The single punch leaves before hbbs has told the controller where to dial, so
it is never in flight at the same time as the controller's SYN: it opens our
NAT, meets nothing, and a gateway that answers it with RST takes the mapping
down with it, leaving the listener waiting on a hole that no longer exists.
Punch again while the controller may still be dialing, and race those punches
against the accept. That is two ways in where there was one: the mapping is
rebuilt if a RST took it, and once the controller sits in SYN_SENT one of the
punches meets its SYN and completes as a simultaneous open - which a punch sent
before the controller had been told anything never could. The crossing reaches
the punch rather than the listener because the two sockets share the address
but only the punch matches the four-tuple, which the tests now pin down.
There is no instant to aim at, and no window either. `Client::connect` sizes
the controller's dial only after our PunchHoleSent, from its own rendezvous
time and the direct failures it has recorded for us: CONNECT_TIMEOUT between
two known-asymmetric NATs that never failed, punch_time_used times three or
six otherwise, floored at a second - so a peer that failed once dials for a
second or two from then on, and none of that reaches this side. The repeats
therefore cover our own ceiling instead, CONNECT_TIMEOUT, which is exactly as
long as the accept has always been willing to take a connection through the
hole, and back off across it: dense at the start, where every window begins
and the short ones end, sparse afterwards, which is `punch_udp`'s shape for
the same reason. A window past that ceiling was lost before this change too,
and mostly to the controller's own kernel - Windows gives a SYN up at 21s,
Linux's next re-send after 15s is at 31s; a window short of it costs a few
SYNs to a port already closed.
No punch is cut on a per-attempt timeout; one in flight is bounded only by
the shared deadline plus PUNCH_GRACE. A punch is cancel-safe only while it is
still in SYN_SENT; once the controller's SYN has crossed it the socket is half
way through a handshake, and cutting it there cuts the connection the
controller is opening - whose `connect` has already returned, so that attempt
fails outright, there being no relay fallback after a failed TCP handshake. A
timer cannot tell the two states apart, and none is needed: a gateway that
answers with RST fails the connect at once and the loop punches again, while
one that drops the SYN in silence leaves the socket in SYN_SENT, holding the
mapping open while the kernel re-sends, which any SYN of the controller's then
crosses - a second punch has nothing to add. The deadline decides whether
another punch starts; one in flight runs a grace past it, enough for a
crossing begun just before it to complete. The last sleep is cut at the
deadline rather than run out past it, so the window ends on a punch given
that grace and not on a gap of up to the backoff ceiling: the controller's
window opened after ours, on the PunchHoleSent hbbs relayed, so one as long
as ours is still open through our tail.
Only the accept races the punch, never `accept_connection`: that one does not
return until the session it goes on to run has ended, so racing it would tear a
live session down.
Whichever arrives first is the one connection the request produces. `meta`
carries the control permissions hbbs granted for this one controller, so
serving the loser as well would hand them to a second peer - and nothing about
a connection tells the two apart before `create_tcp_connection` has spoken to
it, least of all its address: a carrier NAT shares one between subscribers,
and a NAT that pools its external addresses may dial us from a different one
than hbbs saw the controller through. So the address is not checked, as
`accept_connection` never checked it; the handshake says who arrived, and what
holds the invariant is that there is no second serve. Those
permissions are a ceiling and not a grant either way: `Connection` gates every
message on `authorized`, and latches the login scope of the first request it
accepts, so a peer that reached the hole still arrives with nothing.
The accept loops rather than taking a single connection, so that a transient
accept error does not spend the window the controller still has to arrive in.
libp2p's DCUtR reaches the same place by having both peers dial at one instant
agreed over the relay. Nothing we send reaches the controller directly, so we
cover its dial window rather than name an instant inside it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
The controller sends every candidate twice, because the server's hop to a
peer registered over UDP can lose one. The ICE agent that dedups repeats
sits downstream of the answerer's queue, so the answerer paid for both
copies: a slot, a JSON parse, and the ICE agent's lock, once per repeat.
Remember a digest of what was queued and skip the repeat. Recorded only
once queued, so a candidate a full queue refused stays repairable by the
re-send.
The queue's depth is unchanged. A real peer gathers well under it - four
STUN servers, link-local IPv6 filtered, one component - and the drain
empties it as candidates trickle in, so what this removes is the redundant
work, not an overflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019aokqJuhjvB3kijXtAg5Ns
The earlier commit took dcsctp's min_rtt_variance = 220 as a raw floor under
rttvar. dcsctp divides the option by kHeuristicVarianceAdjustment = 8.0 first,
a historical accident it kept because downstream users had measured good
values with it, so the intended floor is 27.5ms of variance contributing 110ms
to RTO. Flooring at 220 contributed 880ms instead, which on a 50ms path left
RTO within 7% of the 1000ms default this change exists to escape.
The fork also now records why T1/T2 share T3's RTO manager here, unlike
dcsctp's separate control timers: RTO_INITIAL is the T3 value for the first
DATA chunk, since no RTT sample exists before the first SACK.
punch_udp sent a zero-length datagram and called the hole open on whatever
arrived next. The rendezvous NAT test's own leftover replies satisfy that
immediately - connect() does not flush the receive queue - so the retry loop
never ran and success meant nothing. The dead socket then cost KCP its full
timeout to rediscover, which is how a failed punch came to take 18 seconds.
Probes now carry a magic and a 64-bit transaction id, and both ends answer
each other's probes, so returning is a fact: a reply echoing our own id is the
one thing that proves the pair carries traffic both ways. With failure now
distinguishable from 'not yet', the window drops from 20s to 3s.
Two asymmetries fall out of that:
Only the connector stops on its own acknowledgement, because only it has
something to send next. An acknowledgement proves our probe came back, not
that the peer's probe was answered - and after punch_udp returns nothing
answers probes any more, since KCP's io loop drops anything shorter than its
header. A listener that stopped there would go mute while a peer whose own
probe or answer was lost - the normal state of a hole still opening - kept
probing an endpoint that works, until it timed out.
So the listener stops on the peer's first real packet instead, and hands that
packet to KcpStream::accept as its init_packet: its arrival proves the pair as
well as an acknowledgement would, and KCP never retransmits its SYN.
webrtc-sctp ships RFC 4960's RTO.Initial/RTO.Min (3000/1000), TCP's values for
arbitrary public paths. On this workload they set the recovery time outright:
a request/response exchange keeps one chunk in flight, so no later SACK ever
raises miss_indicator to the 3 that arms fast retransmit, and the T3 floor is
the only way back. A single loss during a handshake or a first keyframe
therefore costs whole seconds.
The fork now carries dcsctp's numbers instead - the SCTP implementation Google
wrote to replace usrsctp for Chrome's WebRTC data channels, the same realtime
workload: rto_initial 500, rto_min 400, a 220ms floor under the RTT variance,
and mtu 1191. INITIAL_MTU 1228 plus DTLS/UDP/IPv6 overhead is 1313, past the
1280 minimum, so every full-size chunk fragmented on an IPv6 path.
Both patch entries move to the new branch, which also carries the Windows IPv6
byte-swap fix, so one rev matches the whole webrtc 0.13 stack.
`test_ipv6` kept its own hand-written copy of the STUN servers. It now reads
`WebRTCStream::stun_servers()`, so an operator who points OPTION_ICE_SERVERS at their own
server gets it on both paths instead of one.
`test_bind_ipv6` sends nothing - `connect` only makes the kernel pick a route and a source
address - so the whole cost is DNS. It races the lookups rather than betting this host's
IPv6 support on whether the first entry happens to publish a AAAA where the user resolves
from; google's does not, from a Chinese resolver, and it was the entry being bet on.
`stun_ipv4_test`, `STUNS_V4` and `test_nat_ipv4` have had no callers since the punch stopped
taking its port from a second socket, and go.
`get_kcp_cc_enabled` reads the renamed option through `option2bool`, like every other one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
`stream_type` reaches the UI as the transport that won the race, and every other transport
already carries the family in that label - the v6 punch reports `IPv6`. WebRTC does not: one
label covers both families, and it is the one path whose real remote address can differ from
the rendezvous-observed one the session is identified by.
Refine it at the hand-off to the UI rather than at the source: five sites in client.rs
compare `typ == "WebRTC"`, so widening the label there would silently move control flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
Also pin webrtc-util to a fork of 0.11.0 carrying a Windows IPv6 enumeration fix.
`ifaces` reads the adapter list's on-wire IPv6 bytes as host-order `[u16; 8]`, so on a
little-endian host every group comes out byte-swapped and unbindable: a peer's real
240e:369:9606:4600:f52a:7a8d:2530:4de0 is enumerated as e24:6903:696:46:2af5:8d7a:3025:e04d,
::1 as ::100 and fe80:: as 80fe::. Each fails to bind with WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL, so ICE gathers
no IPv6 host candidate at all on Windows - where a globally routable address is the one
NAT-free path a CGNAT'd peer has.
Never reported upstream; the unix twin of the same bug was fixed in webrtc-rs#475 (2023).
Fork: rustdesk-org/webrtc, branch rustdesk-patches, tag webrtc-util-0.11.0-win-ipv6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
`get_local_endpoint_trickle` became `local_endpoint() -> &str`, which
cannot fail, so both call sites lose an unreachable error arm — the
mediator's closed a pc against a failure that no longer exists.
`punch_type` named one transport, and picked it off `allow_tcp_punch`.
A round carries several at once — a NAT port and a v6 address and an
offer — and since the TCP punch became a switch it can carry none, so
one name had to misreport both: the logs of the round that broke WebRTC
read "#1 UDP punch attempt" while the request also carried the v6
address and the offer that was actually failing, and a round with
nothing to punch with was labelled "WebRTC". List them instead —
"UDP+IPv6+WebRTC" — and call the empty round "Relay", which is what it
can still end as and what `typ` prints for it.
The offer is moved into the request rather than cloned into it; that
was its last use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019UzcMTdYTEv2QbMHcTSUy3
TCP punching was the one direct transport without a switch, while UDP,
IPv6 and WebRTC each had one. Add "Enable TCP hole punching" above the
UDP toggle on both desktop and mobile, default on — including on
self-hosted servers, since unlike the other three (whose default-off
there guards against an hbbs that cannot forward their fields) TCP
punching has always been supported by every server.
Turning all four off would leave no way to punch at all, so TCP runs
regardless in that case. That backstop keys off the switches alone: a
transport that is enabled but fails to materialize — no public v6
address, no NAT port, a failed offerer — is already covered by the
relay fallback for a round that ends up with no usable direct
transport. With the TCP punch off, the fallback request is skipped
too: it exists only to carry that punch, and would otherwise reach
connect() with nothing to try and merely open a second relay.
Known cost, unchanged behavior for the peer: the request carries no
field for this choice, so a peer that receives one with no udp_port and
no offer still punches a TCP hole and listens for a connection the
controller will not make. Representing the transport choice on the
wire needs a proto field and the server forwarding it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne
The punch request carries udp_port only if the rendezvous server's
TestNatResponse has arrived, and the wait for it was bounded by
rtt / 2 — half the TCP connect time, on the assumption that TCP and
UDP round trips are comparable and the test, started earlier, has
already answered.
A transparent TCP proxy breaks that assumption: a TUN-mode VPN on the
host, or a redirect-mode proxy on the LAN gateway serving every device
behind it, completes the handshake locally in ~3ms while the real UDP
round trip is hundreds of ms. Log-confirmed against 5.161.65.208: ping
341ms, TCP connect 3.7ms, connect to a dead port there "succeeds" just
as fast. The window collapsed to ~1.5ms, udp_port stayed 0 on every
attempt, and UDP punch was never even requested — although UDP itself
passes such gateways untouched.
So use the TCP clock only when it is believable: below a plausible WAN
round trip it says nothing about the UDP path, and a flat ceiling
applies instead. The loop still exits the moment the port arrives, so
a genuinely nearby server pays nothing and only a UDP-dead network
waits out the ceiling — on the udp-carrying round alone, while the
parallel pure-TCP round is unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne
Closing the controlling window left the controlled side waiting out
ICE decay — ~25-30s in the peer's log, its disconnected/failed ladder
running to completion — where TCP delivers a FIN at once. The session
end closed the pc by spawning onto io_loop's own
`#[tokio::main(flavor = "current_thread")]` runtime, which is dropped
the moment io_loop returns, and nothing after that call yields: the
task was never polled even once, so no DTLS close_notify ever left.
Every attempt to fix that on the caller's side failed the same way,
because the mismatch was never about where the close ran: a pc's UDP
sockets register with the reactor, and its ICE/DTLS/SCTP pumps spawn
on the runtime, that is current while it is built — so a pc created
by a session outlives the only runtime that can drive its I/O, and a
close driven anywhere else completes without reaching the wire.
The bump homes them where they can outlive any caller: WebRTCStream
builds on a process-lifetime runtime and every detached close runs
there as its own never-cancelled task. io_loop keeps its plain
close_webrtc() calls and only documents why nothing here may spawn or
await the teardown on the dying session runtime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016HV43uh1ztv6Wm5qi3Y1ne
Three correctness fixes in the transport race, plus three convention
cleanups.
- race_transports_prefer_webrtc committed a relayed result while a direct
attempt was still in flight: the others arm returned on
webrtc_fut.is_none() even with an unfinished direct future, and the
WebRTC-error arm returned a held relay without checking others_fut. A
relay is now committed only when nothing direct can still arrive (or
the window expires); a parked relay is also preferred over composing
an error when both sides fail. Three regression tests, mutation-checked.
- connect()'s plain select_ok let a TURN-relayed WebRTC win as "first
success", dropping still-racing UDP/IPv6 direct attempts and reporting
the relayed pair as direct. It now runs through the same prefer-P2P
race with each attempt carrying whether its path is direct, and the
WebRTC future resolves is_relayed() so a TURN win is held behind
direct attempts, not committed as one.
- The RelayResponse path kept direct == true when a WebRTC win's DTLS
handshake failed and it fell back to relay, so the relay was reported
P2P. Clear the flag with the transport switch.
- Trim the OffererGuard doc to the three-line max; move the new
enable-webrtc localization key to the end of every lang list; the KCP
option constant moved to hbb_common config::keys (0f663aa).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
386 added comment lines down to 287 across client, mediator, kcp_stream
and common. Same rule as hbb_common 3d64e43: out go past-bug narration,
rejected alternatives, measurements and restatements of the code; the
non-derivable why stays.
is_direct_transport goes with them. Judging the race by a transport
label was replaced by the resolved direct flag, leaving it used only by
its own test — and, having been inserted between the doc comment and
race_transports_prefer_webrtc, it had also taken that function's
contract with it. Removing it reattaches the doc where it belongs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Third review round. Two of these are regressions from the previous one.
- The RelayResponse race predicate was `is_direct_transport(result.2)`,
which answers true for the label "WebRTC" - but WebRTC is only a
direct path when ICE nominated a non-TURN pair. A TURN-relayed WebRTC
result therefore committed instantly and cancelled the IPv6 attempt
racing beside it, which is the same inversion the previous fix removed
in the other direction. (That fix was also argued from a wrong premise:
the site does carry an IPv6 future, pushed ~50 lines earlier than the
relay one.) Each future now resolves whether its path is direct and
the predicate reads that bool, matching the outer race, and the
downstream recomputation goes away.
- policy_relay still folded in Config::is_proxy(), and that is what gets
persisted into the peer's config as force-always-relay - so one
session through a proxy pinned the peer to relay forever and disabled
WebRTC for it, exactly the latch the previous round fixed for
WebSocket. Split out peer_relay: the saved option or an explicit
request for THIS peer, and the only part written back.
- The controlled side buffered remote ICE candidates in an unbounded
channel while the controller caps the same buffer at 64, and draining
one costs a JSON parse plus the ICE agent's lock. Whoever can reach a
session's route could grow it without limit inside the long-lived
service process. Bounded, with the overflow logged through the
existing throttle.
- That route was also removed by key alone when an answerer finished, so
a punch retry that built a fresh answerer under the same fingerprint
had its live sender deleted by the previous one's cleanup - after
which it received no candidates at all. Evict only our own sender, the
way the session cache already guards the analogous case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
The webrtc feature pulls time 0.3 into scrap's graph (hbb_common ->
webrtc -> webrtc-dtls -> der-parser -> asn1-rs), and that crate carries
an `impl Div<time::Duration> for std::time::Duration`. Orphan rules
allow it because the RHS is its own type, and trait impls are visible
across the whole dependency graph without a use, so std::time::Duration
now has two Div candidates. `yuv_count as _` casts to a plain inference
variable, which both candidates fit, so it stops resolving:
error[E0282]: type annotations needed
--> libs/scrap/examples/benchmark.rs:146:33
Only two of the four sites are reported - rustc emits one E0282 per
function body - so all four are annotated. The already-explicit
`as u32` at the hwcodec site and `start.elapsed() / cnt` are unaffected,
the latter because an integer literal's variable can only unify with an
integral type and rules the time impl out on its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- close_webrtc is no longer async (hbb_common 88f965f), so the ten call
sites in port_forward and io_loop - all inside select! arms or futures
the UI can abandon - can no longer be cancelled mid-teardown, which
left the pc unclosable and its session entry stranded. Client's own
spawn_close_webrtc went with it: the runtime-teardown guard it existed
for now lives in close_detached, so both Drop paths share one
implementation.
- webrtc_relayed() returns None when no candidate pair is selected or
the pc closed under a concurrent teardown, and both call sites read
that as "not relayed", i.e. direct. A TURN-relayed session could
therefore be shown to the user as peer-to-peer. Claiming a direct path
needs evidence of one, so an unknown answer now counts as relayed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Review of #15684 and hbb_common#579. Each of these left the code reading
correct while the feature did not function.
- The RelayResponse race classified P2P with `result.2 == "IPv6"`, but
that site's futures are only ever the relay ("Relay"/"WebSocket") and
the WebRTC branch's own "WebRTC" — so the predicate was constantly
false. When the relay landed first the result was still right (the
webrtc arm's `others_fut.is_none()` fallback), but when WebRTC
connected FIRST it was parked as if it were a relay and the relay was
committed on arrival, discarding a live direct connection. That is the
LAN case: the better the network, the worse the outcome. Classify by
what the label means, via is_direct_transport, and test both orderings
— only the relay-first one was covered.
- handle_peer_info wrote "force-always-relay=Y" into the peer's saved
config whenever force_relay was set, which now includes the WebSocket
transport. One ws session therefore turned the peer into a permanent
relay-by-policy peer, and relay-by-policy means Relay-only ICE, so
WebRTC could never go direct to it again — the flagship path worked
exactly once. Persist policy_relay, which is the user's choice; the
transport is a property of this client, not of the peer.
- The answerer gated on this machine's enable-webrtc option, but that is
LocalConfig: the UI process writes it and never syncs it over IPC,
while handle_punch_hole runs in the server process, which on Windows
resolves LocalConfig under a different profile and reads the
private-server default of "N". The gate refused to answer in exactly
the self-hosted deployments the transport exists for. Drop it: the
answerer follows the request, like the udp/ipv6 legs, and the option
still gates the feature where it can — an offer only exists because
some controller had it enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Turning on hbb_common's "webrtc" feature pulls webrtc-util into the android
link, and its ifaces() -- reached from vnet::Net::new() on every ICE gather --
calls getifaddrs(). bionic exports getifaddrs/freeifaddrs only from API 24,
while flutter/ndk_*.sh builds against --platform 21, so every abi failed to
link on the undefined symbols.
Raising the platform to 24 would have to drag minSdkVersion 22 with it and
turn the link error into a load-time one on Android 5.1/6.0, so define the
two symbols instead, using the RTM_GETLINK + RTM_GETADDR netlink dump bionic
itself uses. The definition also shadows bionic's on API >= 24 rather than
delegating to it, so the path that ships is the path every test device runs.
Checked against synthesised netlink dumps on the host -- link/address parsing,
prefix masks, point-to-point, ipv6 scope ids, malformed and truncated messages
-- under UBSan and byte-exact guard malloc, with a deliberately unsigned
remainder as the negative control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The branch had flipped KCP to nc=0 (built-in congestion window) for
every session. That is a transport-behavior change for all users made on
reasoning alone, and the reasoning does not decide it: which profile wins
depends on why packets are being lost.
nc=1 - what RustDesk has always shipped - never shrinks the send window,
so on a genuinely congested uplink it deepens the loss it is reacting to.
But nc=0's backoff is blunt: a fast retransmit halves the window while an
RTO sets cwnd = 1 outright (ikcp.c) and recovery slow-starts from one
packet, so on a link with random loss and no congestion - Wi-Fi
interference, a long-haul path - it reads loss as congestion and can
stall an interactive stream for seconds. That failure mode is also the
more visible one to a remote-desktop user.
No benchmark settles this either: a loopback A/B has no bottleneck queue,
hence no congestion to control, and would flatter nc=1 by construction.
Deciding it needs a shaped link or field data.
So keep the profile users already run and let the other one be asked for
("enable-kcp-congestion-control" = "Y"). Flipping the default later is a
one-line change once there is evidence. kcp-sys keeps its own test
covering the nc=0 path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
auth.rs predated hbb_common's LogThrottle and grew its own equivalent:
same shape (last_log_at + suppressed), same 5s interval, plus a helper
and three OnceLock<Mutex<..>> statics. It also counted the other way -
excluding the event being reported - so each of the three sites carried
two near-identical log::warn! arms to avoid printing "suppressed 0".
The shared macro covers all of it: one static per call site declared by
the expansion, and the multiplicity suffix appears only when there is
one, which is what those duplicated arms were for. 102 lines out, 27 in.
Behavior difference, deliberate: a burst now reads "(x47)" - the total
including this line - instead of "(suppressed 46 similar events)". One
number, no arithmetic, and one convention across the codebase.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
kcp-sys has been through two review rounds of behavioral fixes; the
client wrapper (kcp_io pumps, connect/accept deadlines, framed-stream
adaptation, guard lifetimes) had no tests pinning what rustdesk actually
relies on. Four now do, each through real 127.0.0.1 UDP sockets and the
BytesCodec framing sessions use:
- handshake + bidirectional framed roundtrip + graceful close: the peer
observes end-of-stream instead of hanging (guard outlives the framed
stream so the FIN goes out);
- a writer that queues 50 frames and closes immediately loses none of
them - the client-side pin for the close-tail-drain semantics;
- socket errors after the peer vanishes are treated as loss: writes keep
succeeding, nothing tears down (ICMP is advisory on connected UDP);
- the connect deadline holds when nothing answers.
Mutation-checked: dropping inbound forwarding in kcp_io reddens exactly
the three tests that need the pump, and the timeout test alone stays
green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
OPTION_ENABLE_WEBRTC (hbb_common 48c2d4d) follows the udp/ipv6 punch
options end to end: default on against the public server, off against
private ones, same settings UI placement on desktop and mobile, and the
same bool2option local-option handling. Gates:
- controller: should_create_webrtc_offerer checks it first — no pc, no
STUN/TURN gathering, no offer in the request;
- controlled: unlike the udp/ipv6 legs, which deliberately follow the
request, answering builds a pc that gathers ICE from this host, so
the answerer honors this machine's own switch too.
Translations for "Enable WebRTC P2P connection" added to all 50 lang
files next to the IPv6 entry (IPv6 and WebRTC are invariant terms in
the same grammatical slot in every one of them).
Also stop probing v6 reachability (test_ipv6) under any forced relay:
the v6 punch socket is never bound there, so the probe was wasted work
on every ws/proxy/relay connection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Companion to hbb_common 68d2729: the full-ICE declaration now lives as
an `ice_policy: "all"` key inside the webrtc:// envelope, so the request
assembly no longer sets webrtc_all_ice and the controlled side asks the
envelope (endpoint_declares_all_ice) instead of a PunchHole field. The
rendezvous server carries the offer opaquely — no forwarding to keep in
sync. Skew behavior is unchanged: an unmarked or unparseable envelope
reads as the old Relay-only semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Reverts the connect/accept/add_conn changes that regressed concurrent
connects (the state_map guard held across add_conn is load-bearing), states
the single-conn contract on KcpEndpoint so shared-endpoint behaviour stops
consuming review effort, pins the two invariants that keep truncated input
from aborting under panic='abort', and fixes three findings from external
review: sendwnd() echoing raw config instead of KCP's effective window (a
non-positive factory value stalled sending forever), the passive closer's
lost final FIN delaying EOF by up to ~20s, and the doubled window
overflowing for extreme factory values.
Lock-only change: cargo update -p kcp-sys also re-picked libloading's
windows-targets between two versions already present in the lock; that was
reverted to keep this commit to the one line it is about. cargo metadata
--locked passes on the result.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebSocket support folds into force_relay because a ws tunnel kills
classic TCP/UDP punching — but that conflated transport necessity with
relay policy, and the WebRTC decisions keyed off the merged flag: a ws
client built no offerer at all without TURN, and only a Relay-only-ICE
one with it. ws deployments could never reach a direct WebRTC
connection, which is exactly the path they are supposed to live on.
Split the flag. LoginConfigHandler now tracks policy_relay (the
force-always-relay option, an explicit relay request — /r ids and
retry-via-relay included — and proxy) separately; force_relay stays
policy_relay || use_ws() and keeps governing the classic paths, so
non-ws behavior is unchanged everywhere:
- the offerer's existence and ICE policy follow policy_relay: under
pure ws the offer gathers every candidate type and may go direct;
under relay-by-policy it stays Relay-only ICE, TURN-gated, exactly
as before;
- the RelayResponse race applies the prefer-P2P window under ws (a
direct ICE path is worth delaying an already-ready relay for) while
policy relay keeps first-success semantics;
- the request carries webrtc_all_ice (hbb_common 64b54ab) so the
controlled side knows the offer is full-ICE: it answers with full ICE
and no TURN requirement, while offers without the bit keep today's
relay-only answer path on every version-skew combination.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Picks up the handshake-recovery work plus the review round on top of it:
ABBA deadlock between the endpoint's two DashMaps, graceful-close tail
truncation, mid-stream hole on ikcp_send failure, FIN retransmission for
lost-FIN half-open hangs, SYN-ACK budget burned on dropped packets,
spurious ConnectTimeout after a completed handshake, accept-backlog
overflow stranding conns, aliasing UB in the output callback, and the
log-facade/throttling cleanup (per-packet sites no longer reach the
debug-level file logger, peer-rate warns throttled).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
The send and recv arms shared one counter, and an ICMP error on a connected
socket is reported once and then cleared — so the steady state is an
alternation: the send succeeds and clears the counter, the next recv reports
the error and finds the counter at 1, and logs. Every error still wrote a
line, at the ~100/s the previous commit set out to stop, while the
persistent-failure and recovery branches were unreachable.
Use one LogThrottle per direction instead of a hand-rolled counter. That
removes the shared state the bug lived in, drops a third throttling mechanism
in favour of the one already added, and leaves the surrounding `if let Err`
untouched rather than reshaping it into a match.
Also fix test_udp_uat's socket-error arm, the untreated twin of the punch_udp
site: it had no backoff at all, so a persistent error re-armed recv
immediately and spun the loop at CPU speed, one warn line per iteration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Debug output goes to the log file, so a site that fires per received message
or per retry lets someone else decide how much a machine writes to disk. The
WebRTC work added the first such sites.
- KCP io loop: absorbing ICMP errors as packet loss made a broken socket write
~100 lines a second for the 60s until the pong timeout reaps it. Log by run
instead: one line when a run starts, one per ~5s while it persists so a stuck
socket stays visible, and one on recovery with the total.
- punch_udp: the recv error retries every 10ms for up to MAX_TIME, so one line
per occurrence wrote thousands per punch. Log the first, report the count in
the timeout message.
- ICE candidate paths (client, mediator): the peer sets the candidate rate and
the rendezvous route carrying them needs no prior punch, so throttle to one
line a minute each with the suppressed count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
Candidates arrive in gathering order — host, then srflx, then relay — so a
full buffer was discarding exactly the ones that traverse NAT while keeping
host ones that only work on a shared LAN. Evict from the front instead.
Also document why the controller's ICE bridge must not reconnect on error, in
contrast to the controlled side's per-candidate retry: its socket address is
the return route itself (mangled into PunchHole.socket_addr, echoed back in
IceCandidate.socket_addr, resolved through tcp_punch), so a reconnect would
arrive from an address no route points at, and the server drops the old entry
when the connection closes. Once it dies both directions are dead, and
abandoning WebRTC is the correct response rather than retrying.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
race_transports_prefer_webrtc committed any success from its first argument
outright, on the assumption that it is the WebRTC connect. It is not: the call
site passes a whole punch attempt, which internally falls back to request_relay
when its direct transports fail. That relay was therefore committed instantly
while the offer-less fallback's TCP punch was still in flight — inverting the
preference this function exists to enforce, since the is_p2p predicate the
caller already supplies was applied only to the `others` branch.
Apply it to both branches: a direct result from either side still commits
immediately, and a relayed result from either side is held for the window so
the other side can land something direct. Also commit a held connection when
the surviving branch errors, which the previous code only did on the first
branch's failure path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
The rebase onto master (switch-code feature) added an 8th request_relay
parameter; pass the interface's switch code from both WebRTC->relay
fallback paths so a role-swap session survives the fallback. Also drop
a duplicate bindgen 0.72.1 entry the Cargo.lock merge produced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ExUfAkYbq8UC9pQCiLy8TQ
- treat ICMP-driven UDP socket errors (WSAECONNRESET 10054 on Windows,
ECONNREFUSED on Linux) as packet loss in punch_udp and the KCP pump
instead of tearing the session down; KCP retransmits through them and a
truly dead link is still reaped by the pong/app-level timeouts
- resolve STUN hostnames via tokio::net::lookup_host so DNS never blocks a
runtime worker; fix the inverted non-IPv4 error message
- add enable-kcp-congestion-control option (default on): switch the turbo
profile to nc=0 so brief loss on constrained links no longer spirals into
stalls; sender-side only, no wire negotiation
- pin kcp-sys to the rustdesk-patches branch: upstream main lost the
RustDesk patches on the EasyTier sync, and this branch also wires
set_kcp_config_factory into connection setup, making the option effective
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- the WebRTC offer now rides any punch request; only an offer-less request
may close and reuse the rendezvous socket for TCP punching
(request_allows_tcp_punch replaces the udp_port-based invariant), with a
separate offer-less request racing as the TCP fallback
- WebSocket mode no longer disables WebRTC — ws only tunnels the
signaling/relay legs while ICE stays the only P2P path there; SOCKS proxy
still disables it (ICE would bypass the proxy and leak the real IP)
- controlled side: WebRTC-only punch replies and trickled ICE candidates go
over dedicated TCP connections to the rendezvous server instead of the UDP
mediator channel, for ws/TCP-only hbbs deployments; drop the now-redundant
rz_sender plumbing and the 400ms candidate re-send on that leg
- guard is_udp handling against responses to requests that advertised no
udp_port; skip the IPv6 socket bind under force-relay
- test_udp_uat: drop the STUN port race — the punch port must come from the
rendezvous server's TestNatResponse observing this socket's mapping, a
STUN probe from another socket can advertise an unreachable port
- bump hbb_common (webrtc 0.13 MSRV pin rationale + upgrade checklist docs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- prefer-P2P racing (race_transports_prefer_webrtc) across punch and RelayResponse; ICE bridge with 400ms candidate resend
- controlled-side answerer and ICE routing; sign local DTLS fingerprint into SignedId, controller verifies the binding fail-closed
- fix pc leaks: close_webrtc() on insecure-decline paths (io_loop, port_forward); compute direct before disarming the offerer guard
- point hbb_common to the WebRTC data-plane commit 9f5a296
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* hbb_common: bump to the port-forward-mux proto
Also latches PortForward.multiplex into login_scope_digest, which
destructures PortForward's fields exhaustively by design (a new field
must be latched or deliberately ignored to compile).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: window accounting and channel frame builders
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: fix RecvWindow counter overflow on long transfers
Replace cumulative accounting (granted/received) with remaining credit
tracking to prevent u32 overflow after 4 GiB of data on a single channel.
Wire behavior is identical, but the fix allows large file transfers
without mid-stream channel closure.
Add regression test for 8 GiB transfer to verify fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: credit-windowed relay halves and channel coordinator
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* server: PortForwardMux channel table and per-channel tasks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* server: multiplexed port-forward connections stay in the protobuf loop
Wire PortForwardMux into Connection: take the multiplexed path at login
when the controller sets PortForward.multiplex, route
PortForwardChannel frames to it from on_message, sweep the channel
table's targets after open/close, and clean it up on connection close.
Introduce is_port_forward() (socket-based or multiplexed) and use it
at the four sites that classify the connection, so a multiplexed
connection stays in the message loop, gets TestDelay keepalives, and
reports features.port_forward_mux in PeerInfo. The three sites that
break into the raw pipe loop or gate the keepalive still check
port_forward_socket specifically, since a multiplexed connection must
not take that path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* cm: update a port-forward row's targets as tunnel channels come and go
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: controller tunnel with a single-writer stream loop
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: publish Muxed before spawning the tunnel loop
Publishing after spawn let a loop that dies immediately reset the state
first, so the later publish pinned it at Muxed with a dead handle
forever. Also adds a test pinning open-before-data ordering across many
concurrently opened channels, and drops an unused Clone derive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: share one multiplexed tunnel across a window's listeners
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: fix round 1 review findings
Drop the mux default-false assignment now that definite-assignment proves
every path that reads it has set it; the enable-port-forward-mux config
commit picks up the missing attribution trailers; the default-on test
pins the enable- prefix itself rather than option2bool's weaker fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: end-to-end tests over a loopback tunnel
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: fix bulk test's premature half-close, pin the half-close limitation
many_channels_echo_concurrently_and_a_bulk_one_does_not_starve_them dropped
its bulk write half as soon as writing finished, which shuts down the write
side of the socket and, by design (see the design doc's TCP half-close
non-goal; today's run_forward does the same), ends the whole channel. Keep
the write half alive until the reader is done so the test measures
starvation, not half-close. Add a_local_half_close_ends_the_whole_channel to
pin that limitation in code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: cap send credit and other final review fixes
Fix 1 (critical): clamp SendCredit to MAX_SEND_CREDIT (= CHANNEL_WINDOW)
in both new() and add(), so a peer with tunnel permission can no longer
advertise an unbounded window and force the controlled side's unbounded
FrameSink::Direct sink to buffer unlimited target data per channel.
Fix 2: rename the "starve" test to many_channels_echo_concurrently and
drop its (untrue) starvation claim, since it opens every channel before
the bulk transfer starts. Add a_channel_opened_during_a_bulk_transfer_
is_served_promptly, which opens the small channel while the bulk one is
demonstrably mid-flight.
Fix 3: only look up the tunnel permission for `open` frames in the
PortForwardChannel arm of on_message, instead of once per data frame.
Fix 4: two rustfmt deviations in connection.rs (matches! wrapping and a
tuple literal), fixed by hand without a blanket cargo fmt run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: report a refused channel's reason as an error dialog
The controlled side already answers a refused port-forward channel with
opened { success: false, message }; on the multiplexed path TunnelHandle::
on_frame only logged that message at debug and closed the channel, so the
user saw a closed connection with no explanation, worst on the RDP path
where only the RDP client's own error remained. on_frame now returns the
message the window should show, deduplicated per distinct reason (capped
at MAX_REPORTED_OPEN_ERRORS) so one page load's dozen refused connections
surface one dialog per reason instead of a dozen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* Use on_error for refused-channel dialog in tunnel_loop
Redirect the refused-channel error through the standard on_error path
instead of calling msgbox directly, for consistency with other errors
in the port-forward flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: apply the whole-branch review
Correctness:
- listen(): the Legacy arm is merged with the Claimed arm. On its own it
ignored outcome.local_eof, so a client that hung up during login still
got a target connect, an audit record and a CM row on the controlled
side, and ignored outcome.mux, so a peer upgraded while a legacy window
stayed open answered as a tunnel while the controller went raw.
- Refusal dialogs are deduplicated per quiet spell (10 s) rather than per
tunnel lifetime; the lifetime set went silent for the rest of a
long-lived window after the first burst.
- Android's CM listener handles UpdatePortForward; it fell into `_ => {}`.
- relay_socket_to_tunnel reads into one scratch buffer per channel and
sends an exact-size copy. A frame owning its 64 KiB read allocation
pinned it until sent, once per byte on interactive traffic.
Consistency and cleanups:
- The controlled side's refusal text is the raw pipe's wording, RDP
substitution included.
- connection.rs: the PortForwardChannel arm is a one-line hook, the CM
label is pushed from the 1 s tick alone, and the unreachable inner.tx
fall-through is gone.
- The Ready enum is removed; wait_ready() returns Option<Claim>.
- SendCredit::add wakes with notify_one alone.
- on_ui_command() replaces the two ui_receiver handlers in listen().
- TunnelHandle is no longer re-exported (unused-import warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a legacy window stays legacy until it is reopened
Review: the merged `Claimed | Legacy` arm gave a legacy window a hot
transition to a tunnel — every accept re-negotiated, and a peer upgraded
while the window stayed open was promoted underneath live connections.
The product does not need a mode switch inside a window's lifetime, and
the transition was extra state-machine surface for nothing: reopening
the window picks up an upgraded peer.
The two arms are separate again. `Claimed` negotiates once and the
peer's answer fixes the window's mode. `Legacy` logs in for every accept
as before, asks for no tunnel — `LoginConfigHandler::port_forward_mux`
carries the request per login, so the raw pipe never has to talk to a
peer that thinks it agreed to multiplex — and ignores what the peer
reports. Both arms keep skipping a local socket that hung up during
login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* hbb_common: bump to main with rustdesk/hbb_common#594 merged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* server: admit only INITIAL_WINDOW on a channel before opened
The demultiplexer accepted CHANNEL_WINDOW into a pending channel's
unbounded queue, four times the bound the channel task enforces once
it polls. The window now starts at INITIAL_WINDOW and is widened right
before `opened` advertises the rest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: a tunnel ends when its window drops the Tunnel
The loop held its own handle and state sender, so once the window
closed nothing was left to stop it: it kept answering TestDelay and the
peer connection, CM row included, lived on until the peer went away.
`Tunnel` now owns a watch sender nobody sends on; the loop's receiver
errors when the last `Tunnel` drops, and the loop ends.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: one tunnel per mapping, bound to the authenticated target
The login latches `PortForward.host`/`port` into the session scope and
approval is shown that target, but a window-wide tunnel let any later
`open` name another target with only `enable-tunnel` rechecked. A
tunnel now belongs to one listener and serves the one target its login
authenticated: the controlled side refuses an `open` for any other
target, and a window with several targets uses one connection each,
approved on its own.
With one owner per tunnel the claim needs no waiters: `Establishing`,
`Claim::Wait` and `wait_ready` go, and `try_claim` becomes a plain
read. The CM label that followed a tunnel's targets goes with them; a
row shows its mapping's target, as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the legacy comment names the mapping, not the window
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: a window violation drops the channel on the spot
Both demultiplexers only queued a `Violation` and left the entry until
the channel task woke and exited, so a peer that kept sending past the
window queued one more entry per frame in the meantime, bounded by
nothing. The entry now goes the moment `accept` fails; later frames for
that id are unknown-channel noise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the login's target travels with the accept, not the handler
`listen()` wrote `lc.port_forward` (and, on this branch, `port_forward_mux`)
into the window's shared `LoginConfigHandler` before connecting, and
`create_login_msg` read them back only when the peer's `Hash` arrived.
Two mappings logging in at the same time could therefore swap targets:
on master that bridged a local socket to the wrong target, and with a
tunnel bound to its login's target it also left the mapping refusing
every later accept until it was recreated.
The target is now a `PortForward` carried by the interface clone that
handles one accept, passed explicitly down to `create_login_msg`; the
handler no longer has a field to race on. No lock spans the login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port_forward_mux: pin permission revocation and whole-tunnel failure in tests
Both already hold; the review asked for them to be stated. `enable-tunnel`
turned off mid-session refuses the next `open` while the live channel
keeps relaying, and a dead tunnel ends every channel on it together,
after which the next accept establishes again on the same `Tunnel`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the legacy comment names re-adding the mapping only
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the raw pipe runs the code it always ran
The multiplexed login had replaced `connect_and_login`, so a mapping
with the setting off, a peer without the feature, or a listener latched
`Legacy` still went through the tunnel's state machine, the capped
pre-read and the changed local-EOF rule. Feature off now means the old
code: `listen()` keeps its accept arm and `connect_and_login` as they
were, and the tunnel is a branch taken only when the setting is on, in
`establish_tunnel` with its own `connect_and_login_mux`. The one line
the raw path does differently is the target riding with the accept's
interface clone instead of the shared handler.
`get_port_forward_mux_enabled` had one caller and moves in here, so
`common.rs` is untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a UI login answers the challenge its own connection was given
`handle_login_from_ui` hashed the typed password against `lc.hash`, the
window's shared handler field, and the window's password prompt is
broadcast to every listener. With two mappings both waiting on that
prompt, the `Hash` that arrived last had overwritten the other's, so
one of the two answered the wrong challenge and failed to log in.
Master shares the same state and broadcasts the same way.
The `Hash` is now a parameter of the login; `Session` keeps it beside
the connection it belongs to, and the per-accept clone that
`with_port_forward` makes gets a slot of its own. `lc.hash` stays for
`handle_peer_info`, which only needs the salt, and that is per peer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a mapping without its hash waits for it before answering the prompt
The window's password prompt is broadcast to every mapping, and can
reach one whose own connection has not received its `Hash` yet. That
mapping used to answer anyway, with a digest over an empty challenge:
the peer refused it and counted a failed attempt, and the empty-salt
result was written into the shared `lc.password`, where the mapping that
prompted had just stored the right one and the next `handle_peer_info`
would persist whatever was there.
The connection's challenge is now `Option<Hash>`, `None` until
`handle_hash` runs, and `handle_login_from_ui` sends nothing without it.
The mapping that prompted stores the salted password in the shared
handler, and the waiting one logs in with that against its own challenge
when its `Hash` arrives, without prompting again.
Test: A answers its prompt, the same broadcast reaches B before its
hash, B sends nothing, B's hash arrives and its login carries B's
challenge and B's target with no dialog. It runs the real `handle_hash`
for B.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the tunnel's login is the raw pipe's, asked for by a window flag
Master's fix for the shared login slots (#16069) keeps the target and
the challenge in the window's `LoginConfigHandler` and serializes the
mappings' logins with a turn lock, all inside `port_forward.rs`. This
branch had carried a broader shape of the same fix, a `with_port_forward`
on `Interface` and the target and `Hash` as parameters through the login
functions, which every caller had to follow. That is gone: `Interface`,
`Session`, `create_login_msg`, `send_login`, `handle_hash` and
`handle_login_from_ui` are as on master.
What the tunnel needs on top is one bit in the login, `multiplex`. It is
a window flag beside `port_forward` in the handler, set once in `io_loop`
before the window's mappings start, so an accept's claim and its login
read the same value; the setting takes effect for windows opened after
it changes. `connect_and_login_mux` is now master's `connect_and_login`
with the tunnel's three differences and the same `hash_arrived` and
`login_from_ui` calls. The raw pipe is master's, line for line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* hbb_common: bump to main with rustdesk/hbb_common#595 merged
840c8ec..f94e3fe is that one merge: the five local settings custom
clients could not preset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the off switch gets a checkbox in Settings → General
`enable-port-forward-mux` was readable only by editing the config file.
It is a local setting of the controlling side, so it sits with the other
outgoing ones, after "Open connection in new tab", with a tooltip saying
what it does.
The two new keys are translated in every language. The three that the
mobile file manager added, "Export", "Export Logs" and "Import Folder",
were empty everywhere but five languages; they are filled in too, and
Korean's "xdp-portal-unavailable" with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* Urdu: fill the backlog of empty and missing translations
ur.rs had fallen behind: 104 keys carried an empty value and 35 keys the
other languages have were absent altogether. Both are filled in, the
missing ones in the order template.rs lists them.
Eight entries stay empty on purpose. They are keys that only ur.rs still
carries, absent from template.rs and from every other language, so their
English source cannot be recovered and nothing reads them:
remember_account_tip, os_account_desk_tip, another_user_login_*_tip,
xorg_not_found_*_tip and no_desktop_*_tip. Twelve more dead keys keep
the values they have; removing either group is a separate decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* Urdu: drop the keys template.rs no longer lists
The twenty keys removed here are absent from template.rs and from every
other language file; ur.rs was the only one still carrying them, eight
of them with no value at all. They are leftovers of features that are
gone: the plugin menu, the OS-account login prompts, the Xorg and
no-desktop errors.
ur.rs now holds exactly the template's key set, all of it translated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: closing the tunnel reaches channels parked on their socket
A channel whose far end neither reads nor writes has both relays parked
on the socket, not on the inbound queue, so `close_all` dropping the
queue's sender woke neither: the socket and both tasks lived on until
the far end hung up. Both sides now hold a per-tunnel teardown signal
that `run_channel` selects on beside its own cancel, and `close_all`
sends it after clearing the map.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a mapping latched to the raw pipe logs in without asking for the tunnel
The login copied the window's `port_forward_mux` into `multiplex`, so a
mapping that had latched to the raw pipe on an old peer kept asking for
the tunnel. Once that peer was upgraded it answered with a tunnel while
the controller switched to raw framing, and every later connection on
the mapping was dead until it was re-added. The login now carries its
own `port_forward_multiplex`, filled with the target under the turn
lock: the probe asks, the raw pipe does not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a channel opened as its tunnel closes still gets the teardown
`open` can straddle `close_all`: the claim passed, the frame receiver was
still alive, and the channel subscribed after the signal had gone out.
`watch::subscribe` marks earlier sends as seen, and the entry sits in a
map that was already cleared, so nothing would ever end it. The signal is
now a level: `close_all` raises it with `send_replace`, which stores even
with no channel live, and `run_channel` waits for the value rather than
for a change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the connect guard counts a live tunnel as connected
`connect_port_forward_if_needed` returned early only for a raw-pipe
socket; called again with a tunnel up it would have built a second
`PortForwardMux` and dropped every channel of the first. Not reachable
today, since the logon response is sent once, but the other checks in
this change already read `is_port_forward()`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* Urdu: the two terminal clipboard keys master added
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a tunnel's TCP stream refuses packets over twice MAX_FRAME
The codec takes a header declaring up to 1 GiB and hands the packet up
only once it has all arrived, so the channel window bounded what the
peer may send, not what this side buffers. Both sides now cap the codec
at 2 * MAX_FRAME as soon as multiplexing is agreed: a data frame with
its envelope and MAC fits with room to spare, and a header over the cap
ends the tunnel before a byte of payload is read. TCP only; the
WebSocket and WebRTC codecs carry caps of their own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a channel id still live when the counter comes round is skipped
The controller handed out `next_id` unchecked. 2^32 opens later it lands
on a channel still up: the entry here was replaced, while the peer,
which ignores an `open` for a live id, kept routing that id to the old
socket, so the new local connection's bytes went into the old target
connection. The id is now taken under the map's lock and advanced past
any id in use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dropdown beside Connect listed file transfer, camera and terminal
but not port forwarding, so reaching it meant having a card for the
peer. `connect` already takes `isTcpTunneling`; only the menu entry and
the parameter that carries it were missing.
Shown on desktop only. The peer card gates the same entry on `isDesktop`
because `connect` routes a tunnel through the desktop path alone; on web
it would have opened a plain remote session instead.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* AGENTS.md: require a regression-surface check before a change is done
The minimal-invasiveness rules say what to prefer; nothing made an
agent check the final diff against them, so a feature could still route
the old path through its new code while every principle was "followed".
This adds the gate: audit every modified existing path, keep feature-off
on the old code, report the regression surface, and treat an
unnecessarily rewritten legacy path as a review finding whatever the
tests say.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* AGENTS.md: a scope check before shared code is touched
The minimal-invasiveness rules are principles; this adds the stop
condition that makes them mechanical. A fix for one path stays in that
path, and an unrelated caller needing a placeholder argument to satisfy
a changed signature is the signal that it did not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* port forward: mappings take turns at the window's login slots
A window's mappings log in concurrently, and each login is built from
the shared `LoginConfigHandler`: `create_login_msg` reads
`port_forward`, which `listen()` set before connecting, and
`handle_login_from_ui` reads `hash`, which the last `Hash` to arrive
set. Two mappings logging in at once could swap targets, bridging a
local socket to the other's target, and answer each other's challenge,
failing one login. The window's password prompt is broadcast to every
mapping, so one whose `Hash` had not arrived answered with whatever the
handler held.
Each mapping now fills `port_forward` and `hash` and sends its login
under a per-window turn lock, and keeps its own `Hash` beside the
connection: a password typed before it arrived is left to the mapping
that prompted, which stores the salted password in the shared handler
for the others to log in with.
The fix stays in `port_forward.rs`. `LoginConfigHandler` gains the lock
and a setter for its private `hash`; `Interface`, `Session` and the
login functions keep their signatures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: the lock and the hash setter are crate-private; test the hash that arrives late on its real path
Both exist only so `port_forward.rs` can reach the handler's private
`hash`; neither is API.
The test for a password typed before a connection's hash ended by
answering the prompt again once the hash was there. What happens in the
code is that the hash's arrival runs `handle_hash`, which logs in with
the password the prompting mapping stored; the test now ends there, with
no preset password. Answering the prompt with one's own challenge while
the handler holds another's is a test of its own.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* port forward: a password typed before the connection's hash answers it when it comes
The previous commit dropped such a password, counting on the mapping
that prompted having stored it in the shared handler by the time this
connection's `Hash` arrived. The broadcast wakes both mappings at once
and `select!` picks between a ready `Hash` and a ready password at
random, so this one could reach `handle_hash` first, find the handler
empty, and prompt again.
The connection keeps the password until its `Hash` arrives and answers
with it then. `login_from_ui` takes the challenge it answers; the wait
is `connect_and_login`'s, in `hash_arrived`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The minimal-invasiveness rules say what to prefer; nothing made an
agent check the final diff against them, so a feature could still route
the old path through its new code while every principle was "followed".
This adds the gate: audit every modified existing path, keep feature-off
on the old code, report the regression surface, and treat an
unnecessarily rewritten legacy path as a review finding whatever the
tests say.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* connection: apply the non-video send timeout once the type is known
`Connection::start` set the send timeout before the login request had
arrived, when `file_transfer`, `port_forward_socket` and `terminal` were
all still unset, so every connection got `SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO` (12 s) and
the `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` branch never ran. A file transfer, terminal or
port forward whose peer stopped draining for 12 s — a Wi-Fi roam, a VPN
reconnect — was dropped.
The type-specific timeout is now set in `on_message` right after the
login request's union has been matched; `start` keeps the video figure
for the login phase.
`SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` also drops from 120 s to 30 s, the same horizon as
the 30 s read timeout: the timeout wraps a single `send`, so it only
fires when the peer makes no progress at all for that long, and beyond
30 s the read check would declare the same peer dead anyway. The raw
port-forward pipe's write to its local target shares the constant and
moves with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* connection: keep the raw port-forward local write at 120 s
`SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` also bounded `forward.send` in
`try_port_forward_loop`, the write to the local target, whose own idle
timeout is an hour. Lowering it to 30 s made a target that stops
draining for half a minute drop the whole tunnel. That write gets its
own constant at the value it always had.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
* connection: keep the non-video send timeout at its long-standing 120 s
Lowering `SEND_TIMEOUT_OTHER` to 30 s was a policy change on top of the
bug fix, argued from the 30 s read timeout, which measures something
else and cannot even run while a send is blocked. The constant goes
back to `SEND_TIMEOUT_VIDEO * 10`, where it has been since 2021, and
the raw port-forward loop's local write shares it again. What remains
is the fix alone: the type-specific timeout is chosen once the login
request has said what the connection is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZ49AbZJYfm8NTp5yDPMab
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keep the configured app name casing when renaming
the updated executable so legacy MSI custom actions
can terminate custom client processes.
Signed-off-by: fufesou <linlong1266@gmail.com>
