactive stream for seconds. That failure mode is also the
more visible one to a remote-desktop user.

No benchmark settles this either: a loopback A/B has no bottleneck queue,
hence no congestion to control, and would flatter nc=1 by construction.
Deciding it needs a shaped link or field data.

So keep the profile users already run and let the other one be asked for
("enable-kcp-congestion-control" = "Y"). Flipping the default later is a
one-line change once there is evidence. kcp-sys keeps its own test
covering the nc=0 path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
0412726a20 bump hbb_common: remaining webrtc review fixes 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
b319cef200 bump hbb_common: webrtc receive-path review fixes 
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
c81c85fb78 ipc/auth: replace the local throttle with the shared throttled_log! 
auth.rs predated hbb_common's LogThrottle and grew its own equivalent:
same shape (last_log_at + suppressed), same 5s interval, plus a helper
and three OnceLock<Mutex<..>> statics. It also counted the other way -
excluding the event being reported - so each of the three sites carried
two near-identical log::warn! arms to avoid printing "suppressed 0".

The shared macro covers all of it: one static per call site declared by
the expansion, and the multiplicity suffix appears only when there is
one, which is what those duplicated arms were for. 102 lines out, 27 in.

Behavior difference, deliberate: a burst now reads "(x47)" - the total
including this line - instead of "(suppressed 46 similar events)". One
number, no arithmetic, and one convention across the codebase.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
553d66035e kcp: client-side integration tests over real loopback sockets 
kcp-sys has been through two review rounds of behavioral fixes; the
client wrapper (kcp_io pumps, connect/accept deadlines, framed-stream
adaptation, guard lifetimes) had no tests pinning what rustdesk actually
relies on. Four now do, each through real 127.0.0.1 UDP sockets and the
BytesCodec framing sessions use:

- handshake + bidirectional framed roundtrip + graceful close: the peer
  observes end-of-stream instead of hanging (guard outlives the framed
  stream so the FIN goes out);
- a writer that queues 50 frames and closes immediately loses none of
  them - the client-side pin for the close-tail-drain semantics;
- socket errors after the peer vanishes are treated as loss: writes keep
  succeeding, nothing tears down (ICMP is advisory on connected UDP);
- the connect deadline holds when nothing answers.

Mutation-checked: dropping inbound forwarding in kcp_io reddens exactly
the three tests that need the pump, and the timeout test alone stays
green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
4ed2a60e35 add enable-webrtc option; gate test_ipv6 under forced relay 
OPTION_ENABLE_WEBRTC (hbb_common 48c2d4d) follows the udp/ipv6 punch
options end to end: default on against the public server, off against
private ones, same settings UI placement on desktop and mobile, and the
same bool2option local-option handling. Gates:

- controller: should_create_webrtc_offerer checks it first — no pc, no
  STUN/TURN gathering, no offer in the request;
- controlled: unlike the udp/ipv6 legs, which deliberately follow the
  request, answering builds a pc that gathers ICE from this host, so
  the answerer honors this machine's own switch too.

Translations for "Enable WebRTC P2P connection" added to all 50 lang
files next to the IPv6 entry (IPv6 and WebRTC are invariant terms in
the same grammatical slot in every one of them).

Also stop probing v6 reachability (test_ipv6) under any forced relay:
the v6 punch socket is never bound there, so the probe was wasted work
on every ws/proxy/relay connection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
305b3e5e48 ws: read the all-ICE declaration from the offer envelope, drop the proto field 
Companion to hbb_common 68d2729: the full-ICE declaration now lives as
an `ice_policy: "all"` key inside the webrtc:// envelope, so the request
assembly no longer sets webrtc_all_ice and the controlled side asks the
envelope (endpoint_declares_all_ice) instead of a PunchHole field. The
rendezvous server carries the offer opaquely — no forwarding to keep in
sync. Skew behavior is unchanged: an unmarked or unparseable envelope
reads as the old Relay-only semantics.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
5a790443a8 bump kcp-sys: 7 review fixes on rustdesk-patches (fa51c15 -> 023a006) 
Reverts the connect/accept/add_conn changes that regressed concurrent
connects (the state_map guard held across add_conn is load-bearing), states
the single-conn contract on KcpEndpoint so shared-endpoint behaviour stops
consuming review effort, pins the two invariants that keep truncated input
from aborting under panic='abort', and fixes three findings from external
review: sendwnd() echoing raw config instead of KCP's effective window (a
non-positive factory value stalled sending forever), the passive closer's
lost final FIN delaying EOF by up to ~20s, and the doubled window
overflowing for extreme factory values.

Lock-only change: cargo update -p kcp-sys also re-picked libloading's
windows-targets between two versions already present in the lock; that was
reverted to keep this commit to the one line it is about. cargo metadata
--locked passes on the result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
47b2c05e1d ws: decouple ICE policy from force_relay — full-ICE WebRTC over WebSocket 
WebSocket support folds into force_relay because a ws tunnel kills
classic TCP/UDP punching — but that conflated transport necessity with
relay policy, and the WebRTC decisions keyed off the merged flag: a ws
client built no offerer at all without TURN, and only a Relay-only-ICE
one with it. ws deployments could never reach a direct WebRTC
connection, which is exactly the path they are supposed to live on.

Split the flag. LoginConfigHandler now tracks policy_relay (the
force-always-relay option, an explicit relay request — /r ids and
retry-via-relay included — and proxy) separately; force_relay stays
policy_relay || use_ws() and keeps governing the classic paths, so
non-ws behavior is unchanged everywhere:

- the offerer's existence and ICE policy follow policy_relay: under
  pure ws the offer gathers every candidate type and may go direct;
  under relay-by-policy it stays Relay-only ICE, TURN-gated, exactly
  as before;
- the RelayResponse race applies the prefer-P2P window under ws (a
  direct ICE path is worth delaying an already-ready relay for) while
  policy relay keeps first-success semantics;
- the request carries webrtc_all_ice (hbb_common 64b54ab) so the
  controlled side knows the offer is full-ICE: it answers with full ICE
  and no TURN requirement, while offers without the bit keep today's
  relay-only answer path on every version-skew combination.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
120fc4f4c5 bump kcp-sys: 14 review fixes on rustdesk-patches (6e44b93 -> fa51c15) 
Picks up the handshake-recovery work plus the review round on top of it:
ABBA deadlock between the endpoint's two DashMaps, graceful-close tail
truncation, mid-stream hole on ikcp_send failure, FIN retransmission for
lost-FIN half-open hangs, SYN-ACK budget burned on dropped packets,
spurious ConnectTimeout after a completed handshake, accept-backlog
overflow stranding conns, aliasing UB in the output callback, and the
log-facade/throttling cleanup (per-packet sites no longer reach the
debug-level file logger, peer-rate warns throttled).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
55cbd1a218 chore: bump hbb_common — drop the reserved tag in PunchHole 
9ea5442..cdcfd8d. `requester_id = 11` never reached main or hbbs, so nothing has
written or read that tag and reserving it guarded a wire format that never
existed — inconsistent with this branch retyping IceCandidate's tag 2 in place.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
0e61153a94 chore: bump hbb_common to the fragment-framing fix 
b7f79c6..9ea5442 — reject a fragment header that is neither FRAG_END nor
FRAG_MORE, and a FRAG_MORE carrying no payload. The latter is the one nothing
downstream caught: it adds nothing to the reassembly accumulator, so the
MAX_FRAME_LENGTH cap never trips and WebRTCStream::next() spins for as long as
the peer keeps writing, with no error and no teardown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
65a819f9e2 fix: the KCP io throttle reset itself every cycle, so it never throttled 
The send and recv arms shared one counter, and an ICMP error on a connected
socket is reported once and then cleared — so the steady state is an
alternation: the send succeeds and clears the counter, the next recv reports
the error and finds the counter at 1, and logs. Every error still wrote a
line, at the ~100/s the previous commit set out to stop, while the
persistent-failure and recovery branches were unreachable.

Use one LogThrottle per direction instead of a hand-rolled counter. That
removes the shared state the bug lived in, drops a third throttling mechanism
in favour of the one already added, and leaves the surrounding `if let Err`
untouched rather than reshaping it into a match.

Also fix test_udp_uat's socket-error arm, the untreated twin of the punch_udp
site: it had no backoff at all, so a persistent error re-armed recv
immediately and spun the loop at CPU speed, one warn line per iteration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
3d5406aa1c fix: bound log volume on sites whose rate a peer or retry loop controls 
Debug output goes to the log file, so a site that fires per received message
or per retry lets someone else decide how much a machine writes to disk. The
WebRTC work added the first such sites.

- KCP io loop: absorbing ICMP errors as packet loss made a broken socket write
  ~100 lines a second for the 60s until the pong timeout reaps it. Log by run
  instead: one line when a run starts, one per ~5s while it persists so a stuck
  socket stays visible, and one on recovery with the total.
- punch_udp: the recv error retries every 10ms for up to MAX_TIME, so one line
  per occurrence wrote thousands per punch. Log the first, report the count in
  the timeout message.
- ICE candidate paths (client, mediator): the peer sets the candidate rate and
  the rendezvous route carrying them needs no prior punch, so throttle to one
  line a minute each with the suppressed count.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
c40cb2a93e fix: evict the oldest pending ICE candidate, not the newest 
Candidates arrive in gathering order — host, then srflx, then relay — so a
full buffer was discarding exactly the ones that traverse NAT while keeping
host ones that only work on a shared LAN. Evict from the front instead.

Also document why the controller's ICE bridge must not reconnect on error, in
contrast to the controlled side's per-candidate retry: its socket address is
the return route itself (mangled into PunchHole.socket_addr, echoed back in
IceCandidate.socket_addr, resolved through tcp_punch), so a reconnect would
arrive from an address no route points at, and the server drops the old entry
when the connection closes. Once it dies both directions are dead, and
abandoning WebRTC is the correct response rather than retrying.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
c631cdcf22 fix: don't let the preferred branch's own relay preempt a direct fallback 
race_transports_prefer_webrtc committed any success from its first argument
outright, on the assumption that it is the WebRTC connect. It is not: the call
site passes a whole punch attempt, which internally falls back to request_relay
when its direct transports fail. That relay was therefore committed instantly
while the offer-less fallback's TCP punch was still in flight — inverting the
preference this function exists to enforce, since the is_p2p predicate the
caller already supplies was applied only to the `others` branch.

Apply it to both branches: a direct result from either side still commits
immediately, and a relayed result from either side is held for the window so
the other side can land something direct. Also commit a held connection when
the surviving branch errors, which the previous code only did on the first
branch's failure path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
2f8c8704bb fix: carry switch_code through WebRTC relay fallbacks after rebase 
The rebase onto master (switch-code feature) added an 8th request_relay
parameter; pass the interface's switch code from both WebRTC->relay
fallback paths so a role-swap session survives the fallback. Also drop
a duplicate bindgen 0.72.1 entry the Cargo.lock merge produced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
b591eeaa76 fix: KCP/UDP resilience to ICMP resets; optional KCP congestion control 
- treat ICMP-driven UDP socket errors (WSAECONNRESET 10054 on Windows,
  ECONNREFUSED on Linux) as packet loss in punch_udp and the KCP pump
  instead of tearing the session down; KCP retransmits through them and a
  truly dead link is still reaped by the pong/app-level timeouts
- resolve STUN hostnames via tokio::net::lookup_host so DNS never blocks a
  runtime worker; fix the inverted non-IPv4 error message
- add enable-kcp-congestion-control option (default on): switch the turbo
  profile to nc=0 so brief loss on constrained links no longer spirals into
  stalls; sender-side only, no wire negotiation
- pin kcp-sys to the rustdesk-patches branch: upstream main lost the
  RustDesk patches on the EasyTier sync, and this branch also wires
  set_kcp_config_factory into connection setup, making the option effective

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:32 +08:00
rustdesk
21cdf4d0a1 feat: decouple WebRTC from UDP punch, route controlled signaling over TCP 
- the WebRTC offer now rides any punch request; only an offer-less request
  may close and reuse the rendezvous socket for TCP punching
  (request_allows_tcp_punch replaces the udp_port-based invariant), with a
  separate offer-less request racing as the TCP fallback
- WebSocket mode no longer disables WebRTC — ws only tunnels the
  signaling/relay legs while ICE stays the only P2P path there; SOCKS proxy
  still disables it (ICE would bypass the proxy and leak the real IP)
- controlled side: WebRTC-only punch replies and trickled ICE candidates go
  over dedicated TCP connections to the rendezvous server instead of the UDP
  mediator channel, for ws/TCP-only hbbs deployments; drop the now-redundant
  rz_sender plumbing and the 400ms candidate re-send on that leg
- guard is_udp handling against responses to requests that advertised no
  udp_port; skip the IPv6 socket bind under force-relay
- test_udp_uat: drop the STUN port race — the punch port must come from the
  rendezvous server's TestNatResponse observing this socket's mapping, a
  STUN probe from another socket can advertise an unreachable port
- bump hbb_common (webrtc 0.13 MSRV pin rationale + upgrade checklist docs)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
rustdesk
5ce320d1cd fix: preserve WebRTC transport preference 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
rustdesk
32ee0c19e3 feat: WebRTC transport racing, DTLS identity binding, and pc-leak fixes 
- prefer-P2P racing (race_transports_prefer_webrtc) across punch and RelayResponse; ICE bridge with 400ms candidate resend
- controlled-side answerer and ICE routing; sign local DTLS fingerprint into SignedId, controller verifies the binding fail-closed
- fix pc leaks: close_webrtc() on insecure-decline paths (io_loop, port_forward); compute direct before disarming the offerer guard
- point hbb_common to the WebRTC data-plane commit 9f5a296

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
rustdesk
0a135e0fae fix: route WebRTC ICE through rendezvous paths 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
rustdesk
d3d5690bbf feat: race WebRTC as a direct transport enhancement 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
rustdesk
7e80399689 feat: route WebRTC ICE on controlled side 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
rustdesk
777d6347e4 feat: add rendezvous WebRTC signaling fields 2026-09-04 23:35:31 +08:00
RustDesk
9a1c8da143 Agents regression surface (#16070) 
* AGENTS.md: require a regression-surface check before a change is done

The minimal-invasiveness rules say what to prefer; nothing made an
agent check the final diff against them, so a feature could still route
the old path through its new code while every principle was "followed".
This adds the gate: audit every modified existing path, keep feature-off
on the old code, report the regression surface, and treat an
unnecessarily rewritten legacy path as a review finding whatever the
tests say.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

* AGENTS.md: a scope check before shared code is touched

The minimal-invasiveness rules are principles; this adds the stop
condition that makes them mechanical. A fix for one path stays in that
path, and an unrelated caller needing a placeholder argument to satisfy
a changed signature is the signal that it did not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 19:50:43 +08:00
RustDesk
978c901f49 port forward: a login's target and challenge travel with its own accept (#16069) 
* port forward: mappings take turns at the window's login slots

A window's mappings log in concurrently, and each login is built from
the shared `LoginConfigHandler`: `create_login_msg` reads
`port_forward`, which `listen()` set before connecting, and
`handle_login_from_ui` reads `hash`, which the last `Hash` to arrive
set. Two mappings logging in at once could swap targets, bridging a
local socket to the other's target, and answer each other's challenge,
failing one login. The window's password prompt is broadcast to every
mapping, so one whose `Hash` had not arrived answered with whatever the
handler held.

Each mapping now fills `port_forward` and `hash` and sends its login
under a per-window turn lock, and keeps its own `Hash` beside the
connection: a password typed before it arrived is left to the mapping
that prompted, which stores the salted password in the shared handler
for the others to log in with.

The fix stays in `port_forward.rs`. `LoginConfigHandler` gains the lock
and a setter for its private `hash`; `Interface`, `Session` and the
login functions keep their signatures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

* port forward: the lock and the hash setter are crate-private; test the hash that arrives late on its real path

Both exist only so `port_forward.rs` can reach the handler's private
`hash`; neither is API.

The test for a password typed before a connection's hash ended by
answering the prompt again once the hash was there. What happens in the
code is that the hash's arrival runs `handle_hash`, which logs in with
the password the prompting mapping stored; the test now ends there, with
no preset password. Answering the prompt with one's own challenge while
the handler holds another's is a test of its own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

* port forward: a password typed before the connection's hash answers it when it comes

The previous commit dropped such a password, counting on the mapping
that prompted having stored it in the shared handler by the time this
connection's `Hash` arrived. The broadcast wakes both mappings at once
and `select!` picks between a ready `Hash` and a ready password at
random, so this one could reach `handle_hash` first, find the handler
empty, and prompt again.

The connection keeps the password until its `Hash` arrives and answers
with it then. `login_from_ui` takes the challenge it answers; the wait
is `connect_and_login`'s, in `hash_arrived`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 19:39:09 +08:00
RustDesk
d453a19601 AGENTS.md: require a regression-surface check before a change is done (#16068) 
The minimal-invasiveness rules say what to prefer; nothing made an
agent check the final diff against them, so a feature could still route
the old path through its new code while every principle was "followed".
This adds the gate: audit every modified existing path, keep feature-off
on the old code, report the regression surface, and treat an
unnecessarily rewritten legacy path as a review finding whatever the
tests say.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 18:31:31 +08:00
RustDesk
50c4e435de connection: apply the non-video send timeout once the type is known (#16063) 
* connection: apply the non-video send timeout once the type is known

`Connection::start` set the send timeout before the login request had
arrived, when `file_transfer`, `port_forward_socket` and `terminal` were
all still unset, so every connection got `SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO` (12 s) and
the `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` branch never ran. A file transfer, terminal or
port forward whose peer stopped draining for 12 s — a Wi-Fi roam, a VPN
reconnect — was dropped.

The type-specific timeout is now set in `on_message` right after the
login request's union has been matched; `start` keeps the video figure
for the login phase.

`SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` also drops from 120 s to 30 s, the same horizon as
the 30 s read timeout: the timeout wraps a single `send`, so it only
fires when the peer makes no progress at all for that long, and beyond
30 s the read check would declare the same peer dead anyway. The raw
port-forward pipe's write to its local target shares the constant and
moves with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

* connection: keep the raw port-forward local write at 120 s

`SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` also bounded `forward.send` in
`try_port_forward_loop`, the write to the local target, whose own idle
timeout is an hour. Lowering it to 30 s made a target that stops
draining for half a minute drop the whole tunnel. That write gets its
own constant at the value it always had.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

* connection: keep the non-video send timeout at its long-standing 120 s

Lowering `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` to 30 s was a policy change on top of the
bug fix, argued from the 30 s read timeout, which measures something
else and cannot even run while a send is blocked. The constant goes
back to `SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO * 10`, where it has been since 2021, and
the raw port-forward loop's local write shares it again. What remains
is the fix alone: the type-specific timeout is chosen once the login
request has said what the connection is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-04 17:12:24 +08:00
fufesou
d5c6d0f6b7 fix(custom client): msi update, preserve exe name (#16057) 
Keep the configured app name casing when renaming
the updated executable so legacy MSI custom actions
can terminate custom client processes.

Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
 2026-09-04 15:49:50 +08:00
Daniel Nylander
b6ff62c74b l10n: fill remaining Swedish entries (#16050) 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Nylander <github@danielnylander.se>
 2026-09-04 15:26:21 +08:00
fufesou
ba6de7990f fix(ci): ubuntu-22.04-arm, oom (#16056) 
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
 2026-09-04 15:16:33 +08:00
Joss Gray
a59ad333fc fix: delimit FFmpeg pkg-config option (#16055) 2026-09-04 15:16:00 +08:00
fufesou
82aa28f129 fix(ci): install CMake 4.3 for ARM64 vcpkg builds (#16044) 
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
 2026-09-03 19:28:54 +08:00
76 changed files with 3375 additions and 555 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files

17
.github/workflows/flutter-build.yml vendored
View File

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ env:
# https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/actions/runs/14414119794/job/40427970174
# 2. Update the `VCPKG_COMMIT_ID` in `ci.yml` and `playground.yml`.
VCPKG_COMMIT_ID: "9e593bb18ea69cc5095e012465dcd675a822ed0d"
VCPKG_CMAKE_VERSION: "4.3.0"
ARMV7_VCPKG_COMMIT_ID: "6f29f12e82a8293156836ad81cc9bf5af41fe836" # 2025.01.13, got "/opt/artifacts/vcpkg/vcpkg: No such file or directory" with latest version
VERSION: "1.5.0"
NDK_VERSION: "r28c"
@@ -1536,7 +1537,6 @@ jobs:
submodules: recursive
- name: Set Swap Space
if: ${{ matrix.job.arch == 'x86_64' }}
uses: pierotofy/set-swap-space@49819abfb41bd9b44fb781159c033dba90353a7c # v1.0
with:
swap-size-gb: 12
@@ -1571,6 +1571,15 @@ jobs:
name: bridge-artifact
path: ./
# vcpkg 2026.07.29's SPDX scripts require CMake 4.3+, but this ARM64 runner selects CMake 3.31.
- name: Install CMake for vcpkg on Linux ARM64
if: matrix.job.arch == 'aarch64' && env.UPLOAD_ARTIFACT == 'true'
run: |
python3 -m pip install --user "cmake==${VCPKG_CMAKE_VERSION}"
user_base="$(python3 -m site --user-base)"
"${user_base}/bin/cmake" --version
echo "${user_base}/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Setup vcpkg with Github Actions binary cache
if: matrix.job.arch == 'x86_64' || env.UPLOAD_ARTIFACT == 'true'
uses: lukka/run-vcpkg@b1a0dd252f06b9e25b3c022a9a03bd7a427fb6a2 # v11
@@ -2141,6 +2150,12 @@ jobs:
echo "Modified vcpkg.json for armv7 build:"
grep -A 2 -B 2 '"baseline"' vcpkg.json
- name: Set Swap Space
if: matrix.job.arch == 'armv7'
uses: pierotofy/set-swap-space@49819abfb41bd9b44fb781159c033dba90353a7c # v1.0
with:
swap-size-gb: 12
- name: Free Space
run: |
df -h

19
AGENTS.md
View File

@@ -74,6 +74,25 @@
* Accept a little duplication over a restructure. A new function that repeats a few lines of an existing one is a better diff than reshaping the original so both can share it.
* Put new logic in self-contained functions in the module it belongs to (platform-specific logic in `src/platform/`, with `use` inside the function body to avoid churning shared import blocks). Call sites in shared files (`src/tray.rs`, `src/core_main.rs`, `src/server/connection.rs`, …) should be thin one-line hooks.
### Scope check before touching shared code
* Before changing a shared trait, a shared struct, or the signature of a widely used function, check whether the bug or feature is specific to one path. If it is, keep the change inside that path unless that is impossible, and say in the PR why it was.
* If an unrelated caller needs `Default::default()`, `None`, or another placeholder solely to satisfy a signature you changed, the diff is too broad: stop and redesign.
* The expected shape of a fix is a new function in the feature's own module, plus at most a new field or a thin hook in the shared code it needs. Feature-specific state belongs beside the feature's existing state, not in a new abstraction every caller has to learn.
### Mandatory regression-surface check
Before considering any implementation complete, perform a minimization pass over the final diff.
* Inspect every modified existing file and every modified existing code path. Each must be strictly necessary for the requested change. Revert changes that are merely cleanup, refactoring, consistency improvements, or fixes for pre-existing issues.
* For new features, preserve the existing implementation path when the feature is disabled or unsupported whenever practical. `feature off` should run the old code, not a rewritten equivalent.
* Do not route existing behavior through a new abstraction merely to share code with the new feature. Prefer a parallel new function or a small amount of duplication over changing a proven existing path.
* Keep new implementation logic in new or feature-specific modules. Changes to shared/core files should normally be thin hooks, capability checks, or protocol plumbing.
* Do not fix unrelated pre-existing bugs in the same PR. Put them in a separate change unless they directly block correctness or security of the requested work.
* For submodule bumps, inspect the exact commit range and ensure unrelated changes are not being pulled into the parent PR.
* Before finalizing, explicitly report the regression surface: list the existing files and existing runtime paths whose behavior changed, and explain why each change is unavoidable.
* During review, treat an unnecessarily modified legacy path as a review finding even if tests pass and the rewritten behavior appears equivalent.
## Reviewing a PR
* Review only what the diff introduces. Verify ownership with `gh pr diff` before reporting a finding — if the offending lines are untouched context, it is a pre-existing problem, not this PR's.

302
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -753,24 +753,6 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.98",
]
[[package]]
name = "bindgen"
version = "0.71.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5f58bf3d7db68cfbac37cfc485a8d711e87e064c3d0fe0435b92f7a407f9d6b3"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.9.1",
"cexpr",
"clang-sys",
"itertools 0.12.1",
"proc-macro2 1.0.93",
"quote 1.0.36",
"regex",
"rustc-hash 2.1.1",
"shlex",
"syn 2.0.98",
]
[[package]]
name = "bindgen"
version = "0.72.1"
@@ -1161,30 +1143,6 @@ version = "0.2.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "613afe47fcd5fac7ccf1db93babcb082c5994d996f20b8b159f2ad1658eb5724"
[[package]]
name = "chacha20"
version = "0.9.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c3613f74bd2eac03dad61bd53dbe620703d4371614fe0bc3b9f04dd36fe4e818"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
"cipher",
"cpufeatures",
]
[[package]]
name = "chacha20poly1305"
version = "0.10.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "10cd79432192d1c0f4e1a0fef9527696cc039165d729fb41b3f4f4f354c2dc35"
dependencies = [
"aead",
"chacha20",
"cipher",
"poly1305",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "chrono"
version = "0.4.41"
@@ -1234,7 +1192,6 @@ checksum = "773f3b9af64447d2ce9850330c473515014aa235e6a783b02db81ff39e4a3dad"
dependencies = [
"crypto-common",
"inout",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2324,7 +2281,7 @@ version = "0.5.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "330c60081dcc4c72131f8eb70510f1ac07223e5d4163db481a04a0befcffa412"
dependencies = [
"libloading 0.8.4",
"libloading 0.7.4",
]
[[package]]
@@ -2442,42 +2399,6 @@ dependencies = [
"linux-raw-sys 0.6.5",
]
[[package]]
name = "dtls"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f531dd7c181beaf3cebab3716afa4d0d41ab888be85232583f56bbaf07ca208a"
dependencies = [
"aes",
"aes-gcm",
"async-trait",
"bincode",
"byteorder",
"cbc",
"ccm",
"chacha20poly1305",
"der-parser",
"hmac",
"log",
"p256",
"p384",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"rcgen",
"ring",
"rustls",
"sec1",
"serde 1.0.228",
"sha1",
"sha2",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"tokio",
"webrtc-util",
"x25519-dalek",
"x509-parser",
]
[[package]]
name = "dtoa"
version = "0.4.8"
@@ -2863,7 +2784,7 @@ dependencies = [
"is-terminal",
"lazy_static",
"log",
"nu-ansi-term 0.49.0",
"nu-ansi-term",
"regex",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
]
@@ -3766,6 +3687,7 @@ dependencies = [
"mac_address",
"machine-uid",
"osascript",
"percent-encoding",
"protobuf",
"protobuf-codegen",
"rand 0.8.5",
@@ -4177,16 +4099,15 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "interceptor"
version = "0.15.0"
version = "0.14.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ea51375727680dc15f06e8ad90fa31df75d79dd030100e8ad60eef1c27fe2c98"
checksum = "1ac0781c825d602095113772e389ef0607afcb869ae0e68a590d8e0799cdcef8"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"bytes",
"futures",
"log",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"rtcp",
"rtp",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
@@ -4338,11 +4259,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "kcp-sys"
version = "0.1.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/rustdesk-org/kcp-sys#32a6c09fc6223f54aea83981a6aa8995931d29be"
source = "git+https://github.com/rustdesk-org/kcp-sys?branch=rustdesk-patches#023a0065398968989f2ddfcf5cc72bb886d02675"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"auto_impl",
"bindgen 0.71.1",
"bindgen 0.72.1",
"bitflags 2.9.1",
"bytes",
"cc",
@@ -4353,8 +4274,6 @@ dependencies = [
"thiserror 2.0.17",
"tokio",
"tokio-util",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"zerocopy 0.7.34",
]
@@ -4488,7 +4407,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e310b3a6b5907f99202fcdb4960ff45b93735d7c7d96b760fcff8db2dc0e103d"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
"windows-targets 0.52.6",
"windows-targets 0.48.5",
]
[[package]]
@@ -5210,16 +5129,6 @@ dependencies = [
"winapi 0.3.9",
]
[[package]]
name = "nu-ansi-term"
version = "0.46.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "77a8165726e8236064dbb45459242600304b42a5ea24ee2948e18e023bf7ba84"
dependencies = [
"overload",
"winapi 0.3.9",
]
[[package]]
name = "nu-ansi-term"
version = "0.49.0"
@@ -5883,12 +5792,6 @@ dependencies = [
"serde_json 1.0.118",
]
[[package]]
name = "overload"
version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b15813163c1d831bf4a13c3610c05c0d03b39feb07f7e09fa234dac9b15aaf39"
[[package]]
name = "owned_ttf_parser"
version = "0.25.1"
@@ -6277,17 +6180,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "poly1305"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8159bd90725d2df49889a078b54f4f79e87f1f8a8444194cdca81d38f5393abf"
dependencies = [
"cpufeatures",
"opaque-debug",
"universal-hash",
]
[[package]]
name = "polyval"
version = "0.6.2"
@@ -7094,9 +6986,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rtcp"
version = "0.14.0"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "81d30d1c4091644431c22acf9f8be6191b56805e0e977f15ca7104b4a6d6eaec"
checksum = "e9689528bf3a9eb311fd938d05516dd546412f9ce4fffc8acfc1db27cc3dbf72"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
@@ -7105,14 +6997,14 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "rtp"
version = "0.14.0"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2f126f38ea84c02480e32e547c1459a939052f74fb92117ac3eef23fdac6b023"
checksum = "c54733451a67d76caf9caa07a7a2cec6871ea9dda92a7847f98063d459200f4b"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"memchr",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"serde 1.0.228",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"webrtc-util",
@@ -7267,6 +7159,7 @@ dependencies = [
"terminfo",
"termios 0.3.3",
"tiny-skia",
"tokio",
"totp-rs",
"tray-icon",
"ttf-parser",
@@ -7547,11 +7440,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "sdp"
version = "0.10.0"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "32c374dceda16965d541c8800ce9cc4e1c14acfd661ddf7952feeedc3411e5c6"
checksum = "4cd277015eada44a0bb810a4b84d3bf6e810573fa62fb442f457edf6a1087a69"
dependencies = [
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"substring",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"url",
@@ -7781,15 +7674,6 @@ dependencies = [
"tzdb 0.5.10",
]
[[package]]
name = "sharded-slab"
version = "0.1.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f40ca3c46823713e0d4209592e8d6e826aa57e928f09752619fc696c499637f6"
dependencies = [
"lazy_static",
]
[[package]]
name = "shared_library"
version = "0.1.9"
@@ -8129,15 +8013,15 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "stun"
version = "0.9.0"
version = "0.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1a512c5d501e3e3b5a4bb3e8e31462d56d54a66b95a28b8596e14422bf21c32b"
checksum = "7dbc2bab375524093c143dc362a03fb6a1fb79e938391cdb21665688f88a088a"
dependencies = [
"base64 0.22.1",
"crc",
"lazy_static",
"md-5",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"ring",
"subtle",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
@@ -8519,16 +8403,6 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.98",
]
[[package]]
name = "thread_local"
version = "1.1.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8b9ef9bad013ada3808854ceac7b46812a6465ba368859a37e2100283d2d719c"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
"once_cell",
]
[[package]]
name = "threadpool"
version = "1.8.1"
@@ -8908,32 +8782,6 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b9d12581f227e93f094d3af2ae690a574abb8a2b9b7a96e7cfe9647b2b617678"
dependencies = [
"once_cell",
"valuable",
]
[[package]]
name = "tracing-log"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ee855f1f400bd0e5c02d150ae5de3840039a3f54b025156404e34c23c03f47c3"
dependencies = [
"log",
"once_cell",
"tracing-core",
]
[[package]]
name = "tracing-subscriber"
version = "0.3.19"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e8189decb5ac0fa7bc8b96b7cb9b2701d60d48805aca84a238004d665fcc4008"
dependencies = [
"nu-ansi-term 0.46.0",
"sharded-slab",
"smallvec",
"thread_local",
"tracing-core",
"tracing-log",
]
[[package]]
@@ -9048,9 +8896,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "turn"
version = "0.11.0"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "5ed995882f66ab94238de77c62e5e778389698ab700afa4696f4754da8f457cb"
checksum = "3f5aea1116456e1da71c45586b87c72e3b43164fbf435eb93ff6aa475416a9a4"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"base64 0.22.1",
@@ -9058,7 +8906,7 @@ dependencies = [
"log",
"md-5",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"ring",
"stun",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
@@ -9184,12 +9032,6 @@ dependencies = [
"unic-common",
]
[[package]]
name = "unicase"
version = "2.8.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "75b844d17643ee918803943289730bec8aac480150456169e647ed0b576ba539"
[[package]]
name = "unicode-bidi"
version = "0.3.15"
@@ -9335,12 +9177,6 @@ dependencies = [
"bindgen 0.65.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "valuable"
version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ba73ea9cf16a25df0c8caa16c51acb937d5712a8429db78a3ee29d5dcacd3a65"
[[package]]
name = "vcpkg"
version = "0.2.15"
@@ -9724,25 +9560,26 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webrtc"
version = "0.14.0"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "08fd686c0920ac08f3a57eacc48e31f0e4ca1ffefba4478784606f78c14e83ad"
checksum = "24bab7195998d605c862772f90a452ba655b90a2f463c850ac032038890e367a"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-trait",
"bytes",
"dtls",
"cfg-if 1.0.0",
"hex",
"interceptor",
"lazy_static",
"log",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"rcgen",
"regex",
"ring",
"rtcp",
"rtp",
"rustls",
"sdp",
"serde 1.0.228",
"serde_json 1.0.118",
@@ -9750,12 +9587,13 @@ dependencies = [
"smol_str",
"stun",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"time 0.3.36",
"tokio",
"turn",
"unicase",
"url",
"waitgroup",
"webrtc-data",
"webrtc-dtls",
"webrtc-ice",
"webrtc-mdns",
"webrtc-media",
@@ -9766,9 +9604,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-data"
version = "0.12.0"
version = "0.11.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "062a5438d63bb0756a221693d76cc0dd6119affee1dfdfe57abe3a2a8c8b3eea"
checksum = "4e97b932854da633a767eff0cc805425a2222fc6481e96f463e57b015d949d1d"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"log",
@@ -9780,17 +9618,54 @@ dependencies = [
]
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-ice"
version = "0.14.0"
name = "webrtc-dtls"
version = "0.12.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "69cb13fd1a373e68addc4bba0c8ca058627518e54342583d024bdcbb8ae5d97d"
checksum = "5ccbe4d9049390ab52695c3646c1395c877e16c15fb05d3bda8eee0c7351711c"
dependencies = [
"aes",
"aes-gcm",
"async-trait",
"bincode",
"byteorder",
"cbc",
"ccm",
"der-parser",
"hkdf",
"hmac",
"log",
"p256",
"p384",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.8.5",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"rcgen",
"ring",
"rustls",
"sec1",
"serde 1.0.228",
"sha1",
"sha2",
"subtle",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"tokio",
"webrtc-util",
"x25519-dalek",
"x509-parser",
]
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-ice"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "eb51bde0d790f109a15bfe4d04f1b56fb51d567da231643cb3f21bb74d678997"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-trait",
"crc",
"log",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"serde 1.0.228",
"serde_json 1.0.118",
"stun",
@@ -9806,9 +9681,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-mdns"
version = "0.10.0"
version = "0.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a17279a067e75df72ce923fdeb7f04cd808f6f5aa4910dc6bcb4fbe66b396ace"
checksum = "979cc85259c53b7b620803509d10d35e2546fa505d228850cbe3f08765ea6ea8"
dependencies = [
"log",
"socket2 0.5.10",
@@ -9819,22 +9694,21 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-media"
version = "0.11.0"
version = "0.10.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "94a84c910fec0848fd5a0d8a5651e0ddbdedaf25a7d3ae3f0b15f71ac73a1773"
checksum = "80041211deccda758a3e19aa93d6b10bc1d37c9183b519054b40a83691d13810"
dependencies = [
"byteorder",
"bytes",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"rtp",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
]
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-sctp"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f985465467d8910c1f8ac4382cd64f83b1f6a1a75021a82b221546f6fb3b856f"
version = "0.12.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/rustdesk-org/webrtc?rev=825a0a4862818f74406d8e1cc25be72259228235#825a0a4862818f74406d8e1cc25be72259228235"
dependencies = [
"arc-swap",
"async-trait",
@@ -9842,7 +9716,7 @@ dependencies = [
"crc",
"log",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"tokio",
"webrtc-util",
@@ -9850,9 +9724,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-srtp"
version = "0.16.0"
version = "0.15.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "66d8cdc33413f1d0192670a80ce93d17cb78d57fe3a2414be30d6f6dff121123"
checksum = "01e773f79b09b057ffbda6b03fe7b43403b012a240cf8d05d630674c3723b5bb"
dependencies = [
"aead",
"aes",
@@ -9873,19 +9747,19 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webrtc-util"
version = "0.12.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d1c0c7e0c8f280f2bbfae442701465777ac07adaf46ce0c5863cd58e13fe472a"
version = "0.11.0"
source = "git+https://github.com/rustdesk-org/webrtc?rev=825a0a4862818f74406d8e1cc25be72259228235#825a0a4862818f74406d8e1cc25be72259228235"
dependencies = [
"async-trait",
"bitflags 1.3.2",
"bytes",
"ipnet",
"lazy_static",
"libc",
"log",
"nix 0.26.4",
"portable-atomic",
"rand 0.9.2",
"rand 0.8.5",
"thiserror 1.0.61",
"tokio",
"winapi 0.3.9",

15
Cargo.toml
View File

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ screencapturekit = ["cpal/screencapturekit"]
[dependencies]
async-trait = "0.1"
scrap = { path = "libs/scrap", features = ["wayland"] }
hbb_common = { path = "libs/hbb_common" }
hbb_common = { path = "libs/hbb_common", features = ["webrtc"] }
serde_derive = "1.0"
serde = "1.0"
serde_json = "1.0"
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ fon = "0.6"
shutdown_hooks = "0.1"
totp-rs = { version = "5.4", default-features = false, features = ["gen_secret", "otpauth"] }
stunclient = "0.4"
kcp-sys= { git = "https://github.com/rustdesk-org/kcp-sys"}
kcp-sys= { git = "https://github.com/rustdesk-org/kcp-sys", branch = "rustdesk-patches" }
reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["blocking", "socks", "json", "native-tls", "rustls-tls", "rustls-tls-native-roots", "gzip", "zstd"], default-features=false }
[target.'cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))'.dependencies]
@@ -215,6 +215,16 @@ exclude = ["vdi/host"]
# This allows building and running on systems without libxdo installed (e.g., Wayland-only)
[patch.crates-io]
libxdo-sys = { path = "libs/libxdo-sys-stub" }
# One branch off upstream v0.13.0, the tag whose crate versions match this stack.
# webrtc-util: reads the Windows adapter list's IPv6 addresses as host-order u16 groups, so every
# one comes out byte-swapped, fails to bind, and ICE gathers no IPv6 host candidate on Windows.
# webrtc-sctp: RFC 4960's 1s RTO floor makes a single loss cost 1-3s on a link whose RTT is 24-64ms,
# and fast retransmit cannot cover a request/response exchange; INITIAL_MTU 1228 also fragments on
# IPv6; and its AIMD pins a lossy long-haul link to MSS/(RTT*sqrt(p)), so a switch sends without
# a congestion window, as KCP does - on by default, `allow-webrtc-congestion-control` opts back in.
# Pinned by rev, not branch: a fork branch can be rewritten out from under the lockfile.
webrtc-util = { git = "https://github.com/rustdesk-org/webrtc", rev = "825a0a4862818f74406d8e1cc25be72259228235" }
webrtc-sctp = { git = "https://github.com/rustdesk-org/webrtc", rev = "825a0a4862818f74406d8e1cc25be72259228235" }
[package.metadata.winres]
LegalCopyright = "Copyright © 2026 Purslane Tech Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved."
@@ -234,6 +244,7 @@ os-version = "0.2"
[dev-dependencies]
hound = "3.5"
docopt = "1.1"
tokio = { version = "1.44", features = ["test-util"] }
[package.metadata.bundle]
name = "RustDesk"

12
build.rs
View File

@@ -43,6 +43,15 @@ fn build_manifest() {
}
}
// bionic only exports getifaddrs()/freeifaddrs() from API 24, while the jniLibs
// are built against the API 21 sysroot (flutter/ndk_*.sh). webrtc-util calls
// them, so without this the android link fails on undefined symbols.
fn build_android_ifaddrs() {
let file = "src/platform/android_ifaddrs.c";
cc::Build::new().file(file).compile("android_ifaddrs");
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed={}", file);
}
fn install_android_deps() {
let target_os = std::env::var("CARGO_CFG_TARGET_OS").unwrap();
if target_os != "android" {
@@ -89,5 +98,8 @@ fn main() {
build_mac();
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=framework=ApplicationServices");
}
if target_os == "android" {
build_android_ifaddrs();
}
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=build.rs");
}

3
flutter/lib/common.dart
View File

@@ -1633,7 +1633,8 @@ String bool2option(String option, bool b) {
String res;
if (option.startsWith('enable-') &&
option != kOptionEnableUdpPunch &&
option != kOptionEnableIpv6Punch) {
option != kOptionEnableIpv6Punch &&
option != kOptionEnableWebrtc) {
res = b ? defaultOptionYes : 'N';
} else if (option.startsWith('allow-') ||
option == kOptionStopService ||

3
flutter/lib/common/widgets/overlay.dart
View File

@@ -606,6 +606,9 @@ class QualityMonitor extends StatelessWidget {
_row(
"Codec", qualityMonitorModel.data.codecFormat ?? '-'),
_row("Chroma", qualityMonitorModel.data.chroma ?? '-'),
if (qualityMonitorModel.webrtcTransport != null)
_row("Transport",
qualityMonitorModel.webrtcTransport!),
],
),
)

2
flutter/lib/consts.dart
View File

@@ -166,10 +166,12 @@ const String kOptionAllowRemoveWallpaper = "allow-remove-wallpaper";
const String kOptionStopService = "stop-service";
const String kOptionDirectxCapture = "enable-directx-capture";
const String kOptionAllowRemoteCmModification = "allow-remote-cm-modification";
const String kOptionEnableTcpPunch = "enable-tcp-punch";
const String kOptionEnableUdpPunch = "enable-udp-punch";
const String kOptionEnableIpv6Punch = "enable-ipv6-punch";
const String kOptionAllowSyncClipboardBetweenSessions =
"allow-sync-clipboard-between-sessions";
const String kOptionEnableWebrtc = "enable-webrtc";
const String kOptionEnableTrustedDevices = "enable-trusted-devices";
const String kOptionShowVirtualMouse = "show-virtual-mouse";
const String kOptionVirtualMouseScale = "virtual-mouse-scale";

16
flutter/lib/desktop/pages/desktop_setting_page.dart
View File

@@ -563,6 +563,12 @@ class _GeneralState extends State<_General> {
kOptionDirectxCapture,
),
if (!isWeb && !incomingOnly) ...[
_OptionCheckBox(
context,
'Enable TCP hole punching',
kOptionEnableTcpPunch,
isServer: false,
),
_OptionCheckBox(
context,
'Enable UDP hole punching',
@@ -575,6 +581,15 @@ class _GeneralState extends State<_General> {
kOptionEnableIpv6Punch,
isServer: false,
),
],
if (!incomingOnly)
_OptionCheckBox(
context,
'Enable WebRTC P2P connection',
kOptionEnableWebrtc,
isServer: false,
),
if (!isWeb && !incomingOnly)
Tooltip(
message: translate('sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip'),
child: _OptionCheckBox(
@@ -584,7 +599,6 @@ class _GeneralState extends State<_General> {
isServer: false,
),
),
],
];
// Add client-side wakelock option for desktop platforms

70
flutter/lib/mobile/pages/settings_page.dart
View File

@@ -97,10 +97,12 @@ class _SettingsState extends State<SettingsPage> with WidgetsBindingObserver {
var _hideNetwork = false;
var _hideWebSocket = false;
var _enableTrustedDevices = false;
var _enableTcpPunch = false;
var _enableUdpPunch = false;
var _allowInsecureTlsFallback = false;
var _disableUdp = false;
var _enableIpv6Punch = false;
var _enableWebrtc = false;
var _isUsingPublicServer = false;
var _allowAskForNoteAtEndOfConnection = false;
var _preventSleepWhileConnected = true;
@@ -141,8 +143,10 @@ class _SettingsState extends State<SettingsPage> with WidgetsBindingObserver {
bind.mainGetBuildinOption(key: kOptionHideWebSocketSetting) == 'Y' ||
isWeb;
_enableTrustedDevices = mainGetBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableTrustedDevices);
_enableTcpPunch = mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableTcpPunch);
_enableUdpPunch = mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableUdpPunch);
_enableIpv6Punch = mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableIpv6Punch);
_enableWebrtc = mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableWebrtc);
_allowAskForNoteAtEndOfConnection =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionAllowAskForNoteAtEndOfConnection);
_preventSleepWhileConnected =
@@ -815,31 +819,65 @@ class _SettingsState extends State<SettingsPage> with WidgetsBindingObserver {
});
},
),
if (!incomingOnly)
SettingsTile.switchTile(
title: Text(translate('Enable TCP hole punching')),
initialValue: _enableTcpPunch,
onToggle: isOptionFixed(kOptionEnableTcpPunch)
? null
: (v) async {
await mainSetLocalBoolOption(kOptionEnableTcpPunch, v);
final newValue =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableTcpPunch);
setState(() {
_enableTcpPunch = newValue;
});
},
),
if (!incomingOnly)
SettingsTile.switchTile(
title: Text(translate('Enable UDP hole punching')),
initialValue: _enableUdpPunch,
onToggle: (v) async {
await mainSetLocalBoolOption(kOptionEnableUdpPunch, v);
final newValue =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableUdpPunch);
setState(() {
_enableUdpPunch = newValue;
});
},
onToggle: isOptionFixed(kOptionEnableUdpPunch)
? null
: (v) async {
await mainSetLocalBoolOption(kOptionEnableUdpPunch, v);
final newValue =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableUdpPunch);
setState(() {
_enableUdpPunch = newValue;
});
},
),
if (!incomingOnly)
SettingsTile.switchTile(
title: Text(translate('Enable IPv6 P2P connection')),
initialValue: _enableIpv6Punch,
onToggle: (v) async {
await mainSetLocalBoolOption(kOptionEnableIpv6Punch, v);
final newValue =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableIpv6Punch);
setState(() {
_enableIpv6Punch = newValue;
});
},
onToggle: isOptionFixed(kOptionEnableIpv6Punch)
? null
: (v) async {
await mainSetLocalBoolOption(kOptionEnableIpv6Punch, v);
final newValue =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableIpv6Punch);
setState(() {
_enableIpv6Punch = newValue;
});
},
),
if (!incomingOnly)
SettingsTile.switchTile(
title: Text(translate('Enable WebRTC P2P connection')),
initialValue: _enableWebrtc,
onToggle: isOptionFixed(kOptionEnableWebrtc)
? null
: (v) async {
await mainSetLocalBoolOption(kOptionEnableWebrtc, v);
final newValue =
mainGetLocalBoolOptionSync(kOptionEnableWebrtc);
setState(() {
_enableWebrtc = newValue;
});
},
),
SettingsTile(
title: Text(translate('Language')),

10
flutter/lib/models/model.dart
View File

@@ -3597,6 +3597,16 @@ class QualityMonitorModel with ChangeNotifier {
bool get show => _show;
QualityMonitorData get data => _data;
// Only a WebRTC session names its transport here: web has no session tab
// to show it on, and WebRTC is the one path that can be direct or TURN.
String? get webrtcTransport {
final ffiModel = parent.target?.ffiModel;
if (ffiModel == null) return null;
final streamType = ffiModel.cachedPeerData.streamType;
if (!streamType.startsWith('WebRTC')) return null;
return ffiModel.direct == false ? '$streamType (TURN)' : streamType;
}
checkShowQualityMonitor(SessionID sessionId) async {
final show = await bind.sessionGetToggleOption(
sessionId: sessionId, arg: 'show-quality-monitor') ==

2
libs/hbb_common

Submodule libs/hbb_common updated: 05ed68fed8...470612bdfb

8
libs/scrap/examples/benchmark.rs
View File

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ fn test_vpx(
println!(
"{:?} encode: {:?}, {} byte",
codec_id,
time_sum / yuv_count as _,
time_sum / yuv_count as u32,
size / yuv_count
);
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ fn test_vpx(
println!(
"{:?} decode: {:?}",
codec_id,
start.elapsed() / yuv_count as _
start.elapsed() / yuv_count as u32
);
}
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ fn test_av1(
assert_eq!(av1s.len(), yuv_count);
println!(
"AV1 encode: {:?}, {} byte",
time_sum / yuv_count as _,
time_sum / yuv_count as u32,
size / yuv_count
);
let mut decoder = AomDecoder::new().unwrap();
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ fn test_av1(
let _ = decoder.decode(&av1);
let _ = decoder.flush();
}
println!("AV1 decode: {:?}", start.elapsed() / yuv_count as _);
println!("AV1 decode: {:?}", start.elapsed() / yuv_count as u32);
}
#[cfg(feature = "hwcodec")]

2
res/vcpkg/ffmpeg/portfile.cmake
View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ if(VCPKG_HOST_IS_WINDOWS)
vcpkg_acquire_msys(MSYS_ROOT PACKAGES automake1.16)
set(SHELL "${MSYS_ROOT}/usr/bin/bash.exe")
vcpkg_add_to_path("${MSYS_ROOT}/usr/share/automake-1.16")
string(APPEND OPTIONS " --pkg-config=${CURRENT_HOST_INSTALLED_DIR}/tools/pkgconf/pkgconf${VCPKG_HOST_EXECUTABLE_SUFFIX}")
string(APPEND OPTIONS " --pkg-config=${CURRENT_HOST_INSTALLED_DIR}/tools/pkgconf/pkgconf${VCPKG_HOST_EXECUTABLE_SUFFIX} ")
else()
find_program(SHELL bash)
endif()

1328
src/client.rs
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

8
src/client/io_loop.rs
View File

@@ -185,6 +185,14 @@ impl<T: InvokeUiSession> Remote<T> {
.unwrap()
.set_connected();
let is_secured = peer.is_secured();
// Only WebRTC needs refining: its label names the transport that won the race,
// not the family ICE ended up nominating, and it is the one path where the two
// can disagree with the address the rendezvous observed.
let stream_type = if peer.webrtc_remote_ipv6().await.unwrap_or(false) {
"WebRTC/IPv6"
} else {
stream_type
};
self.handler
.set_connection_type(is_secured, direct, stream_type); // flutter -> connection_ready
if !is_secured

259
src/common.rs
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
future::Future,
net::{SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs},
net::SocketAddr,
sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock},
task::Poll,
};
@@ -1153,6 +1153,13 @@ pub fn is_public(url: &str) -> bool {
host == "rustdesk.com" || host.ends_with(".rustdesk.com")
}
pub fn get_tcp_punch_enabled() -> bool {
config::option2bool(
keys::OPTION_ENABLE_TCP_PUNCH,
&get_local_option(keys::OPTION_ENABLE_TCP_PUNCH),
)
}
pub fn get_udp_punch_enabled() -> bool {
config::option2bool(
keys::OPTION_ENABLE_UDP_PUNCH,
@@ -1167,9 +1174,19 @@ pub fn get_ipv6_punch_enabled() -> bool {
)
}
pub fn get_webrtc_enabled() -> bool {
config::option2bool(
keys::OPTION_ENABLE_WEBRTC,
&get_local_option(keys::OPTION_ENABLE_WEBRTC),
)
}
pub fn get_local_option(key: &str) -> String {
let v = LocalConfig::get_option(key);
if key == keys::OPTION_ENABLE_UDP_PUNCH || key == keys::OPTION_ENABLE_IPV6_PUNCH {
if key == keys::OPTION_ENABLE_UDP_PUNCH
|| key == keys::OPTION_ENABLE_IPV6_PUNCH
|| key == keys::OPTION_ENABLE_WEBRTC
{
if v.is_empty() {
if !is_public(&Config::get_rendezvous_server()) {
return "N".to_owned();
@@ -2126,11 +2143,21 @@ pub fn get_rs_pk(str_base64: &str) -> Option<sign::PublicKey> {
}
pub fn decode_id_pk(signed: &[u8], key: &sign::PublicKey) -> ResultType<(String, [u8; 32])> {
let (id, pk, _) = decode_id_pk_dtls(signed, key)?;
Ok((id, pk))
}
/// Like [`decode_id_pk`] but also returns the signed DTLS certificate fingerprint (empty string
/// for non-WebRTC peers), used to bind a WebRTC DTLS channel to the verified peer identity.
pub fn decode_id_pk_dtls(
signed: &[u8],
key: &sign::PublicKey,
) -> ResultType<(String, [u8; 32], String)> {
let res = IdPk::parse_from_bytes(
&sign::verify(signed, key).map_err(|_| anyhow!("Signature mismatch"))?,
)?;
if let Some(pk) = get_pk(&res.pk) {
Ok((res.id, pk))
Ok((res.id, pk, res.dtls_fingerprint))
} else {
bail!("Wrong their public length");
}
@@ -2432,16 +2459,26 @@ pub fn is_udp_disabled() -> bool {
Config::get_option(keys::OPTION_DISABLE_UDP) == "Y"
}
/// Run KCP with its congestion window (nc=0) instead of the turbo profile it has always shipped.
///
/// Opt-in: which profile wins depends on why packets are lost — nc=1 deepens real congestion,
/// while nc=0 reads random loss as congestion and its RTO backoff drops cwnd to 1. Undecidable
/// without a shaped link, so keep what users run today.
#[inline]
pub fn get_kcp_cc_enabled() -> bool {
let k = keys::OPTION_ALLOW_KCP_CC;
config::option2bool(k, &Config::get_option(k))
}
// this crate https://github.com/yoshd/stun-client supports nat type
async fn stun_ipv6_test(stun_server: &str) -> ResultType<(SocketAddr, String)> {
use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
async fn stun_ipv6_test(stun_server: String) -> ResultType<(SocketAddr, String)> {
use stunclient::StunClient;
let local_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0u16; 8], 0)); // [::]:0
let socket = UdpSocket::bind(&local_addr).await?;
let Some(stun_addr) = stun_server
.to_socket_addrs()?
.filter(|x| x.is_ipv6())
.next()
// Resolve via tokio so DNS never blocks the async runtime worker.
let Some(stun_addr) = tokio::net::lookup_host(&stun_server)
.await?
.find(|x| x.is_ipv6())
else {
bail!(
"Failed to resolve STUN ipv6 server address: {}",
@@ -2451,81 +2488,36 @@ async fn stun_ipv6_test(stun_server: &str) -> ResultType<(SocketAddr, String)> {
let client = StunClient::new(stun_addr);
let addr = client.query_external_address_async(&socket).await?;
Ok(if addr.ip().is_ipv6() {
(addr, stun_server.to_owned())
(addr, stun_server)
} else {
bail!("STUN server returned non-IPv6 address: {}", addr)
})
}
async fn stun_ipv4_test(stun_server: &str) -> ResultType<(SocketAddr, String)> {
use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
use stunclient::StunClient;
let local_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0u8; 4], 0));
let socket = UdpSocket::bind(&local_addr).await?;
let Some(stun_addr) = stun_server
.to_socket_addrs()?
.filter(|x| x.is_ipv4())
.next()
else {
bail!(
"Failed to resolve STUN ipv4 server address: {}",
stun_server
);
};
let client = StunClient::new(stun_addr);
let addr = client.query_external_address_async(&socket).await?;
Ok(if addr.ip().is_ipv4() {
(addr, stun_server.to_owned())
} else {
bail!("STUN server returned non-IPv6 address: {}", addr)
})
}
static STUNS_V4: [&str; 3] = [
"stun.l.google.com:19302",
"stun.cloudflare.com:3478",
"stun.nextcloud.com:3478",
];
static STUNS_V6: [&str; 3] = [
"stun.l.google.com:19302",
"stun.cloudflare.com:3478",
"stun.nextcloud.com:3478",
];
pub async fn test_nat_ipv4() -> ResultType<(SocketAddr, String)> {
use hbb_common::futures::future::{select_ok, FutureExt};
let tests = STUNS_V4
.iter()
.map(|&stun| stun_ipv4_test(stun).boxed())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
match select_ok(tests).await {
Ok(res) => {
return Ok(res.0);
}
Err(e) => {
bail!(
"Failed to get public IPv4 address via public STUN servers: {}",
e
);
}
};
}
async fn test_bind_ipv6() -> ResultType<SocketAddr> {
use hbb_common::futures::future::FutureExt;
let local_addr = SocketAddr::from(([0u16; 8], 0)); // [::]:0
let socket = UdpSocket::bind(local_addr).await?;
let addr = STUNS_V6[0]
.to_socket_addrs()?
.filter(|x| x.is_ipv6())
.next()
.ok_or_else(|| {
anyhow!(
"Failed to resolve STUN ipv6 server address: {}",
STUNS_V6[0]
)
})?;
// Nothing is sent - `connect` only makes the kernel pick a route and a source address - so any
// resolvable target answers equally and the whole cost is DNS. Race the lookups rather than
// walk them: this is awaited inline on the connection path, not every STUN host publishes a
// AAAA, and one resolver that hangs must not decide whether this host has v6.
let lookups = hbb_common::webrtc::WebRTCStream::default_stun_servers()
.into_iter()
.map(|stun| {
(async move {
let addr = tokio::net::lookup_host(&stun)
.await?
.find(|x| x.is_ipv6())
.ok_or_else(|| {
anyhow!("Failed to resolve STUN ipv6 server address: {}", stun)
})?;
Ok::<SocketAddr, hbb_common::anyhow::Error>(addr)
})
.boxed()
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let (addr, _) = hbb_common::futures::future::select_ok(lookups).await?;
socket.connect(addr).await?;
Ok(socket.local_addr()?)
}
@@ -2592,9 +2584,9 @@ pub async fn test_ipv6() -> Option<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
Some(tokio::spawn(async {
use hbb_common::futures::future::{select_ok, FutureExt};
let tests = STUNS_V6
.iter()
.map(|&stun| stun_ipv6_test(stun).boxed())
let tests = hbb_common::webrtc::WebRTCStream::default_stun_servers()
.into_iter()
.map(|stun| stun_ipv6_test(stun).boxed())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
match select_ok(tests).await {
@@ -2615,51 +2607,114 @@ pub async fn test_ipv6() -> Option<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
}))
}
// A punch packet carries a magic and a transaction id so a reply can be *proven* to answer this
// probe. The punch it replaces sent a zero-length datagram and called the hole open on whatever
// arrived next - which the rendezvous NAT test's own leftover replies satisfied instantly, so the
// retry loop below never actually ran and its success meant nothing.
const PUNCH_PROBE: [u8; 4] = *b"RDP?";
const PUNCH_ACK: [u8; 4] = *b"RDP!";
const PUNCH_PACKET_LEN: usize = 12;
fn punch_packet(tag: &[u8; 4], tid: u64) -> [u8; PUNCH_PACKET_LEN] {
let mut packet = [0u8; PUNCH_PACKET_LEN];
packet[..4].copy_from_slice(tag);
packet[4..].copy_from_slice(&tid.to_le_bytes());
packet
}
fn punch_tid(packet: &[u8], tag: &[u8; 4]) -> Option<u64> {
if packet.len() != PUNCH_PACKET_LEN || packet[..4] != tag[..] {
return None;
}
packet[4..].try_into().ok().map(u64::from_le_bytes)
}
/// Punch until one of our own probes is acknowledged. Both ends run this identically - each
/// probes, each answers the other's probes - and each returns only once a reply carrying its own
/// transaction id comes back, the one thing that proves the pair carries traffic both ways.
///
/// Returning is therefore a fact rather than a guess, which is what lets the caller stop instead
/// of handing a dead socket to a transport whose only way to discover the truth is to time out.
///
/// A datagram that is neither probe nor acknowledgement is returned rather than dropped: it means
/// the peer finished first and is already speaking KCP, whose SYN is never retransmitted.
///
/// Only the connector stops on its own acknowledgement, because only it has something to send
/// next. An acknowledgement proves our probe came back, not that the peer's probe was answered -
/// and after this returns nothing answers probes any more, since KCP's io loop drops anything
/// shorter than its header. A listener that stopped here would go mute while a peer whose own
/// probe or answer was lost - the normal state of a hole that is still opening - kept probing an
/// endpoint that works, until it timed out. So the listener stops on the peer's first real packet.
pub async fn punch_udp(
socket: Arc<UdpSocket>,
listen: bool,
) -> ResultType<Option<bytes::BytesMut>> {
let tid = ((hbb_common::time_based_rand() as u64) << 32) | hbb_common::time_based_rand() as u64;
let probe = punch_packet(&PUNCH_PROBE, tid);
let mut data = [0u8; 1500];
// `connect` does not flush the receive queue, so the NAT test's extra replies are still in it.
while socket.try_recv(&mut data).is_ok() {}
let mut retry_interval = Duration::from_millis(20);
const MAX_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(200);
const MAX_TIME: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
let mut packets_sent = 0;
socket.send(&[]).await.ok();
packets_sent += 1;
// Both ends start within one rendezvous round trip of each other and the acknowledgement is
// one peer round trip, so a pair that has not answered in this long is not going to. The old
// 20s came from having no way to tell "not yet" from "never".
const MAX_TIME: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3);
let mut probes_sent = 0u32;
let mut probes_seen = 0u32;
let mut acked = false;
let mut recv_errors = 0u32;
socket.send(&probe).await.ok();
probes_sent += 1;
let mut last_send_time = Instant::now();
let tm = Instant::now();
let mut data = [0u8; 1500];
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = hbb_common::sleep(retry_interval.as_secs_f32()) => {
if tm.elapsed() > MAX_TIME {
bail!("UDP punch is timed out, stop sending packets after {:?} packets", packets_sent);
bail!("UDP punch is timed out, {probes_sent} probes sent, {probes_seen} probes received, acked: {acked}, {recv_errors} recv errors absorbed");
}
let elapsed = last_send_time.elapsed();
if elapsed >= retry_interval {
socket.send(&[]).await.ok();
packets_sent += 1;
// Exponentially increase interval to reduce network pressure
retry_interval = std::cmp::min(
Duration::from_millis((retry_interval.as_millis() as f64 * 1.5) as u64),
MAX_INTERVAL
);
if last_send_time.elapsed() >= retry_interval {
socket.send(&probe).await.ok();
probes_sent += 1;
retry_interval = std::cmp::min(retry_interval.mul_f64(1.5), MAX_INTERVAL);
last_send_time = Instant::now();
}
}
res = socket.recv(&mut data) => match res {
Err(e) => bail!("UDP punch failed, {packets_sent} packets sent: {e}"),
Err(e) => {
// ICMP unreachable from the peer's NAT is expected while the hole forms and
// surfaces here as ConnectionReset/Refused; treat it as loss, MAX_TIME bounds
// the attempt. Log only the first - this retries every 10ms.
recv_errors += 1;
if recv_errors == 1 {
log::debug!("UDP punch recv error (treated as loss): {e}");
}
hbb_common::sleep(0.01).await;
}
Ok(n) => {
// log::debug!("UDP punch succeeded after sending {} packets after {:?}", packets_sent, tm.elapsed());
if listen {
if n == 0 {
continue;
let ack = punch_tid(&data[..n], &PUNCH_ACK);
if ack == Some(tid) {
if !listen {
log::debug!(
"UDP punch confirmed in {:?}, {probes_sent} probes sent, {probes_seen} received",
tm.elapsed()
);
return Ok(None);
}
acked = true;
} else if let Some(peer_tid) = punch_tid(&data[..n], &PUNCH_PROBE) {
probes_seen += 1;
socket.send(&punch_packet(&PUNCH_ACK, peer_tid)).await.ok();
} else if ack.is_none() && n > 0 {
log::debug!(
"UDP punch confirmed by {n} bytes of peer data in {:?}, {probes_sent} probes sent",
tm.elapsed()
);
return Ok(Some(bytes::BytesMut::from(&data[..n])));
}
return Ok(None);
}
}
}

129
src/ipc/auth.rs
View File

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ use std::os::windows::io::AsRawHandle;
use std::{
fs,
path::{Path, PathBuf},
sync::{Mutex, OnceLock},
};
#[cfg(windows)]
use windows::Win32::{Foundation::HANDLE, System::Pipes::GetNamedPipeClientProcessId};
@@ -520,66 +519,17 @@ pub(crate) fn ensure_peer_executable_matches_current_by_fd(
#[cfg(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]
const UNAUTHORIZED_IPC_LOG_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
#[cfg(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]
#[derive(Default)]
struct UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle {
last_log_at: Option<std::time::Instant>,
suppressed: u64,
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]
impl UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle {
#[inline]
fn on_reject(&mut self, now: std::time::Instant) -> Option<u64> {
if let Some(last) = self.last_log_at {
if now.saturating_duration_since(last) < UNAUTHORIZED_IPC_LOG_INTERVAL {
self.suppressed += 1;
return None;
}
}
self.last_log_at = Some(now);
Some(std::mem::take(&mut self.suppressed))
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]
#[inline]
fn throttled_unauthorized_ipc_log(
throttle_cell: &OnceLock<Mutex<UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle>>,
emit: impl FnOnce(u64),
) {
let throttle = throttle_cell.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle::default()));
let should_log = match throttle.lock() {
Ok(mut throttle) => throttle.on_reject(std::time::Instant::now()),
Err(_) => Some(0),
};
if let Some(suppressed) = should_log {
emit(suppressed);
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]
#[inline]
fn log_rejected_service_connection(postfix: &str, peer_uid: Option<u32>, active_uid: Option<u32>) {
static LOG_THROTTLE: OnceLock<Mutex<UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle>> = OnceLock::new();
throttled_unauthorized_ipc_log(&LOG_THROTTLE, |suppressed| {
if suppressed > 0 {
log::warn!(
"Rejected unauthorized connection on protected service-scoped IPC channel: postfix={}, peer_uid={:?}, active_uid={:?} (suppressed {} similar events)",
postfix,
peer_uid,
active_uid,
suppressed
);
} else {
log::warn!(
"Rejected unauthorized connection on protected service-scoped IPC channel: postfix={}, peer_uid={:?}, active_uid={:?}",
postfix,
peer_uid,
active_uid
);
}
});
hbb_common::throttled_log!(
UNAUTHORIZED_IPC_LOG_INTERVAL,
warn,
"Rejected unauthorized connection on protected service-scoped IPC channel: postfix={}, peer_uid={:?}, active_uid={:?}",
postfix,
peer_uid,
active_uid
);
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
@@ -589,25 +539,14 @@ pub(crate) fn log_rejected_uinput_connection(
peer_uid: Option<u32>,
active_uid: Option<u32>,
) {
static LOG_THROTTLE: OnceLock<Mutex<UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle>> = OnceLock::new();
throttled_unauthorized_ipc_log(&LOG_THROTTLE, |suppressed| {
if suppressed > 0 {
log::warn!(
"Rejected unauthorized connection on uinput ipc channel: postfix={}, peer_uid={:?}, active_uid={:?} (suppressed {} similar events)",
postfix,
peer_uid,
active_uid,
suppressed
);
} else {
log::warn!(
"Rejected unauthorized connection on uinput ipc channel: postfix={}, peer_uid={:?}, active_uid={:?}",
postfix,
peer_uid,
active_uid
);
}
});
hbb_common::throttled_log!(
UNAUTHORIZED_IPC_LOG_INTERVAL,
warn,
"Rejected unauthorized connection on uinput ipc channel: postfix={}, peer_uid={:?}, active_uid={:?}",
postfix,
peer_uid,
active_uid
);
}
#[cfg(windows)]
@@ -620,31 +559,17 @@ pub(crate) fn log_rejected_windows_ipc_connection(
peer_is_system: Option<bool>,
peer_is_elevated: Option<bool>,
) {
static LOG_THROTTLE: OnceLock<Mutex<UnauthorizedIpcLogThrottle>> = OnceLock::new();
throttled_unauthorized_ipc_log(&LOG_THROTTLE, |suppressed| {
if suppressed > 0 {
log::warn!(
"Rejected unauthorized connection on ipc channel: postfix={}, peer_pid={:?}, peer_session_id={:?}, expected_session_id={:?}, peer_is_system={:?}, peer_is_elevated={:?} (suppressed {} similar events)",
postfix,
peer_pid,
peer_session_id,
expected_session_id,
peer_is_system,
peer_is_elevated,
suppressed
);
} else {
log::warn!(
"Rejected unauthorized connection on ipc channel: postfix={}, peer_pid={:?}, peer_session_id={:?}, expected_session_id={:?}, peer_is_system={:?}, peer_is_elevated={:?}",
postfix,
peer_pid,
peer_session_id,
expected_session_id,
peer_is_system,
peer_is_elevated
);
}
});
hbb_common::throttled_log!(
UNAUTHORIZED_IPC_LOG_INTERVAL,
warn,
"Rejected unauthorized connection on ipc channel: postfix={}, peer_pid={:?}, peer_session_id={:?}, expected_session_id={:?}, peer_is_system={:?}, peer_is_elevated={:?}",
postfix,
peer_pid,
peer_session_id,
expected_session_id,
peer_is_system,
peer_is_elevated
);
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]

160
src/kcp_stream.rs
View File

@@ -19,7 +19,28 @@ pub struct KcpStream {
stop_sender: Option<oneshot::Sender<()>>,
}
const KCP_IO_ERR_LOG_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
static KCP_SEND_ERR_LOG: hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle =
hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle::new(KCP_IO_ERR_LOG_INTERVAL);
static KCP_RECV_ERR_LOG: hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle =
hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle::new(KCP_IO_ERR_LOG_INTERVAL);
impl KcpStream {
// Opt in to KCP's built-in congestion window (nc=0) instead of the pure turbo profile
// (nc=1) that has always shipped; see `get_kcp_cc_enabled` for why this is not the default.
// Sender-side only, so no wire negotiation is needed and either peer may run either profile.
// Requires kcp-sys from the `rustdesk-patches` branch, which wires the config factory into
// connection setup (on older revs the factory was stored but never consulted).
fn apply_kcp_config(endpoint: &mut KcpEndpoint) {
if crate::get_kcp_cc_enabled() {
endpoint.set_kcp_config_factory(Box::new(|conv| {
let mut config = kcp_sys::ffi_safe::KcpConfig::new_turbo(conv);
config.nc = Some(0);
config
}));
}
}
fn create_framed(stream: stream::KcpStream, local_addr: Option<SocketAddr>) -> Stream {
Stream::Tcp(FramedStream(
tokio_util::codec::Framed::new(DynTcpStream(Box::new(stream)), BytesCodec::new()),
@@ -35,6 +56,7 @@ impl KcpStream {
init_packet: Option<BytesMut>,
) -> ResultType<(Self, Stream)> {
let mut endpoint = KcpEndpoint::new();
Self::apply_kcp_config(&mut endpoint);
endpoint.run().await;
let (input, output) = (
@@ -70,6 +92,7 @@ impl KcpStream {
timeout: std::time::Duration,
) -> ResultType<(Self, Stream)> {
let mut endpoint = KcpEndpoint::new();
Self::apply_kcp_config(&mut endpoint);
endpoint.run().await;
let (input, output) = (
@@ -104,6 +127,10 @@ impl KcpStream {
let udp = udp_socket.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0; 1500];
// Socket errors are ICMP unreachable on a connected UDP socket — advisory, and
// routine while a hole forms — so treat them as loss and let KCP's pong timeout reap
// a link that is really dead. One throttle PER DIRECTION: the error is reported once
// and cleared, so send-ok/recv-err alternates and a shared counter never fires.
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = &mut stop_receiver => {
@@ -112,8 +139,10 @@ impl KcpStream {
}
Some(data) = output.recv() => {
if let Err(e) = udp.send(&data.inner()).await {
log::debug!("KCP send error: {:?}", e);
break;
if let Some(n) = KCP_SEND_ERR_LOG.due() {
log::debug!("KCP send error x{n} (treated as loss), last: {e}");
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
}
}
result = udp.recv_from(&mut buf) => {
@@ -127,8 +156,10 @@ impl KcpStream {
.await.ok();
}
Err(e) => {
log::debug!("KCP recv_from error: {:?}", e);
break;
if let Some(n) = KCP_RECV_ERR_LOG.due() {
log::debug!("KCP recv error x{n} (treated as loss), last: {e}");
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
}
}
}
@@ -149,3 +180,124 @@ impl Drop for KcpStream {
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::time::Duration;
async fn connected_pair() -> (Arc<UdpSocket>, Arc<UdpSocket>) {
let a = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let b = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
a.connect(b.local_addr().unwrap()).await.unwrap();
b.connect(a.local_addr().unwrap()).await.unwrap();
(Arc::new(a), Arc::new(b))
}
async fn establish() -> ((KcpStream, Stream), (KcpStream, Stream)) {
let (a, b) = connected_pair().await;
let (accept_res, connect_res) = tokio::join!(
KcpStream::accept(b, Duration::from_secs(5), None),
KcpStream::connect(a, Duration::from_secs(5))
);
(
connect_res.expect("connect over loopback"),
accept_res.expect("accept over loopback"),
)
}
// The full client path over real loopback sockets: handshake through the kcp_io
// pumps, framed data both ways, then a graceful close. The endpoint guard stays
// alive across the stream drop so the FIN can go out, and the peer's framed
// stream must end (BrokenPipe from the kcp reader) instead of hanging.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_kcp_stream_loopback_roundtrip_and_close() {
let ((_guard_a, mut stream_a), (_guard_b, mut stream_b)) = establish().await;
stream_a
.send_bytes(Bytes::from_static(b"ping"))
.await
.unwrap();
let got = stream_b.next_timeout(5000).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(&got[..], b"ping");
stream_b
.send_bytes(Bytes::from_static(b"pong"))
.await
.unwrap();
let got = stream_a.next_timeout(5000).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(&got[..], b"pong");
drop(stream_a);
match stream_b.next_timeout(10_000).await {
None | Some(Err(_)) => {}
Some(Ok(data)) => panic!("unexpected data after close: {:?}", data),
}
}
// A writer that queues many frames and closes immediately must not cost the
// reader any of them: every frame arrives intact, in order, before end-of-stream.
// This is the client-side pin for the kcp-sys close-tail-drain semantics, through
// the real BytesCodec framing rustdesk sessions use.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_kcp_stream_close_delivers_all_frames() {
let ((_guard_a, mut tx), (_guard_b, mut rx)) = establish().await;
const N: usize = 50;
let payload = vec![7u8; 32 * 1024];
for _ in 0..N {
tx.send_bytes(Bytes::from(payload.clone())).await.unwrap();
}
drop(tx);
let mut got = 0usize;
loop {
match rx.next_timeout(10_000).await {
Some(Ok(data)) => {
assert_eq!(data.len(), payload.len(), "frame boundary broken");
assert!(data.iter().all(|&b| b == 7), "frame content corrupted");
got += 1;
}
// BrokenPipe (kcp reader end) or timeout-None both end the stream.
None | Some(Err(_)) => break,
}
}
assert_eq!(got, N, "graceful close lost frames");
}
// Socket errors on the connected UDP socket (ICMP unreachable after the peer
// vanishes) are advisory: the io loop must treat them as loss - keep accepting
// writes, keep running - rather than tearing the session down. Whether the OS
// actually surfaces ECONNREFUSED here is platform-dependent; either way the
// session must stay alive for this window.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_kcp_io_treats_socket_errors_as_loss() {
let ((_guard_a, mut stream_a), (guard_b, stream_b)) = establish().await;
// Kill the peer entirely: endpoint stops, socket closes.
drop(stream_b);
drop(guard_b);
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
for _ in 0..10 {
stream_a
.send_bytes(Bytes::from_static(b"into the void"))
.await
.expect("socket errors must be treated as loss, not stream failure");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
}
}
// The connect deadline must hold when nothing answers: no hang, prompt error.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_kcp_connect_timeout_without_peer() {
let (a, _b) = connected_pair().await;
let start = tokio::time::Instant::now();
let res = KcpStream::connect(a, Duration::from_millis(600)).await;
assert!(res.is_err(), "connect must fail with no peer endpoint");
assert!(
start.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(5),
"connect did not honor its deadline"
);
}
}

2
src/lang/ar.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "قفل اللوحة"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "مزامنة الحافظة بين الجلسات"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "النص أو الصور المنسوخة في جلسة بعيدة واحدة تُرسَل أيضًا إلى حافظة جلساتك المتصلة الأخرى."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "تمكين اتصال نظير إلى نظير عبر WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "تمكين تقنية حفر الثغرات عبر TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/be.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Заблакіраваць палатно"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Сінхранізаваць буфер абмену паміж сеансамі"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Тэкст або відарысы, скапіяваныя ў адным аддаленым сеансе, таксама адпраўляюцца ў буфер абмену іншых вашых падключаных сеансаў."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Выкарыстоўваць падключэнне WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Выкарыстоўваць TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/bg.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Заключване на платното"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Синхронизиране на клипборда между сесиите"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Текст или изображения, копирани в една отдалечена сесия, се изпращат и към клипборда на другите ви свързани сесии."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Позволяване на WebRTC P2P връзка"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Позволяване на TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ca.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Bloca el llenç"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincronitza el porta-retalls entre sessions"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "El text o les imatges copiats en una sessió remota també s'envien al porta-retalls de les altres sessions connectades."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Habilita la connexió WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Activa la perforació TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/cn.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "锁定画布"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "在会话间同步剪贴板"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "在一个远程会话中复制的文本或图片也会发送到其他已连接会话的剪贴板。"),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "启用 WebRTC P2P 连接"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "启用 TCP 打洞"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/cs.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Zamknout zobrazení"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synchronizovat schránku mezi relacemi"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Text nebo obrázky zkopírované v jedné vzdálené relaci se odešlou i do schránky ostatních připojených relací."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Povolit připojení WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Povolit TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/da.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Lås lærred"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synkroniser udklipsholder mellem sessioner"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Tekst eller billeder, der kopieres i én fjernsession, sendes også til udklipsholderen i dine andre forbundne sessioner."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Aktivér WebRTC P2P-forbindelse"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Aktivér TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/de.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Sichtfeld sperren"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Zwischenablage zwischen Sitzungen synchronisieren"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "In einer Remote-Sitzung kopierter Text oder kopierte Bilder werden auch an die Zwischenablage Ihrer anderen verbundenen Sitzungen gesendet."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC-P2P-Verbindung aktivieren"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP-Hole-Punching aktivieren"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/el.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Κλείδωμα καμβά"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Συγχρονισμός προχείρου μεταξύ συνεδριών"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Κείμενο ή εικόνες που αντιγράφονται σε μία απομακρυσμένη συνεδρία αποστέλλονται και στο πρόχειρο των άλλων συνδεδεμένων συνεδριών σας."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Ενεργοποίηση σύνδεσης WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Ενεργοποίηση διάτρησης οπών TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/eo.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Ŝlosi kanvason"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinkronigi poŝon inter seancoj"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Teksto aŭ bildoj kopiitaj en unu fora seanco ankaŭ sendiĝas al la poŝo de viaj aliaj konektitaj seancoj."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Ebligi WebRTC P2P-konekton"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Ebligi TCP-trapikadon"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/es.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Bloquear lienzo"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincronizar portapapeles entre sesiones"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "El texto o las imágenes copiados en una sesión remota también se envían al portapapeles de tus otras sesiones conectadas."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Habilitar conexión WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Habilitar perforación de agujero TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/et.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Lukusta lõuend"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sünkrooni lõikelaud seansside vahel"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Ühes kaugseansis kopeeritud tekst või pildid saadetakse ka teiste ühendatud seansside lõikelauale."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Luba WebRTC P2P-ühendus"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Luba TCP-augustamine"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/eu.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Blokeatu oihala"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinkronizatu arbela saioen artean"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Urruneko saio batean kopiatutako testua edo irudiak konektatutako beste saioen arbelera ere bidaltzen dira."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Gaitu WebRTC P2P konexioa"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Gaitu TCP zulo-egitea"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/fa.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "قفل کردن صفحه"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "همگام‌سازی کلیپ‌بورد بین نشست‌ها"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "متن یا تصاویری که در یک نشست راه دور کپی می‌شوند به کلیپ‌بورد سایر نشست‌های متصل شما نیز ارسال می‌شوند."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "فعال‌سازی اتصال همتا‌به‌همتای WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "فعال‌سازی تکنیک TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/fi.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Lukitse näkymä"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synkronoi leikepöytä istuntojen välillä"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Yhdessä etäistunnossa kopioitu teksti tai kuvat lähetetään myös muiden yhdistettyjen istuntojen leikepöydälle."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Ota WebRTC P2P yhteys käyttöön"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Ota käyttöön TCP hole punching tekniikka"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/fr.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Verrouiller la vue"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synchroniser le presse-papiers entre les sessions"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Le texte ou les images copiés dans une session distante sont également envoyés au presse-papiers de vos autres sessions connectées."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Activer la connexion P2P WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Activer le « hole punching » TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ge.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "ტილოს დაბლოკვა"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "გაცვლის ბუფერის სინქრონიზაცია სესიებს შორის"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "ერთ დაშორებულ სესიაში დაკოპირებული ტექსტი ან სურათები ასევე იგზავნება თქვენი სხვა დაკავშირებული სესიების გაცვლის ბუფერში."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P კავშირის ჩართვა"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP hole punching-ის ჩართვა"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/gu.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "કેનવાસ લોક કરો"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "સત્રો વચ્ચે ક્લિપબોર્ડ સિંક કરો"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "એક રિમોટ સત્રમાં કૉપિ કરેલ ટેક્સ્ટ કે છબીઓ તમારા અન્ય જોડાયેલા સત્રોના ક્લિપબોર્ડ પર પણ મોકલવામાં આવે છે."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P કનેક્શન સક્ષમ કરો"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP હોલ પંચિંગ સક્ષમ કરો"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/he.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "נעל לוח ציור"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "סנכרן לוח בין סשנים"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "טקסט או תמונות שהועתקו בסשן מרוחק אחד נשלחים גם ללוח של שאר הסשנים המחוברים שלך."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "אפשר חיבור WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "אפשר TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/hi.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "कैनवास लॉक करें"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "सत्रों के बीच क्लिपबोर्ड सिंक करें"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "एक रिमोट सत्र में कॉपी किए गए टेक्स्ट या चित्र आपके अन्य जुड़े सत्रों के क्लिपबोर्ड पर भी भेजे जाते हैं।"),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P कनेक्शन सक्षम करें"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP होल पंचिंग सक्षम करें"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/hr.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Zaključaj pozadinu"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinkroniziraj međuspremnik između sesija"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Tekst ili slike kopirani u jednoj udaljenoj sesiji šalju se i u međuspremnik vaših ostalih povezanih sesija."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Omogući WebRTC P2P vezu"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Omogući TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/hu.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Nézet zárolása"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Vágólap szinkronizálása a munkamenetek között"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Az egyik távoli munkamenetben másolt szöveg vagy kép a többi csatlakoztatott munkamenet vágólapjára is elküldésre kerül."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P kapcsolat engedélyezése"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP résszűrés engedélyezése"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/id.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Kunci kanvas"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinkronkan papan klip antar sesi"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Teks atau gambar yang disalin di satu sesi jarak jauh juga dikirim ke papan klip sesi terhubung Anda yang lain."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Aktifkan koneksi P2P WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Aktifkan TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/it.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Blocca tela"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincronizza gli appunti tra le sessioni"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Il testo o le immagini copiati in una sessione remota vengono inviati anche agli appunti delle altre sessioni connesse."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Abilita connessione P2P WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Abilita hole punching TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ja.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "キャンバスをロック"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "セッション間でクリップボードを同期"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "1つのリモートセッションでコピーしたテキストや画像は、接続中の他のセッションのクリップボードにも送信されます。"),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P 接続を有効化する"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP ホールパンチを有効化する"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ko.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "캔버스 잠금"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "세션 간 클립보드 동기화"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "하나의 원격 세션에서 복사한 텍스트나 이미지는 연결된 다른 세션의 클립보드에도 전송됩니다."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P 연결 사용"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP 홀 펀칭 사용"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/kz.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Кенепті құлыптау"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Сеанстар арасында көшіру-тақтасын синхрондау"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Бір қашықтағы сеанста көшірілген мәтін немесе суреттер басқа қосылған сеанстардың көшіру-тақтасына да жіберіледі."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P қосылымын іске қосу"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP hole punching'ті іске қосу"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/lt.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Užrakinti drobę"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinchronizuoti iškarpinę tarp seansų"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Viename nuotoliniame seanse nukopijuotas tekstas ar vaizdai taip pat siunčiami į kitų prijungtų seansų iškarpinę."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Įgalinti WebRTC P2P ryšį"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Įgalinti TCP gręžimą (hole punching)"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/lv.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Bloķēt audeklu"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinhronizēt starpliktuvi starp sesijām"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Vienā attālajā sesijā nokopētais teksts vai attēli tiek nosūtīti arī uz pārējo pievienoto sesiju starpliktuvi."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Iespējot WebRTC P2P savienojumu"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Iespējot TCP caurumu veidošanu"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ml.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "ക്യാൻവാസ് ലോക്ക് ചെയ്യുക"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "സെഷനുകൾക്കിടയിൽ ക്ലിപ്പ്ബോർഡ് സമന്വയിപ്പിക്കുക"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "ഒരു റിമോട്ട് സെഷനിൽ പകർത്തിയ ടെക്സ്റ്റോ ചിത്രങ്ങളോ നിങ്ങളുടെ മറ്റ് കണക്റ്റുചെയ്ത സെഷനുകളുടെ ക്ലിപ്പ്ബോർഡിലേക്കും അയയ്ക്കപ്പെടും."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P കണക്ഷൻ അനുവദിക്കുക"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP ഹോൾ പഞ്ചിംഗ് അനുവദിക്കുക"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/nb.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Lås lerret"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synkroniser utklippstavlen mellom økter"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Tekst eller bilder som kopieres i én ekstern økt, sendes også til utklippstavlen i de andre tilkoblede øktene dine."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Aktiver WebRTC P2P-tilkobling"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Aktiver TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/nl.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Canvas vergrendelen"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Klembord synchroniseren tussen sessies"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Tekst of afbeeldingen die in één externe sessie worden gekopieerd, worden ook naar het klembord van uw andere verbonden sessies gestuurd."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P-verbinding inschakelen"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP-hole punching inschakelen"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/pl.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Zablokuj ekran"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synchronizuj schowek między sesjami"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Tekst lub obrazy skopiowane w jednej sesji zdalnej są wysyłane także do schowka pozostałych połączonych sesji."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Włącz połączenie P2P WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Włącz tworzenie tunelu TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/pt_PT.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Bloquear tela"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincronizar área de transferência entre sessões"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "O texto ou as imagens copiados numa sessão remota também são enviados para a área de transferência das suas outras sessões ligadas."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Ativar ligação P2P por WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Ativar TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ptbr.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Bloquear tela"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincronizar área de transferência entre sessões"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Texto ou imagens copiados em uma sessão remota também são enviados para a área de transferência das suas outras sessões conectadas."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Habilitar conexão WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Habilitar TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ro.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Blochează ecranul"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincronizează clipboardul între sesiuni"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Textul sau imaginile copiate într-o sesiune la distanță sunt trimise și în clipboardul celorlalte sesiuni conectate."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Activează conexiunea P2P prin WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Activează traversarea TCP (hole punching)"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ru.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Заблокировать холст"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Синхронизировать буфер обмена между сеансами"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Текст или изображения, скопированные в одном удалённом сеансе, также отправляются в буфер обмена других подключённых сеансов."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Использовать подключение WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Использовать TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/sc.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Bloca sa tela"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sincroniza sa punta de billete intre is sessiones"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Su testu o is immàgines copiadas in una sessione remota sunt imbiadas fintzas a sa punta de billete de is àteras sessiones connètidas."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Abìlita connessione P2P WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Abìlita s'istampadura TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/sk.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Uzamknúť zobrazenie"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synchronizovať schránku medzi reláciami"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Text alebo obrázky skopírované v jednej vzdialenej relácii sa odošlú aj do schránky ostatných pripojených relácií."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Povoliť pripojenie WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Povoliť TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/sl.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Zakleni platno"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinhroniziraj odložišče med sejami"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Besedilo ali slike, kopirane v eni oddaljeni seji, se pošljejo tudi v odložišče vaših drugih povezanih sej."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Omogoči povezavo WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Omogoči preboj lukenj TCP"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/sq.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Kyç canvas"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinkronizo clipboard-in midis sesioneve"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Teksti ose imazhet e kopjuara në një sesion të largët dërgohen edhe në clipboard-in e sesioneve të tjera të lidhura."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Aktivizo lidhjen WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Aktivizo TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/sr.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Zaključaj pozadinu"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Sinhronizuj klipbord između sesija"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Tekst ili slike kopirane u jednoj udaljenoj sesiji šalju se i u klipbord vaših ostalih povezanih sesija."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Omogući WebRTC P2P konekciju"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Omogući TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

8
src/lang/sv.rs
View File

@@ -659,9 +659,9 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("screenshot-merged-screen-not-supported-tip", "Sammanslagning av skärmdumpar från flera skärmar stöds för närvarande inte. Byt till en enda skärm och försök igen."),
("screenshot-action-tip", "Välj hur du vill fortsätta med skärmdumpen."),
("Save as", "Spara som"),
("Export", ""),
("Export Logs", ""),
("Import Folder", ""),
("Export", "Exportera"),
("Export Logs", "Exportera loggar"),
("Import Folder", "Importera mapp"),
("Copy to clipboard", "Kppiera till urklipp"),
("Enable remote printer", "Aktivera fjärrskrivare"),
("Downloading {}", "Laddar ner {}"),
@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Lås canvas"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Synkronisera urklipp mellan sessioner"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Text eller bilder som kopieras i en fjärrsession skickas även till urklipp i dina andra anslutna sessioner."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Aktivera WebRTC P2P anslutning"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Aktivera TCP hålslagning"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/ta.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "கேன்வாஸைப் பூட்டு"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "அமர்வுகளுக்கு இடையே கிளிப்போர்டை ஒத்திசைக்கவும்"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "ஒரு தொலை அமர்வில் நகலெடுக்கப்பட்ட உரை அல்லது படங்கள் உங்கள் பிற இணைக்கப்பட்ட அமர்வுகளின் கிளிப்போர்டுக்கும் அனுப்பப்படும்."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P இணைப்பு இயக்கு"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP hole punching இயக்கு"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/template.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", ""),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", ""),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", ""),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", ""),
("Enable TCP hole punching", ""),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/th.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "ล็อคแคนวาส"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "ซิงค์คลิปบอร์ดระหว่างเซสชัน"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "ข้อความหรือรูปภาพที่คัดลอกในเซสชันระยะไกลหนึ่งจะถูกส่งไปยังคลิปบอร์ดของเซสชันอื่นที่เชื่อมต่ออยู่ด้วย"),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "เปิดใช้งานการเชื่อมต่อ P2P แบบ WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "เปิดใช้งาน TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/tr.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Tuvali kilitle"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Oturumlar arasında panoyu senkronize et"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Bir uzak oturumda kopyalanan metin veya görseller, bağlı diğer oturumlarınızın panosuna da gönderilir."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "WebRTC P2P bağlantısını etkinleştir"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "TCP delik açmayı etkinleştir"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/tw.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "鎖定畫布"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "在工作階段間同步剪貼簿"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "在一個遠端工作階段中複製的文字或圖片也會傳送到其他已連線工作階段的剪貼簿。"),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "啟用 WebRTC P2P 連線"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "啟用 TCP 打洞"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/uk.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Блокування полотна"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Синхронізувати буфер обміну між сеансами"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Текст або зображення, скопійовані в одному віддаленому сеансі, також надсилаються до буфера обміну інших підключених сеансів."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Увімкнути P2P-підключення через WebRTC"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Увімкнути TCP hole punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

2
src/lang/vi.rs
View File

@@ -763,5 +763,7 @@ pub static ref T: std::collections::HashMap<&'static str, &'static str> =
("Lock canvas", "Khóa khung hình"),
("Sync clipboard between sessions", "Đồng bộ clipboard giữa các phiên"),
("sync-clipboard-between-sessions-tip", "Văn bản hoặc hình ảnh được sao chép trong một phiên từ xa cũng được gửi đến clipboard của các phiên đã kết nối khác."),
("Enable WebRTC P2P connection", "Cho phép kết nối WebRTC P2P"),
("Enable TCP hole punching", "Bật TCP Hole Punching"),
].iter().cloned().collect();
}

404
src/platform/android_ifaddrs.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
/*
* getifaddrs()/freeifaddrs() for Android: bionic only exports them from API 24,
* while the jniLibs are built against the API 21 sysroot (flutter/ndk_*.sh) and
* webrtc-util calls them whenever WebRTC gathers ICE candidates.
*
* Only AF_INET and AF_INET6 entries are reported; the AF_PACKET ones the real
* getifaddrs() also returns have no reader in this build.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <ifaddrs.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
/* Refuse a single netlink datagram larger than this rather than grow forever. */
#define RD_NL_MAX_BUF (1024 * 1024)
/* A dump that never terminates must not hang the caller. */
#define RD_NL_MAX_DATAGRAMS 4096
typedef int (*rd_nl_cb)(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *ctx);
struct rd_link_info {
unsigned int index;
unsigned int flags;
char name[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
};
struct rd_link_table {
struct rd_link_info *items;
size_t len;
size_t cap;
};
/* One allocation per reported address; `ifa` first so freeifaddrs() can free
* the node it is handed. */
struct rd_ifaddrs_storage {
struct ifaddrs ifa;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_storage netmask;
struct sockaddr_storage ifu;
char name[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
};
struct rd_addr_ctx {
const struct rd_link_table *links;
struct ifaddrs *head;
struct ifaddrs *tail;
};
static void rd_parse_rtattr(struct rtattr *rta, int len, struct rtattr **tb, int max)
{
memset(tb, 0, sizeof(*tb) * ((size_t)max + 1));
for (; RTA_OK(rta, len); rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, len)) {
if (rta->rta_type <= (unsigned short)max && tb[rta->rta_type] == NULL)
tb[rta->rta_type] = rta;
}
}
/* `len` must stay signed: NLMSG_NEXT subtracts the *aligned* length, which
* overshoots on an unaligned trailing message, and only a negative remainder
* stops NLMSG_OK from reading past the buffer. */
static int rd_nl_parse(char *buf, int len, unsigned short reply_type, unsigned int seq,
rd_nl_cb cb, void *ctx, int *done)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)buf;
for (; NLMSG_OK(nlh, len); nlh = NLMSG_NEXT(nlh, len)) {
if (nlh->nlmsg_seq != seq)
continue;
if (nlh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_DONE) {
*done = 1;
return 0;
}
if (nlh->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR) {
struct nlmsgerr *err = (struct nlmsgerr *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
if (nlh->nlmsg_len >= NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*err)) && err->error != 0)
errno = -err->error;
else
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
if (nlh->nlmsg_type != reply_type)
continue;
if (cb(nlh, ctx) != 0)
return -1;
/* A non-multipart reply is the whole answer; nothing follows it. */
if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_MULTI) == 0) {
*done = 1;
return 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int rd_nl_dump(int fd, unsigned short request_type, unsigned short reply_type,
unsigned int seq, rd_nl_cb cb, void *ctx)
{
struct {
struct nlmsghdr nlh;
struct rtgenmsg gen;
} req;
struct sockaddr_nl kernel;
char *buf;
size_t cap = 8192;
int datagrams = 0;
int done = 0;
int rc = -1;
int saved;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
req.nlh.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.gen));
req.nlh.nlmsg_type = request_type;
req.nlh.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_DUMP;
req.nlh.nlmsg_seq = seq;
req.gen.rtgen_family = AF_UNSPEC;
memset(&kernel, 0, sizeof(kernel));
kernel.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
for (;;) {
if (sendto(fd, &req, req.nlh.nlmsg_len, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&kernel,
sizeof(kernel)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EINTR)
return -1;
}
buf = (char *)malloc(cap);
if (buf == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
while (!done) {
/* MSG_PEEK|MSG_TRUNC reports the datagram's real size, so an
* undersized buffer costs a resize instead of a silent truncation. */
ssize_t n = recv(fd, buf, cap, MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
goto out;
}
if ((size_t)n > cap) {
char *grown;
if ((size_t)n > RD_NL_MAX_BUF) {
errno = EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
grown = (char *)realloc(buf, (size_t)n);
if (grown == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
buf = grown;
cap = (size_t)n;
continue;
}
n = recv(fd, buf, cap, 0);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
goto out;
}
if (n == 0 || ++datagrams > RD_NL_MAX_DATAGRAMS) {
errno = EIO;
goto out;
}
if (rd_nl_parse(buf, (int)n, reply_type, seq, cb, ctx, &done) != 0)
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
out:
saved = errno;
free(buf);
errno = saved;
return rc;
}
static int rd_link_cb(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *ctx)
{
struct rd_link_table *t = (struct rd_link_table *)ctx;
struct ifinfomsg *ifi;
struct rtattr *tb[IFLA_IFNAME + 1];
struct rd_link_info *slot;
int payload;
int namelen;
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*ifi)))
return 0;
ifi = (struct ifinfomsg *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
payload = (int)nlh->nlmsg_len - (int)NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*ifi));
if (payload < 0)
payload = 0;
rd_parse_rtattr(IFLA_RTA(ifi), payload, tb, IFLA_IFNAME);
/* An interface we cannot name is of no use: callers dereference ifa_name. */
if (tb[IFLA_IFNAME] == NULL || (int)RTA_PAYLOAD(tb[IFLA_IFNAME]) <= 0)
return 0;
if (t->len == t->cap) {
size_t ncap = t->cap ? t->cap * 2 : 16;
struct rd_link_info *items =
(struct rd_link_info *)realloc(t->items, ncap * sizeof(*items));
if (items == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
t->items = items;
t->cap = ncap;
}
slot = &t->items[t->len];
memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot));
slot->index = (unsigned int)ifi->ifi_index;
slot->flags = ifi->ifi_flags;
namelen = (int)RTA_PAYLOAD(tb[IFLA_IFNAME]);
if (namelen > IFNAMSIZ)
namelen = IFNAMSIZ;
memcpy(slot->name, RTA_DATA(tb[IFLA_IFNAME]), (size_t)namelen);
slot->name[namelen] = '\0';
t->len++;
return 0;
}
static const struct rd_link_info *rd_link_find(const struct rd_link_table *t,
unsigned int index)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < t->len; i++) {
if (t->items[i].index == index)
return &t->items[i];
}
return NULL;
}
static void rd_fill_mask(unsigned char *out, int len, unsigned int prefix)
{
int i;
if (prefix > (unsigned int)len * 8)
prefix = (unsigned int)len * 8;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (prefix >= 8) {
out[i] = 0xff;
prefix -= 8;
} else if (prefix > 0) {
out[i] = (unsigned char)(0xff << (8 - prefix));
prefix = 0;
} else {
out[i] = 0;
}
}
}
static void rd_set_in(struct sockaddr_storage *ss, const void *addr)
{
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)ss;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr, 4);
}
static int rd_addr_cb(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *ctx)
{
struct rd_addr_ctx *c = (struct rd_addr_ctx *)ctx;
struct ifaddrmsg *ifa;
struct rtattr *tb[IFA_BROADCAST + 1];
struct rtattr *ra;
const struct rd_link_info *link;
struct rd_ifaddrs_storage *st;
int payload;
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*ifa)))
return 0;
ifa = (struct ifaddrmsg *)NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
if (ifa->ifa_family != AF_INET && ifa->ifa_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
/* Without the link entry there is no name, and callers deref ifa_name. */
link = rd_link_find(c->links, ifa->ifa_index);
if (link == NULL)
return 0;
payload = (int)nlh->nlmsg_len - (int)NLMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*ifa));
if (payload < 0)
payload = 0;
rd_parse_rtattr(IFA_RTA(ifa), payload, tb, IFA_BROADCAST);
/* On a point-to-point link IFA_ADDRESS holds the peer and IFA_LOCAL the
* local address; ipv6 only ever sets IFA_ADDRESS. */
if (ifa->ifa_family == AF_INET)
ra = tb[IFA_LOCAL] ? tb[IFA_LOCAL] : tb[IFA_ADDRESS];
else
ra = tb[IFA_ADDRESS] ? tb[IFA_ADDRESS] : tb[IFA_LOCAL];
if (ra == NULL)
return 0;
if ((int)RTA_PAYLOAD(ra) < (ifa->ifa_family == AF_INET ? 4 : 16))
return 0;
st = (struct rd_ifaddrs_storage *)calloc(1, sizeof(*st));
if (st == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return -1;
}
memcpy(st->name, link->name, sizeof(st->name));
st->ifa.ifa_name = st->name;
st->ifa.ifa_flags = link->flags;
st->ifa.ifa_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&st->addr;
st->ifa.ifa_netmask = (struct sockaddr *)&st->netmask;
if (ifa->ifa_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *mask = (struct sockaddr_in *)&st->netmask;
rd_set_in(&st->addr, RTA_DATA(ra));
mask->sin_family = AF_INET;
rd_fill_mask((unsigned char *)&mask->sin_addr, 4, ifa->ifa_prefixlen);
if ((link->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) && tb[IFA_ADDRESS] && tb[IFA_LOCAL] &&
(int)RTA_PAYLOAD(tb[IFA_ADDRESS]) >= 4 &&
memcmp(RTA_DATA(tb[IFA_ADDRESS]), RTA_DATA(tb[IFA_LOCAL]), 4) != 0) {
rd_set_in(&st->ifu, RTA_DATA(tb[IFA_ADDRESS]));
st->ifa.ifa_dstaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&st->ifu;
} else if (tb[IFA_BROADCAST] && (int)RTA_PAYLOAD(tb[IFA_BROADCAST]) >= 4) {
rd_set_in(&st->ifu, RTA_DATA(tb[IFA_BROADCAST]));
st->ifa.ifa_broadaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&st->ifu;
}
} else {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&st->addr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *mask = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&st->netmask;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, RTA_DATA(ra), 16);
/* A link-local address is not routable without its scope id. */
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&sin6->sin6_addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_MC_LINKLOCAL(&sin6->sin6_addr))
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ifa->ifa_index;
mask->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
rd_fill_mask((unsigned char *)&mask->sin6_addr, 16, ifa->ifa_prefixlen);
}
if (c->tail != NULL)
c->tail->ifa_next = &st->ifa;
else
c->head = &st->ifa;
c->tail = &st->ifa;
return 0;
}
void freeifaddrs(struct ifaddrs *ifa)
{
while (ifa != NULL) {
struct ifaddrs *next = ifa->ifa_next;
free(ifa);
ifa = next;
}
}
int getifaddrs(struct ifaddrs **ifap)
{
struct rd_link_table links;
struct rd_addr_ctx ctx;
int fd;
int saved;
if (ifap == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
*ifap = NULL;
memset(&links, 0, sizeof(links));
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.links = &links;
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_ROUTE);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
if (rd_nl_dump(fd, RTM_GETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK, 1, rd_link_cb, &links) != 0)
goto fail;
if (rd_nl_dump(fd, RTM_GETADDR, RTM_NEWADDR, 2, rd_addr_cb, &ctx) != 0)
goto fail;
close(fd);
free(links.items);
*ifap = ctx.head;
return 0;
fail:
saved = errno;
close(fd);
free(links.items);
freeifaddrs(ctx.head);
errno = saved;
return -1;
}

4
src/platform/windows.rs
View File

@@ -1496,8 +1496,8 @@ pub fn rename_exe_cmd(src_exe: &str, path: &str) -> ResultType<String> {
.ok_or(anyhow!("Can't get file name of {src_exe}"))?
.to_string_lossy()
.to_string();
let app_name = crate::get_app_name().to_lowercase();
if src_exe_filename.to_lowercase() == format!("{app_name}.exe") {
let app_name = crate::get_app_name();
if src_exe_filename == format!("{app_name}.exe") {
Ok("".to_owned())
} else {
Ok(format!(

256
src/port_forward.rs
View File

@@ -92,12 +92,11 @@ pub async fn listen(
tokio::select! {
Ok((forward, addr)) = listener.accept() => {
log::info!("new connection from {:?}", addr);
lc.write().unwrap().port_forward = (remote_host.clone(), remote_port);
let id = id.clone();
let password = password.clone();
let mut forward = Framed::new(forward, BytesCodec::new());
let mut close_port_forward = false;
match connect_and_login(&id, &password, &mut ui_receiver, interface.clone(), &mut forward, key, token, is_rdp, &mut close_port_forward).await {
match connect_and_login(&id, &password, &mut ui_receiver, interface.clone(), &mut forward, key, token, is_rdp, &mut close_port_forward, &remote_host, remote_port).await {
Ok(Some(stream)) => {
let interface = interface.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -143,6 +142,8 @@ async fn connect_and_login(
token: &str,
is_rdp: bool,
close_port_forward: &mut bool,
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: i32,
) -> ResultType<Option<Stream>> {
let conn_type = if is_rdp {
ConnType::RDP
@@ -160,6 +161,8 @@ async fn connect_and_login(
}
let mut buffer = Vec::new();
let mut received = false;
let mut challenge = None;
let mut pending_login = None;
let _keep_it = hc_connection(feedback, rendezvous_server, token).await;
@@ -177,7 +180,8 @@ async fn connect_and_login(
let msg_in = Message::parse_from_bytes(&bytes)?;
match msg_in.union {
Some(message::Union::Hash(hash)) => {
if !interface.handle_hash(password, hash, &mut stream).await {
challenge = Some(hash.clone());
if !hash_arrived(&interface, password, hash, pending_login.take(), remote_host, remote_port, &mut stream).await {
return Ok(None);
}
}
@@ -208,9 +212,10 @@ async fn connect_and_login(
},
d = ui_receiver.recv() => {
match d {
Some(Data::Login((os_username, os_password, password, remember))) => {
interface.handle_login_from_ui(os_username, os_password, password, remember, &mut stream).await;
}
Some(Data::Login(login)) => match &challenge {
Some(hash) => login_from_ui(&interface, hash, login, remote_host, remote_port, &mut stream).await,
None => pending_login = Some(login),
},
Some(Data::Message(msg)) => {
allow_err!(stream.send(&msg).await);
}
@@ -233,6 +238,76 @@ async fn connect_and_login(
Ok(Some(stream))
}
/// A mapping's login is built from the window's shared handler:
/// `create_login_msg` reads `port_forward` and `handle_login_from_ui` reads
/// `hash`. Mappings log in concurrently, so each fills them and sends under
/// the window's turn lock, or one login carried another mapping's target or
/// answered another's challenge.
async fn login_with_hash(
interface: &impl Interface,
password: &str,
hash: Hash,
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: i32,
stream: &mut Stream,
) -> bool {
let lc = interface.get_lch();
let turn = lc.read().unwrap().port_forward_login_turn.clone();
let _turn = turn.lock().await;
lc.write().unwrap().port_forward = (remote_host.to_owned(), remote_port);
interface.handle_hash(password, hash, stream).await
}
type UiLogin = (String, String, String, bool);
/// This connection's `Hash`. The window's password prompt is broadcast to
/// every mapping and can reach this one first, so a password typed while
/// the `Hash` was on its way is kept and answers it now, rather than being
/// dropped in the hope that the mapping which prompted has already stored
/// it in the shared handler.
async fn hash_arrived(
interface: &impl Interface,
password: &str,
hash: Hash,
pending_login: Option<UiLogin>,
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: i32,
stream: &mut Stream,
) -> bool {
match pending_login {
Some(login) => {
login_from_ui(interface, &hash, login, remote_host, remote_port, stream).await;
true
}
None => login_with_hash(interface, password, hash, remote_host, remote_port, stream).await,
}
}
/// The window's password prompt is broadcast to every mapping; this one
/// answers it with its own challenge.
async fn login_from_ui(
interface: &impl Interface,
hash: &Hash,
login: UiLogin,
remote_host: &str,
remote_port: i32,
stream: &mut Stream,
) {
let lc = interface.get_lch();
let turn = lc.read().unwrap().port_forward_login_turn.clone();
let _turn = turn.lock().await;
{
let mut lc = lc.write().unwrap();
lc.port_forward = (remote_host.to_owned(), remote_port);
lc.set_hash(hash.clone());
}
let (os_username, os_password, password, remember) = login;
interface
.handle_login_from_ui(os_username, os_password, password, remember, stream)
.await;
}
async fn run_forward(forward: Framed<TcpStream, BytesCodec>, stream: Stream) -> ResultType<()> {
log::info!("new port forwarding connection started");
let mut forward = forward;
@@ -257,3 +332,172 @@ async fn run_forward(forward: Framed<TcpStream, BytesCodec>, stream: Stream) ->
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod login_tests {
use super::*;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use hbb_common::{
tcp::FramedStream,
tokio::time::{sleep, Duration},
};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
/// A window's interface over its shared handler. `handle_hash` can pause
/// before building the login, where the real one looks passwords up.
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Ui {
lc: Arc<RwLock<LoginConfigHandler>>,
pause: Duration,
}
#[async_trait]
impl Interface for Ui {
fn send(&self, _data: Data) {}
fn msgbox(&self, _msgtype: &str, _title: &str, _text: &str, _link: &str) {}
fn handle_login_error(&self, _err: &str) -> bool {
false
}
fn handle_peer_info(&self, _pi: PeerInfo) {}
fn set_multiple_windows_session(&self, _sessions: Vec<WindowsSession>) {}
async fn handle_hash(&self, pass: &str, hash: Hash, peer: &mut Stream) -> bool {
sleep(self.pause).await;
crate::client::handle_hash(self.lc.clone(), pass, hash, self, peer).await
}
async fn handle_login_from_ui(
&self,
os_username: String,
os_password: String,
password: String,
remember: bool,
peer: &mut Stream,
) {
crate::client::handle_login_from_ui(
self.lc.clone(),
os_username,
os_password,
password,
remember,
peer,
)
.await
}
async fn handle_test_delay(&self, _t: TestDelay, _peer: &mut Stream) {}
fn get_lch(&self) -> Arc<RwLock<LoginConfigHandler>> {
self.lc.clone()
}
}
fn window() -> Ui {
let mut lc = LoginConfigHandler::default();
lc.conn_type = ConnType::PORT_FORWARD;
Ui {
lc: Arc::new(RwLock::new(lc)),
pause: Duration::ZERO,
}
}
/// (our end, the peer's end) of one connection.
async fn loopback() -> (Stream, Stream) {
let l = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let addr = l.local_addr().unwrap();
let client = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr).await.unwrap();
let (server, _) = l.accept().await.unwrap();
(
Stream::Tcp(FramedStream::from(client, addr)),
Stream::Tcp(FramedStream::from(server, addr)),
)
}
async fn login_at(peer: &mut Stream) -> LoginRequest {
let bytes = peer.next().await.unwrap().unwrap();
Message::parse_from_bytes(&bytes)
.unwrap()
.login_request()
.clone()
}
fn target(lr: &LoginRequest) -> (String, i32) {
(lr.port_forward().host.clone(), lr.port_forward().port)
}
fn hash(challenge: &str) -> Hash {
Hash {
salt: "salt".to_owned(),
challenge: challenge.to_owned(),
..Default::default()
}
}
/// What the peer expects for password `pw` under `hash(challenge)`.
fn digest(challenge: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update("pw");
h.update("salt");
let salted = h.finalize();
let mut h2 = Sha256::new();
h2.update(&salted[..]);
h2.update(challenge);
h2.finalize()[..].to_vec()
}
#[test]
fn mappings_logging_in_at_once_each_carry_their_own_target() {
let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()
.unwrap();
rt.block_on(async {
let mut ui = window();
ui.pause = Duration::from_millis(50);
let (mut a, mut a_peer) = loopback().await;
let (mut b, mut b_peer) = loopback().await;
tokio::join!(
login_with_hash(&ui, "pw", hash("a"), "a", 1, &mut a),
login_with_hash(&ui, "pw", hash("b"), "b", 2, &mut b),
);
assert_eq!(target(&login_at(&mut a_peer).await), ("a".to_owned(), 1));
assert_eq!(target(&login_at(&mut b_peer).await), ("b".to_owned(), 2));
});
}
#[test]
fn a_mapping_answers_the_prompt_with_its_own_challenge() {
let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()
.unwrap();
rt.block_on(async {
let ui = window();
let (mut a, mut a_peer) = loopback().await;
let (mut b, mut b_peer) = loopback().await;
// A's hash arrived last, so it is the one the handler holds.
assert!(login_with_hash(&ui, "pw", hash("a"), "a", 1, &mut a).await);
login_at(&mut a_peer).await;
let typed = (String::new(), String::new(), "pw".to_owned(), false);
login_from_ui(&ui, &hash("b"), typed, "b", 2, &mut b).await;
let lr = login_at(&mut b_peer).await;
assert_eq!(lr.password, digest("b"));
assert_eq!(target(&lr), ("b".to_owned(), 2));
});
}
#[test]
fn a_password_typed_before_this_connections_hash_answers_it_when_it_comes() {
let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()
.unwrap();
rt.block_on(async {
let ui = window();
let (mut b, mut b_peer) = loopback().await;
// The prompt's password reached B before its hash, and no other
// mapping has stored it in the handler yet.
let typed = (String::new(), String::new(), "pw".to_owned(), false);
assert!(hash_arrived(&ui, "", hash("b"), Some(typed), "b", 2, &mut b).await);
let lr = login_at(&mut b_peer).await;
assert_eq!(lr.password, digest("b"));
assert_eq!(target(&lr), ("b".to_owned(), 2));
});
}
}

754
src/rendezvous_mediator.rs
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
use std::{
collections::{hash_map::RandomState, HashMap, VecDeque},
hash::BuildHasher,
net::SocketAddr,
sync::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
@@ -21,8 +23,13 @@ use hbb_common::{
rendezvous_proto::*,
sleep,
socket_client::{self, connect_tcp, is_ipv4, new_direct_udp_for, new_udp_for},
tokio::{self, select, sync::Mutex, time::interval},
tokio::{
self, select,
sync::{mpsc, Mutex},
time::interval,
},
udp::FramedSocket,
webrtc::WebRTCStream,
AddrMangle, IntoTargetAddr, ResultType, Stream, TargetAddr,
};
@@ -47,7 +54,66 @@ lazy_static::lazy_static! {
static ref SOLVING_PK_MISMATCH: Mutex<String> = Default::default();
static ref LAST_MSG: Mutex<(SocketAddr, Instant)> = Mutex::new((SocketAddr::new([0; 4].into(), 0), Instant::now()));
static ref LAST_RELAY_MSG: Mutex<(SocketAddr, Instant)> = Mutex::new((SocketAddr::new([0; 4].into(), 0), Instant::now()));
static ref WEBRTC_ICE_TXS: Mutex<HashMap<String, IceRoute>> = Default::default();
static ref ICE_DIGEST_STATE: RandomState = Default::default();
}
/// Remote ICE candidates buffered per session while the answerer applies them. Same depth as the
/// controller's own buffer (`Client::MAX_PENDING_WEBRTC_ICE`), though that one evicts its oldest
/// where a full channel here refuses the newest.
const MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE: usize = 64;
/// Queued candidates remembered so the controller's re-send is skipped instead of taking a slot
/// of its own. Far more than an honest peer gathers, at eight bytes each.
const ICE_DEDUP_WINDOW: usize = 256;
// The rendezvous ICE route is reachable without a prior punch and the peer decides how many
// candidates it sends, so these sites would let someone else set how much this machine writes to
// its log file. One line a minute each, carrying the suppressed count.
const ICE_LOG_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);
static UNKNOWN_ICE_SESSION_LOG: hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle =
hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle::new(ICE_LOG_INTERVAL);
static REJECTED_REMOTE_ICE_LOG: hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle =
hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle::new(ICE_LOG_INTERVAL);
static FULL_ICE_QUEUE_LOG: hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle =
hbb_common::log_throttle::LogThrottle::new(ICE_LOG_INTERVAL);
struct IceRoute {
tx: mpsc::Sender<String>,
recent: VecDeque<u64>,
}
impl IceRoute {
fn new(tx: mpsc::Sender<String>) -> Self {
Self {
tx,
recent: VecDeque::new(),
}
}
/// Keeps `queue` the only way onto the channel, so nothing reaches it unrecorded.
fn is_same_channel(&self, other: &mpsc::Sender<String>) -> bool {
self.tx.same_channel(other)
}
/// Skip the controller's re-send of a candidate already queued: the ICE agent that dedups
/// repeats is downstream of this queue, so the copy would spend a slot of its own.
/// False means the candidate was dropped.
fn queue(&mut self, candidate: String) -> bool {
let digest = ICE_DIGEST_STATE.hash_one(candidate.as_str());
if self.recent.contains(&digest) {
// Only honest about the drop if the route is still alive to have taken it.
return !self.tx.is_closed();
}
// Recorded once queued, never before: a refused candidate stays repairable by the re-send.
if self.tx.try_send(candidate).is_err() {
return false;
}
if self.recent.len() >= ICE_DEDUP_WINDOW {
self.recent.pop_front();
}
self.recent.push_back(digest);
true
}
}
static SHOULD_EXIT: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
static MANUAL_RESTARTED: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
static SENT_REGISTER_PK: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
@@ -399,6 +465,30 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
allow_err!(rz.handle_intranet(fla, server).await);
});
}
Some(rendezvous_message::Union::IceCandidate(ice)) => {
let queued = {
let mut txs = WEBRTC_ICE_TXS.lock().await;
txs.get_mut(&ice.session_key)
.map(|route| route.queue(ice.candidate))
};
match queued {
Some(false) => {
if let Some(n) = FULL_ICE_QUEUE_LOG.due() {
log::debug!("dropped {} ICE candidate(s): queue full or closed", n);
}
}
None => {
if let Some(n) = UNKNOWN_ICE_SESSION_LOG.due() {
log::debug!(
"dropped {} ICE candidate(s) for unknown WebRTC session key, last: {}",
n,
ice.session_key
);
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
Some(rendezvous_message::Union::ConfigureUpdate(cu)) => {
let v0 = Config::get_rendezvous_servers();
Config::set_option(
@@ -508,6 +598,7 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
rr.secure,
false,
Default::default(),
String::new(),
meta,
)
.await
@@ -522,6 +613,7 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
secure: bool,
initiate: bool,
socket_addr_v6: bytes::Bytes,
webrtc_sdp_answer: String,
meta: ConnectionMeta,
) -> ResultType<()> {
let peer_addr = AddrMangle::decode(&socket_addr);
@@ -540,6 +632,7 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
socket_addr: socket_addr.into(),
version: crate::VERSION.to_owned(),
socket_addr_v6,
webrtc_sdp_answer,
..Default::default()
};
if initiate {
@@ -606,6 +699,7 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
true,
true,
socket_addr_v6,
String::new(),
meta,
)
.await
@@ -642,6 +736,163 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
Ok(())
}
/// Build the WebRTC answerer for a punch-hole offer and return the SDP answer that rides in
/// the punch reply (PunchHoleSent / RelayResponse).
///
/// Awaited inline on the punch-reply path, which only holds because everything here is local
/// (pc + keygen + SDP; trickle means the answer carries no candidates). Keep network I/O out
/// — connection setup belongs in the detached task below.
async fn spawn_webrtc_answerer(
&self,
ph: &PunchHole,
relay_only_ice: bool,
server: ServerPtr,
peer_addr: SocketAddr,
meta: ConnectionMeta,
) -> ResultType<String> {
let mut stream =
WebRTCStream::new(&ph.webrtc_sdp_offer, relay_only_ice, CONNECT_TIMEOUT).await?;
let answer = stream.local_endpoint().to_owned();
let session_key = stream.session_key().to_owned();
let return_route = ph.socket_addr.clone();
// A duplicate PunchHole (the offerer re-sends the same request across punch attempts)
// resolves to the SESSIONS-cached stream. `take_local_ice_rx` yields the receiver
// exactly once per stream instance, so `None` here means an answerer was already
// spawned for this offer: return the (identical) cached answer without spawning a
// second connect task. Otherwise two `create_tcp_connection` tasks would detach and
// read the same data channel, interleaving the handshake and corrupting the session.
let Some(mut local_ice_rx) = stream.take_local_ice_rx() else {
return Ok(answer);
};
// Bounded: how many candidates arrive is the sender's choice, while draining one costs a
// JSON parse and the ICE agent's lock, so an unbounded queue lets whoever can reach this
// session's route grow it without limit inside a long-lived service process. A full queue
// drops the newest candidate, and the controller re-sends it once — the digests beside the
// sender are what keep that re-send from spending a slot of its own.
let (remote_ice_tx, mut remote_ice_rx) = mpsc::channel::<String>(MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE);
let own_ice_tx = remote_ice_tx.clone();
WEBRTC_ICE_TXS
.lock()
.await
.insert(session_key.clone(), IceRoute::new(remote_ice_tx));
let stream_for_remote_ice = stream.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(candidate) = remote_ice_rx.recv().await {
if let Err(err) = stream_for_remote_ice.add_remote_ice_candidate(&candidate).await
{
if let Some(n) = REJECTED_REMOTE_ICE_LOG.due() {
log::warn!(
"failed to add {} remote WebRTC ICE candidate(s), last: {}",
n,
err
);
}
}
}
});
{
let host = self.host.clone();
let socket_addr = return_route.clone();
let session_key_for_ice = session_key.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
// Candidates ride a dedicated TCP connection to the rendezvous server, like
// the answer, NOT the mediator channel: that channel is UDP in the default
// setup, and target deployments front hbbs with websocket/TCP only, where
// its UDP port is unreachable. The server keeps candidate-carrying TCP
// connections open, so one lazily-opened connection serves the whole
// trickle, and TCP reliability replaces the old 400ms duplicate re-send
// (the controller keeps its own re-send for the server->peer UDP downlink).
let mut conn = None;
while let Some(candidate) = local_ice_rx.recv().await {
let mut msg = Message::new();
msg.set_ice_candidate(IceCandidate {
socket_addr: socket_addr.clone(),
session_key: session_key_for_ice.clone(),
candidate,
..Default::default()
});
// One reconnect attempt per candidate: the first send after an hbbs
// restart or an idle-killed connection fails on the stale stream.
for _ in 0..2 {
if conn.is_none() {
match connect_tcp(&*host, CONNECT_TIMEOUT).await {
Ok(s) => conn = Some(s),
Err(err) => {
log::warn!(
"failed to connect for WebRTC ICE candidate: {}",
err
);
break;
}
}
}
if let Some(s) = conn.as_mut() {
match s.send(&msg).await {
Ok(()) => break,
Err(err) => {
log::debug!(
"WebRTC ICE candidate send failed, reconnecting: {}",
err
);
conn = None;
}
}
}
}
}
});
}
let session_key_for_cleanup = session_key.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let result = stream.wait_connected(CONNECT_TIMEOUT).await;
// Only evict our own route. The key is the offer's DTLS fingerprint, identical across
// the controller's punch retries, so a retry that built a fresh answerer has already
// replaced this entry — removing it blindly would delete the live session's sender and
// leave it receiving no candidates at all.
{
let mut txs = WEBRTC_ICE_TXS.lock().await;
if txs
.get(&session_key_for_cleanup)
.is_some_and(|route| route.is_same_channel(&own_ice_tx))
{
txs.remove(&session_key_for_cleanup);
}
}
if let Err(err) = result {
log::warn!("webrtc wait_connected failed: {}", err);
// Release the pc now rather than waiting for the ICE agent to time out into a
// terminal state (~30s); this also drops the SESSIONS entry promptly.
stream.close().await;
return;
}
// create_tcp_connection takes ownership of the stream; keep a handle to close the pc
// once the session returns. It runs the whole session and returns Ok on normal end,
// Err on setup failure — either way the pc must be closed, else it lingers forever in
// SESSIONS (its state handler only fires on a terminal ICE state, which a cleanly
// closed session may never reach) leaking the pc, channels, and socket fds.
let stream_for_cleanup = stream.clone();
if let Err(err) = crate::server::create_tcp_connection(
server,
Stream::WebRTC(stream),
peer_addr,
true,
meta,
)
.await
{
log::warn!("failed to create WebRTC server connection: {}", err);
}
stream_for_cleanup.close().await;
});
Ok(answer)
}
async fn handle_punch_hole(&self, ph: PunchHole, server: ServerPtr) -> ResultType<()> {
let mut peer_addr = AddrMangle::decode(&ph.socket_addr);
let last = *LAST_MSG.lock().await;
@@ -651,12 +902,41 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
return Ok(());
}
let peer_addr_v6 = hbb_common::AddrMangle::decode(&ph.socket_addr_v6);
let relay = use_ws() || Config::is_proxy() || ph.force_relay;
let local_proxy = use_ws() || Config::is_proxy();
let relay = local_proxy || ph.force_relay;
let mut socket_addr_v6 = Default::default();
let meta = connection_meta(
ph.control_permissions.into_option(),
ph.controlled_context.into_option(),
ph.control_permissions.clone().into_option(),
ph.controlled_context.clone().into_option(),
);
// The controller's force_relay alone does not say whether ICE must be Relay-only; its
// offer envelope does. `ice_policy: "all"` means the relay was forced by the transport
// (ws), so answer with full ICE and let a direct pair form.
let webrtc_relay_only =
ph.force_relay && !WebRTCStream::endpoint_declares_all_ice(&ph.webrtc_sdp_offer);
// No enable-webrtc check here: it is LocalConfig, which the UI process writes and never
// syncs over IPC, so this (server) process would read the private-server default of "N"
// and refuse to answer in exactly the self-hosted deployments the transport is for.
// A proxy still rules it out — ICE would bypass it and leak the real IP.
let webrtc_viable = !ph.webrtc_sdp_offer.is_empty()
&& !Config::is_proxy()
&& (!webrtc_relay_only || WebRTCStream::has_turn_server());
let webrtc_sdp_answer = if webrtc_viable {
self.spawn_webrtc_answerer(
&ph,
webrtc_relay_only,
server.clone(),
peer_addr,
meta.clone(),
)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|err| {
log::warn!("failed to create WebRTC answer: {}", err);
String::new()
})
} else {
String::new()
};
if peer_addr_v6.port() > 0 && !relay {
socket_addr_v6 =
start_ipv6(peer_addr_v6, peer_addr, server.clone(), meta.clone()).await;
@@ -678,6 +958,7 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
true,
true,
socket_addr_v6.clone(),
webrtc_sdp_answer.clone(),
meta,
)
.await;
@@ -691,6 +972,7 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
nat_type: nat_type.into(),
version: crate::VERSION.to_owned(),
socket_addr_v6,
webrtc_sdp_answer,
..Default::default()
};
if ph.udp_port > 0 {
@@ -699,12 +981,25 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
.await?;
return Ok(());
}
if !ph.webrtc_sdp_offer.is_empty() {
// Return the answer over its own short-lived TCP connection rather than the mediator
// channel: that channel is UDP by default, and hbbs applies UDP-punch semantics
// (source-address observation) to a PunchHoleSent that arrives on it. No TCP punch
// is made — the controller keeps its request socket for trickled ICE.
let mut msg_out = Message::new();
msg_out.set_punch_hole_sent(msg_punch);
let mut socket = connect_tcp(&*self.host, CONNECT_TIMEOUT).await?;
socket.send(&msg_out).await?;
return Ok(());
}
log::debug!("Punch tcp hole to {:?}", peer_addr);
let mut socket = {
let socket = connect_tcp(&*self.host, CONNECT_TIMEOUT).await?;
let local_addr = socket.local_addr();
// key important here for punch hole to tell my gateway incoming peer is safe.
// it can not be async here, because local_addr can not be reused, we must close the connection before use it again.
// Awaited rather than spawned so the mapping exists before `PunchHoleSent` goes out;
// `local_addr` itself is shared, not exclusive - every socket here binds it with the
// reuse flags `new_socket` sets.
allow_err!(socket_client::connect_tcp_local(peer_addr, Some(local_addr), 30).await);
socket
};
@@ -712,7 +1007,10 @@ impl RendezvousMediator {
msg_out.set_punch_hole_sent(msg_punch);
let bytes = msg_out.write_to_bytes()?;
socket.send_raw(bytes).await?;
crate::accept_connection(server.clone(), socket, peer_addr, true, meta).await;
let local_addr = socket.local_addr();
// The listener inside takes this address over, so the mediator's socket goes first.
drop(socket);
punch_tcp_until_connected(server, peer_addr, local_addr, meta).await;
Ok(())
}
@@ -951,11 +1249,11 @@ async fn udp_nat_listen(
let socket_cloned = socket.clone();
let func = async {
socket.connect(peer_addr).await?;
let res = crate::punch_udp(socket.clone(), true).await?;
let init_packet = crate::punch_udp(socket.clone(), true).await?;
let stream = crate::kcp_stream::KcpStream::accept(
socket,
Duration::from_millis(CONNECT_TIMEOUT as _),
res,
init_packet,
)
.await?;
crate::server::create_tcp_connection(server, stream.1, peer_addr_v4, true, meta).await?;
@@ -971,6 +1269,194 @@ async fn udp_nat_listen(
Ok(())
}
/// Where the repeats start, and the factor they slow by. The controller's SYN arrives once, at an
/// instant we are never told, inside a window we are not told either: `Client::connect` sizes its
/// dial only after our PunchHoleSent, from its own rendezvous time and the direct failures it has
/// recorded for us - `CONNECT_TIMEOUT` between two known-asymmetric NATs that never failed, as
/// little as a second once one has. So the repeats cover our own ceiling instead, `CONNECT_TIMEOUT`,
/// which is as long as the accept below has always been willing to take a connection, and back
/// off across it: dense at the start, where every window begins and the short ones end, sparse
/// afterwards, which is `punch_udp`'s shape for the same reason.
const PUNCH_INTERVAL: f32 = 0.15;
const PUNCH_BACKOFF: f32 = 1.5;
const PUNCH_MAX_INTERVAL: f32 = 2.0;
/// How long a punch in flight may run past the deadline, and the only timer it runs on. A punch
/// is cancel-safe while it is still in SYN_SENT and not once the controller's SYN has crossed it:
/// the socket is then half way through a handshake, and dropping it there cuts the connection the
/// controller is opening - which its `connect` has already returned, so that attempt fails
/// outright rather than falling back to relay. A timer cannot tell the two states apart, so no
/// punch is cut on a schedule of its own, and none needs to be. A gateway that answers with RST
/// fails the connect at once, and the loop punches again. One that drops the SYN in silence
/// leaves the socket in SYN_SENT, where it holds the mapping open and the kernel re-sends the
/// SYN, and any SYN of the controller's that arrives crosses it - a second punch has nothing to
/// add. That leaves the deadline, and this much past it lets a crossing begun just before it
/// complete; Windows gives a SYN up at about 21s anyway.
const PUNCH_GRACE: u64 = 3000;
/// The punch above leaves before hbbs has told the controller where to dial, so it is never in
/// flight at the same time as the controller's SYN: it opens our NAT, meets nothing, and a gateway
/// that answers it with RST takes the mapping down with it - leaving the listener below waiting on
/// a hole that no longer exists. Punching again across the window in which the controller dials
/// rebuilds it, and once the controller sits in SYN_SENT one of those punches meets its SYN and
/// completes as a simultaneous open: a second way in, which a single punch never had.
async fn punch_tcp_until_connected(
server: ServerPtr,
peer_addr: SocketAddr,
local_addr: SocketAddr,
meta: ConnectionMeta,
) {
use hbb_common::tcp::new_listener;
// Shadows the module's `std::time::Instant`: the deadline is held against tokio's sleeps and
// timeouts, so it runs on their clock.
use hbb_common::tokio::time::Instant;
// Not fatal on its own - the punch below can still meet the controller's SYN without it, and
// that half is the one a listener the OS refused to bind could not have covered anyway.
let listener = match new_listener(local_addr, true).await {
Ok(listener) => {
log::info!("Server listening on: {local_addr}");
Some(listener)
}
Err(err) => {
log::warn!("Failed to listen on {local_addr} after punching: {err}");
None
}
};
// Bounds both halves: the punch keeps the mapping open only while the accept is still
// willing to take a connection through it.
let until = Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(CONNECT_TIMEOUT);
let punch = punch_until(until, peer_addr, |ms| {
socket_client::connect_tcp_local(peer_addr, Some(local_addr), ms)
});
let Some(listener) = listener else {
if let Some(stream) = punch.await {
serve_punched(server, stream, peer_addr, meta).await;
}
return;
};
// Accepting in a loop, not once: a transient `accept` error must not spend the whole window
// the controller still has to arrive in.
let accept = async {
loop {
let left = until.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now()).as_millis() as u64;
if left == 0 {
break;
}
match hbb_common::timeout(left, listener.accept()).await {
// Not filtered by address, as `accept_connection` never did: hbbs saw the
// controller through one mapping and a NAT that pools its external addresses may
// dial us from another, and what keeps `meta`'s control permissions from a second
// peer is the handshake, plus that exactly one connection is ever served.
Ok(Ok(accepted)) => return Some(accepted),
Ok(Err(err)) => {
log::warn!("Failed to accept from {peer_addr}: {err}");
// One that persists - EMFILE, say - would otherwise spin here for the window.
sleep(1.).await;
}
Err(_) => break,
}
}
log::info!("Nothing connected to the hole punched to {peer_addr}");
None
};
// Only the accept races the punch. Racing `accept_connection` instead would race the whole
// session it goes on to run, so a punch landing mid-session would tear that session down.
//
// Whichever arrives first is the one connection this request produces. Serving the loser too
// would give a second peer the control permissions hbbs granted for this one controller, and
// no test on the connection itself can tell the two apart before `create_tcp_connection` has
// spoken to it - so the invariant is kept here, by there being no second serve.
let punched = select! {
// Both ready at once is two connections, not one seen twice - a crossing carries the
// punch's four-tuple, which the listener never matches - and the punch is the one kept:
// it is known to have met something at the address hbbs gave, where the accept takes
// any address, and dropping it would reset the connection the controller is opening.
biased;
Some(stream) = punch => stream,
Some((stream, addr)) = accept => {
return accept_punched_connection(server, stream, addr, meta).await;
}
else => return,
};
serve_punched(server, punched, peer_addr, meta).await;
}
/// The repeats of `punch_tcp_until_connected`, over any punch rather than `connect_tcp_local`
/// alone, so that a test can run the schedule against a paused clock - which no socket can be.
async fn punch_until<T, F, Fut>(
until: tokio::time::Instant,
peer_addr: SocketAddr,
mut punch: F,
) -> Option<T>
where
F: FnMut(u64) -> Fut,
Fut: std::future::Future<Output = ResultType<T>>,
{
use hbb_common::tokio::time::Instant;
let mut interval = PUNCH_INTERVAL;
let mut round = 0;
loop {
// The deadline decides whether another punch starts, never how long one already in
// flight may take: that one runs to PUNCH_GRACE past it.
let left = until.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now());
if left.is_zero() {
log::debug!("None of {round} punches to {peer_addr} was met");
return None;
}
// Cut at the deadline rather than slept out past it, so the window ends on a punch and
// not on a gap of up to PUNCH_MAX_INTERVAL: the controller's window opened after ours,
// on the PunchHoleSent hbbs relayed, so one as long as ours is still open through our tail.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs_f32(interval).min(left)).await;
interval = (interval * PUNCH_BACKOFF).min(PUNCH_MAX_INTERVAL);
let ms = until.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now()).as_millis() as u64 + PUNCH_GRACE;
match punch(ms).await {
// The controller's SYN crossed this punch, so the stream is the connection it
// dialed, not a spare one: dropping it would reset that connection.
Ok(stream) => return Some(stream),
// Not logged one by one, but the count says which gateway it was: RST fails a
// punch at once and fits a dozen into the window, a silent drop holds the one
// punch for the whole of it. `connect_tcp_local` keeps no errno anyway.
Err(_) => round += 1,
}
}
}
async fn serve_punched(
server: ServerPtr,
stream: Stream,
peer_addr: SocketAddr,
meta: ConnectionMeta,
) {
log::info!("Punched tcp hole to {peer_addr}, connected on the punch itself");
if let Err(err) =
crate::server::create_tcp_connection(server, stream, peer_addr, true, meta).await
{
log::warn!("Failed to serve the connection punched to {peer_addr}: {err}");
}
}
/// The accept half of `accept_connection`, kept here because only the accept may race the punch.
async fn accept_punched_connection(
server: ServerPtr,
stream: tokio::net::TcpStream,
addr: SocketAddr,
meta: ConnectionMeta,
) {
use crate::server::create_tcp_connection;
stream.set_nodelay(true).ok();
match stream.local_addr() {
Ok(stream_addr) => {
let stream = Stream::from(stream, stream_addr);
if let Err(err) = create_tcp_connection(server, stream, addr, true, meta).await {
log::warn!("Failed to serve the connection from {addr}: {err}");
}
}
Err(err) => log::warn!("Failed to read the address accepted from {addr}: {err}"),
}
}
// When config is not yet synced from root, register_pk may have already been sent with a new generated pk.
// After config sync completes, the pk may change. This struct detects pk changes and triggers
// a re-registration by setting key_confirmed to false.
@@ -995,3 +1481,255 @@ impl Drop for CheckIfResendPk {
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{mpsc, socket_client, tokio, IceRoute, ICE_DEDUP_WINDOW, MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE};
use hbb_common::tcp::new_listener;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
// A SOCKS proxy makes `connect_tcp_local` dial the proxy and ignore the local address, so
// nothing these two assert can hold. Read once, from the same global config production reads.
fn proxied() -> bool {
hbb_common::config::Config::get_socks().is_some()
}
/// Both held while their addresses are read, so the pair cannot be the same port - which
/// `SO_REUSEPORT` would let bind twice rather than refuse, leaving the tests degenerate.
async fn free_loopback_pair() -> (SocketAddr, SocketAddr) {
let (a, b) = (
tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(),
tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap(),
);
(a.local_addr().unwrap(), b.local_addr().unwrap())
}
fn queue(route: &mut IceRoute, candidate: &str) -> bool {
route.queue(candidate.to_owned())
}
#[test]
fn the_re_sent_copy_does_not_spend_a_queue_slot() {
// Two slots, three sends: without the dedup the re-send takes the second and "relay",
// the one that traverses NAT, is the one refused.
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<String>(2);
let mut route = IceRoute::new(tx);
for _ in 0..2 {
assert!(queue(&mut route, "host"));
}
assert!(queue(&mut route, "relay"));
let mut queued = Vec::new();
while let Ok(candidate) = rx.try_recv() {
queued.push(candidate);
}
assert_eq!(queued, vec!["host".to_owned(), "relay".to_owned()]);
}
#[test]
fn a_candidate_the_full_queue_refused_is_not_remembered() {
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<String>(1);
let mut route = IceRoute::new(tx);
assert!(queue(&mut route, "host"));
assert!(!queue(&mut route, "relay"));
// The re-send is the only repair for a refused candidate; remembering it would swallow it.
assert_eq!(rx.try_recv().ok(), Some("host".to_owned()));
assert!(queue(&mut route, "relay"));
assert_eq!(rx.try_recv().ok(), Some("relay".to_owned()));
}
#[test]
fn a_re_send_is_skipped_while_the_original_is_still_queued() {
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<String>(MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE);
let mut route = IceRoute::new(tx);
for i in 0..MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE {
assert!(queue(&mut route, &format!("candidate-{}", i)));
}
assert!(queue(&mut route, "candidate-0"));
let mut queued = 0;
while rx.try_recv().is_ok() {
queued += 1;
}
assert_eq!(queued, MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE);
}
#[test]
fn the_window_forgets_in_arrival_order() {
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<String>(MAX_PENDING_REMOTE_ICE);
let mut route = IceRoute::new(tx);
for i in 0..=ICE_DEDUP_WINDOW {
assert!(queue(&mut route, &format!("candidate-{}", i)));
assert!(rx.try_recv().is_ok());
}
// The oldest digest made room for the newest, so its re-send is admitted again.
assert!(queue(&mut route, "candidate-0"));
assert!(rx.try_recv().is_ok());
// A recent one is still skipped.
let recent = format!("candidate-{}", ICE_DEDUP_WINDOW);
assert!(queue(&mut route, &recent));
assert!(rx.try_recv().is_err());
}
// The second way in that the repeat punch opens: a punch reaching a peer already in SYN_SENT
// is answered by that socket rather than reset, and the two ends come up on one connection.
// A punch that misses the crossing is reset outright here, loopback having no NAT to absorb
// it and no round trip to hide behind - so a single punch lands only by luck, and repeating
// is what makes it land at all. That is the premise of the repeat, asserted directly. A round
// that misses costs one loopback RST, so rounds are cheap and there are many.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn a_punch_that_meets_the_peers_syn_connects_both_ends() {
// The crossing needs both connects genuinely in flight at once. Loopback answers a SYN to
// a port nobody is listening on with an instant RST, so on one CPU the first connect runs
// to completion before the second is scheduled and no round can ever cross - a property of
// the box, which this test cannot tell apart from a broken punch.
if proxied() || std::thread::available_parallelism().map_or(true, |cpus| cpus.get() < 2) {
return;
}
for _ in 0..256 {
let (a, b) = free_loopback_pair().await;
// Held for the whole crossing, because production always has one here and the design
// rests on which of the two the kernel hands the connection to: the punch and the
// peer's SYN share a four-tuple exactly, the listener only matches the address, and
// the punch has to win that or every crossing would be swallowed as a plain accept.
let listener = new_listener(a, true).await.unwrap();
let to_b = tokio::spawn(socket_client::connect_tcp_local(b, Some(a), 3000));
let to_a = tokio::spawn(socket_client::connect_tcp_local(a, Some(b), 3000));
let (at_a, at_b) = tokio::join!(to_b, to_a);
let (Ok(Ok(mut at_a)), Ok(Ok(mut at_b))) = (at_a, at_b) else {
continue;
};
at_a.send_bytes(bytes::Bytes::from_static(b"punch"))
.await
.unwrap();
let got = at_b.next_timeout(3000).await.unwrap().unwrap();
assert_eq!(&got[..], b"punch", "both ends must share one connection");
assert!(
hbb_common::timeout(200, listener.accept()).await.is_err(),
"the crossing must reach the punch, not be accepted as an inbound connection"
);
return;
}
panic!("no punch met the peer's SYN in 256 rounds on a machine that can cross them");
}
// The punch binds the address the listener already holds, so it has to go through the same
// `connect_tcp_local` production uses - a punch built by hand here would still pass if
// `new_socket` ever stopped setting the reuse flags, while every real punch failed to bind.
// The peer's view of the source port is what proves the bind took: a fallback to an ephemeral
// one would connect just as happily.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn a_punch_binds_the_address_the_listener_holds() {
if proxied() {
return;
}
// `free_loopback_pair` hands back ports it no longer holds, so another process can take
// one in between; retry rather than fail for something the punch had no part in.
for _ in 0..8 {
let (local, peer_addr) = free_loopback_pair().await;
let (Ok(listener), Ok(peer)) = (
new_listener(local, true).await,
new_listener(peer_addr, true).await,
) else {
continue;
};
let punch = tokio::spawn(socket_client::connect_tcp_local(
peer_addr,
Some(local),
1500,
));
let (_peer_side, seen_as) = hbb_common::timeout(3000, peer.accept())
.await
.expect("the punch must reach the peer")
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
seen_as.port(),
local.port(),
"the punch must leave from the address the listener holds, not an ephemeral one"
);
// Held, not asserted and dropped: the coexistence below is only exercised while this
// socket is still on the address, which is the state production spends its window in.
let _punched = punch.await.unwrap().expect("the punch must connect");
let dialed = tokio::spawn(tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(local));
let accepted = hbb_common::timeout(3000, listener.accept()).await;
assert!(
matches!(accepted, Ok(Ok(_))),
"the listener must still take connections while a punch shares its address: {accepted:?}"
);
assert!(dialed.await.unwrap().is_ok());
return;
}
panic!("could not hold two free loopback addresses in 8 tries");
}
// The schedule on its own, against a paused clock: the window is CONNECT_TIMEOUT long, and
// what these pin is where inside it the punches fall, which no socket could show.
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn the_punches_end_on_one_at_the_deadline() {
use super::{punch_until, PUNCH_GRACE, PUNCH_INTERVAL, PUNCH_MAX_INTERVAL};
use hbb_common::{anyhow::anyhow, config::CONNECT_TIMEOUT};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::time::Instant;
let peer: SocketAddr = "127.0.0.1:1".parse().unwrap();
let start = Instant::now();
let until = start + Duration::from_millis(CONNECT_TIMEOUT);
let mut punches = Vec::new();
// A gateway that answers with RST: every punch fails the moment it is made.
let met = punch_until::<(), _, _>(until, peer, |ms| {
punches.push((Instant::now(), ms));
async { Err(anyhow!("RST")) }
})
.await;
assert!(met.is_none());
assert_eq!(
Instant::now(),
until,
"must return the moment the window closes, not a backoff later"
);
// Tokio rounds every sleep up to the next millisecond.
let slack = Duration::from_millis(1);
assert!(punches[0].0 - start <= Duration::from_secs_f32(PUNCH_INTERVAL) + slack);
for pair in punches.windows(2) {
assert!(
pair[1].0 - pair[0].0 <= Duration::from_secs_f32(PUNCH_MAX_INTERVAL) + slack,
"no gap in the window may exceed the backoff ceiling: {pair:?}"
);
}
assert_eq!(
*punches.last().unwrap(),
(until, PUNCH_GRACE),
"the window must end on a punch, given the whole grace"
);
}
#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
async fn a_punch_in_flight_runs_the_grace_past_the_deadline_and_no_further() {
use super::{punch_until, PUNCH_GRACE};
use hbb_common::{anyhow::anyhow, config::CONNECT_TIMEOUT};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::time::Instant;
let peer: SocketAddr = "127.0.0.1:1".parse().unwrap();
let until = Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(CONNECT_TIMEOUT);
let mut punches = 0;
// A gateway that drops the SYN in silence: the punch sits in SYN_SENT for all it is given.
let met = punch_until::<(), _, _>(until, peer, |ms| {
punches += 1;
async move {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(ms)).await;
Err(anyhow!("timed out"))
}
})
.await;
assert!(met.is_none());
assert_eq!(
punches, 1,
"a punch held in SYN_SENT is the only one the window needs"
);
assert_eq!(
Instant::now(),
until + Duration::from_millis(PUNCH_GRACE),
"must return when the grace runs out, not a backoff later"
);
}
}

10
src/server.rs
View File

@@ -211,11 +211,21 @@ pub async fn create_tcp_connection(
let sk = sign::SecretKey(sk_);
let mut msg_out = Message::new();
let (our_pk_b, our_sk_b) = box_::gen_keypair();
// On a WebRTC transport, bind our DTLS certificate fingerprint to our signed identity so
// the controller can verify the DTLS channel it negotiated actually terminates at us
// (not a rendezvous/relay that swapped the SDP fingerprint). Empty on other transports.
// Fail immediately on WebRTC if the local fingerprint is unavailable: signing "" would
// only make the client fail-closed after a wasted round-trip.
let dtls_fingerprint = stream.dtls_fingerprint(true).await.unwrap_or_default();
if stream.is_webrtc() && dtls_fingerprint.is_empty() {
bail!("WebRTC local DTLS fingerprint unavailable");
}
msg_out.set_signed_id(SignedId {
id: sign::sign(
&IdPk {
id: Config::get_id(),
pk: Bytes::from(our_pk_b.0.to_vec()),
dtls_fingerprint,
..Default::default()
}
.write_to_bytes()

23
src/server/connection.rs
View File

@@ -585,13 +585,9 @@ impl Connection {
crate::rustdesk_interval(time::interval_at(Instant::now(), TEST_DELAY_TIMEOUT));
let mut last_recv_time = Instant::now();
conn.stream.set_send_timeout(
if conn.file_transfer.is_some() || conn.port_forward_socket.is_some() || conn.terminal {
SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER
} else {
SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO
},
);
// The connection type is not known until the login request arrives;
// `on_message` picks the type-specific timeout then.
conn.stream.set_send_timeout(SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO);
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "ios")))]
std::thread::spawn(move || Self::handle_input(_rx_input, tx_cloned));
@@ -2580,11 +2576,13 @@ impl Connection {
let PortForward {
host,
port,
multiplex,
special_fields: _,
} = pf;
push(b"port_forward");
push(host.as_bytes());
push(&port.to_le_bytes());
push(&[*multiplex as u8]);
}
// Variants this build does not know execute as remote, so they latch as remote.
None | Some(_) => push(b"remote"),
@@ -2766,6 +2764,17 @@ impl Connection {
}
}
self.stream.set_send_timeout(
if self.file_transfer.is_some()
|| self.terminal
|| matches!(self.lr.union, Some(login_request::Union::PortForward(_)))
{
SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER
} else {
SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO
},
);
if !crate::common::is_direct_ip_access(&lr.username) && lr.username != Config::get_id()
{
self.send_login_error(crate::client::LOGIN_MSG_OFFLINE)

8
src/ui_session_interface.rs
View File

@@ -1294,7 +1294,13 @@ impl<T: InvokeUiSession> Session<T> {
// override only if true
if true == force_relay {
self.lc.write().unwrap().force_relay = true;
let mut lc = self.lc.write().unwrap();
lc.force_relay = true;
// An explicit retry-via-relay is a decision about this peer, not transport
// necessity: Relay-only ICE for this round like any force-always-relay session,
// and it is the one kind of relay that belongs in the peer's saved config.
lc.policy_relay = true;
lc.peer_relay = true;
}
self.lc.write().unwrap().peer_info = None;
self.reconnect_count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);