Files
rustdesk/docs/DRM_CAPTURE_SECURITY.md
Mariano Abad 58ff3f9d2b drm: the polish list, and a correction to my own ABI floor
The version floor I added two commits ago was one release too low.
drmtap_open_render and drmtap_convert_dmabuf are 0.4.9, but drmtap_grab_desc is
0.4.10, so a genuine 0.4.9 library passed the version gate and was then refused
by the symbol gate with a message that called it a stale or pre-release build,
which it is not. The floor is 0.4.10 now, the release where the whole split API
exists, and the test lists 0.4.9 among the rejected versions with the reason.

ExportLedger is deleted. DRM_FD_ELISION was false, so should_send_fd returned
true at its first branch and about sixty lines of eviction and epoch machinery
were unreachable, untested, in a security sensitive file. Why it was disabled
is worth keeping, so here it is: eliding the fd on an fb_id the converter has
already imported looks free, but the kernel can recycle an fb_id onto a
different buffer with identical geometry and modifier, and the exporter cannot
see the dma-buf inode that would tell the difference, so the elision can serve
a stale EGLImage. Sending it is cheap, the converter imports once per buffer and
closes the surplus fd, and libdrmtap's own cache keys on fb_id AND inode and can
only re-import when it is handed a real fd. That reasoning now lives here
instead of in dead code.

The rest:

- num_planes is clamped on the consumer before it reaches the C descriptor. The
  producer normalizes it and must be root, so this is only defense in depth, but
  the wire is the one place the value arrives from another process.
- warm_availability returns early on X11. Nothing there can consume a DRM
  stream, and probing makes the ROOT service open DRM readers, so an X11 host
  running a drm build was paying that at every startup for a path it can never
  take.
- drm_cursor_id no longer clones the cursor. The cursor service polls it at
  frame cadence to compare eight bytes, and a 256x256 cursor is 256 KiB.
- The premultiplied ARGB pass-through is now documented as matching the XFixes
  path, since that is why it is correct rather than an oversight.
- cfg hygiene: input_service.rs uses all(target_os = "linux", feature = "drm")
  like every other site, and active_uid_cached is gated with the feature too,
  which also removes a dead-code warning from drm-off Linux builds.
- Nits: DrmConn is pub(crate) like its constructors, new_drm_listener is no
  longer async with nothing to await, and the two anyhow! plus return Err pairs
  are bail! as the codebase writes them.
- DRM_CAPTURE_SECURITY.md moves to docs/ with the other docs, and its "no
  privileged child process is ever spawned" claim is corrected: an empty
  helper_path is not a disable switch in the C, find_helper searches six fixed
  paths and would exec one if the direct export ever failed. It is unreachable
  here for two independent reasons, the root service holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN so the
  direct path succeeds and the package builds no helper at all, and the paths
  are root-writable only, so the accurate statement is that this package never
  installs one, not that it can never happen.
- The comments that narrated the review rather than the code are rewritten to
  say what the code does. One of them had also drifted: the convert context is
  opened before we answer with DrmStart, not before the handshake.

Both configs build with no new warnings, 100 tests pass.
2026-07-28 09:06:11 -03:00

158 lines
10 KiB
Markdown

# DRM/KMS capture — security model & threat model
The optional `drm` feature adds a Linux capture backend that reads the active
scanout directly from DRM/KMS, **bypassing the xdg-desktop-portal consent
dialog**. It exists for unattended / login-screen / Wayland scenarios where the
portal prompt is not acceptable. Because it bypasses consent, treat it as a
**privileged, opt-in host-mode feature**, not a normal Wayland capture backend.
## How it works
Reading the active scanout needs `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` (to map other clients'
framebuffers). RustDesk's root `--service` already runs with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, so
the `drm` feature does the read **in-process in that root service**: it
`dlopen`s `libdrmtap.so` and calls it in direct mode — no privileged child, no
`setcap` helper. On the **default (split) path** the root service does not touch
pixels: it exports the active scanout as a DMA-BUF and passes just that
**read-only** fd to the unprivileged user `--server` over a dedicated
service-scoped IPC channel (`_drm`) via `SCM_RIGHTS`. The `--server` keeps an
**import-once EGLImage cache** (keyed on the buffer, so a given scanout buffer is
imported once and re-imports are elided), detiles/converts it to linear RGBA in
its own unprivileged address space, and feeds the encoder — so the root service
never loads libEGL/libGLESv2 and never copies scanout pixels. Only the **CPU
fallback path** (used when the seat/driver cannot produce a transferable DMA-BUF,
or the consumer has no render node of its own, see *When the CPU fallback is
chosen* below) copies the scanout to packed BGRA inside the root service and
streams those bytes over `_drm`. This mirrors
the Windows `portable_service` split (a privileged process captures, an
unprivileged one presents) but reuses RustDesk's own hardened IPC.
- `libdrmtap.so` is loaded through a small `dlopen` loader (`drmtap_dl`); if the
library or one of its runtime deps is missing the load fails cleanly and the
caller falls back to the PipeWire/portal path.
- The loader also **refuses a library that cannot do the split**: one reporting
below 0.4.10, and one reporting a newer version without actually exporting
`drmtap_grab_desc` / `drmtap_open_render` / `drmtap_convert_dmabuf` (a stale or
pre-release build). The only way to capture with such a library is the
in-process convert, which in the root service means loading the vendor GL stack
there, so it is refused and the caller falls back to PipeWire/portal. The
privileged process therefore never loads GL because of which file happened to
be on the load path; the CPU fallback below is entered only for a fact about
the seat or the consumer.
- The reader restricts the device it opens to a realpath under `/dev/dri/`
(`drm_reader.rs`); RustDesk always runs libdrmtap in direct in-process mode
(`helper_path` is `NULL`). **No `drmtap-helper` binary is built, shipped, or
installed by this package**: there is no `setcap`, no capability-bearing file,
and no capture group in this deployment. Being precise about what that does
and does not guarantee: an empty `helper_path` is not by itself a "helper
disabled" switch in the C. `find_helper` (`privilege_helper.c`) searches six
hardcoded paths, one of which is `/usr/lib/rustdesk/drmtap-helper`, the
directory this package installs into, and `fork`/`exec`s the first executable
it finds if the direct export ever returns `EACCES`/`EPERM`. Here that path is
unreachable for two independent reasons: the root service holds
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN` so the direct export succeeds, and the package builds only the
shared library, so no helper exists at any of those paths. They are all
root-writable-only, so a helper appearing there would not be an escalation
either, but the honest statement is "a privileged child is spawned only if a
helper binary exists at one of those fixed root-owned paths, and this package
never installs one", not "never".
- The `_drm` socket lives beside the hardened `_service` socket
(`/tmp/<app>-service/ipc_drm`). It is `0666` so the unprivileged `--server`
can connect, but every accepted peer is authorized in `handle_drm_conn`
(`authorize_service_scoped_ipc_connection`: peer must be root or the active
session uid, with a `/proc/<pid>/exe` identity match). Connectable is not
authorized.
## Threat model
- **Consent bypass.** This mode does not show the portal "select what to share"
prompt. On a misconfigured install it could expose the login screen, the lock
screen, or another local user's graphical session.
- **The scanout parse runs in the root service.** Moving the read in-process
removes the old `setcap` helper and its world-exec attack surface. On the
**default (split) path** the root service does only a **metadata-only** parse
of the scanout descriptor and exports the DMA-BUF fd; the untrusted-framebuffer
detile / pixel-format conversion runs in the **unprivileged `--server`**,
outside `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. Export-side validation is therefore metadata-only —
geometry bounded to `<= MAX_DIM` (16384) and `num_planes` in `1..=4`
(`drm_reader.rs` `grab_desc`); there is **no fourcc gate** on the export side,
because the format check is delegated to the unprivileged converter, which
handles every format `libdrmtap` supports (XRGB/ARGB8888, 10-bit XR30/AR30,
HDR, CCS-compressed). The exported fd is **read-only**: `libdrmtap` exports the
DMA-BUF via `drmPrimeHandleToFD` with `DRM_RDWR` dropped (`O_RDONLY`), and
`drm_reader` `dup()`s it — which shares the same open file description and so
preserves that access mode — so the unprivileged consumer can map the scanout
for reading but never write into the live framebuffer. On the **CPU fallback
path** the pixel-format conversion / detile instead runs inside the
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN` service without a seccomp cage; there the frame copy has
format / stride / geometry and integer-overflow guards (`drm_reader.rs`
`grab`), and non-32bpp scanouts are rejected before the copy. The device is
realpath-gated to `/dev/dri/` on both paths.
- **`_drm` is a screen-content channel.** It is authorized per connection (see
above); without that authz any local process could read the screen. On the
**default (split) path** the channel carries the scanout DMA-BUF fd, passed to
the unprivileged `--server` over `SCM_RIGHTS` as a **read-only** descriptor
(the `--server` holds an import-once EGLImage cache, so a given scanout buffer
is imported once and re-imports are elided); the peer can map the scanout for
reading but cannot write it. The **CPU fallback path** instead carries plain
packed-BGRA bytes over the same authorized socket (no fd passing, no shared
memory).
- **When the CPU fallback is chosen.** The split path is the default; the
consumer asks the service for the CPU-converted frame in two cases: no render
node can be opened for this seat, or a previous convert on this display
already failed. A third case is a **multi-GPU safety fallback**: if
the service could not name the render node of the GPU that exports the scanout
(an older `libdrmtap` without `drmtap_render_node`) and the host has more than
one render node, the consumer refuses to guess one, because importing a scanout
on a device that did not export it can succeed and return corrupted pixels
rather than fail. The conversion then happens in the service, on the device it
already has open, so it is correct by construction. Hosts with a single render
node have nothing to pick wrong and keep the DMA-BUF fast path.
## Deployment
- **Off by default.** The `drm` feature is **not** in the default feature set and
is **not** enabled in standard release packages; the drm-off build is
byte-identical to upstream. Build it explicitly with
`python3 build.py --flutter --drm` (Linux only).
- **Separate opt-in package.** A `--drm` build ships as a distinctly named
`rustdesk-unattended-wayland` package (Conflicts/Replaces `rustdesk`), so
enabling consent-free capture is an explicit install choice.
- **Bundled library, no capabilities.** The package installs the versioned
`libdrmtap.so.0.<minor>.<patch>` plus a `libdrmtap.so.0` soname symlink under
`/usr/lib/rustdesk/`, and the in-process `dlopen` names that absolute path
(`/usr/lib/rustdesk/libdrmtap.so.0`). The package deliberately does **not**
register the directory with the dynamic linker: no
`/etc/ld.so.conf.d/` drop-in and no `ldconfig` trigger are shipped, so a
private library cannot shadow a system one for unrelated binaries
(Debian Policy 10.2). The bare-soname lookups remain only as a fallback for a
development build reached through `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`.
There is no `setcap`, no `rustdesk-capture` group, and no privileged binary:
the capture runs inside the root `--service`, which already holds the
capability it needs. Hosts without `/dev/dri` access (or where the library
fails to load) transparently fall back to the PipeWire/portal path.
- **Minimum OS: Ubuntu 18.04 (or equivalent, libdrm ≥ 2.4.95).** `libdrmtap` needs the DRM
`GetFB2` framebuffer API (libdrm 2.4.95); Ubuntu 18.04 ships 2.4.101, so 18.04 is the floor. The
`rustdesk-unattended-wayland` deb is built and packaged on an ubuntu18.04 container in CI (a
build-time compatibility check only — DRM capture itself is not installed or exercised there), so
it is built against the 18.04 toolchain and libraries and is compatible with 18.04 and newer.
Capture also requires an active KMS scanout (a Wayland/KMS session with a display
on); on hosts where the compositor drives the display outside DRM/KMS (e.g. the proprietary NVIDIA
X11 stack) there is no capturable CRTC and the path falls back to PipeWire/portal.
- **Recommended for** single-user, physically-controlled, or unattended hosts.
## Auditing
```bash
# the bundled capture library and its soname symlink — no capabilities are set on either
ls -l /usr/lib/rustdesk/libdrmtap.so.0*
# the dlopen names the symlink by absolute path, so what matters is where the symlink points:
readlink /usr/lib/rustdesk/libdrmtap.so.0 # expect: the versioned object shipped by the package
# and there should be no other object left beside it (a leftover is not loaded on its own, but it
# is what a stray ldconfig over this directory would repoint the symlink to)
ls /etc/ld.so.conf.d/ | grep -i rustdesk # expect: no output (none is shipped)
# confirm no privileged helper is present (there should be none)
getcap -r /usr/lib/rustdesk 2>/dev/null # expect: no output
```